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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

FOR

FY 1982

AO 92940

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Prepared by

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)

February 1981

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PREFACE

↓ The FY 1982 edition of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report reflects our continuing effort to focus the report on the discussion of the manpower programs in each of the Service chapters. As part of that effort, we have cut the first four chapters of last year's report to two chapters that provide a more concise introduction to the report and statement of the manpower request. This year's Special Analyses include a chapter on recruit quality addressing the renorming of the military enlistment qualifications test (ASVAB) and the minimum standards on recruit quality imposed by the previous Congress. ↗

Although the Defense Manpower Requirements Report is an official report of the Secretary of Defense, its preparation is the personal work of many people in the OSD and Service staffs. To give credit where it is due, the Service chapters were pulled together by: Mr. Jim Moore - Army, LCDR Mike Witham - Navy, Maj. Bill Tehan - Marine Corps, and Capt. John Gorski - Air Force. The special analyses were written by: Dr. Steve Sellman - Recruit Quality, Mr. Pete Poulos - Productivity, and Ms. Elaine Babcock - Cost of Manpower. The overall coordination and all other chapters and analyses were the work of the Manpower Management Directorate of OAS (MRA&L).

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FY 1982 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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PART A - Defense Manpower Requirements

Part A presents a summary of the Department of Defense manpower program for Fiscal Year 1982. It describes each of the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs), summarizes manpower requirements for each DPPC, and explains the essential elements of U.S. defense policy from which manpower requirements are determined. It also describes the manpower requirements and achievements of each of the individual Services and the defense agencies.

Chapter I	-	Introduction
Chapter II	-	Summary of Requirements
Chapter III	-	Army
Chapter IV	-	Navy
Chapter V	-	Marine Corps
Chapter VI	-	Air Force
Chapter VII	-	Defense Agencies

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1982 in compliance with Section 138(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code.

This report should be read and used along with the following related Defense Department reports:

- I. The Report of Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request, and FY 1982 through FY 1986 Defense Programs.
- II. The FY 1982 Military Manpower Training Report.

This chapter discusses the following general topics:

- A. Reporting requirement.
- B. Content and organization of the report.
- C. Total Force - categories of Defense manpower.
- D. Manpower counting.
- E. The Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) language used throughout the report.

A. Reporting Requirement

Section 138(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code requires that the Secretary of Defense submit to the Congress a written report, not later than February 15 of each fiscal year, recommending the manpower requirements for the next fiscal year.

This law was amended by Public Law 94-361, The Defense Appropriation Authorization Act For FY 1977, to require a report on the military base structure.

This law was further amended by Public Law 96-107, the Department of Defense Authorization Act 1980, to read as follows:

"(A) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a written report, not later than February 15 of each fiscal year, recommending the annual active duty end strength level for each component of the armed forces for the next fiscal year and the annual civilian personnel end strength level for each component of the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year, and shall include in that report justification for the strength levels recommended and an explanation of the relationship

between the personnel strength levels recommended for that fiscal year and the national security policies of the United States in effect at the time. The justification and explanation shall specify in detail for all military forces (including each land force division, carrier and other major combatant vessel, air wing, and other comparable unit) the -

- (i) unit mission and capability;
- (ii) strategy which the unit supports; and
- (iii) area of deployment and illustrative areas of potential deployment, including a description of any United States commitment to defend such areas. (Note: Detailed deployment data are presented in Chapter XI.)

"(B) The Secretary of Defense shall also include in the report required under subparagraph (A) a detailed discussion of -

- (i) the manpower required for support and overhead functions within the armed forces and the Department of Defense;
- (ii) the relationship of the manpower required for support and overhead functions to the primary combat missions and support policies; and
- (iii) the manpower required to be stationed or assigned to duty in foreign countries and aboard vessels located outside the territorial limits of the United States, its territories, and possessions.

"(C) In such report, the Secretary of Defense shall also identify, define, and group by mission and by region the types of military bases, installations, and facilities and shall provide an explanation and justification of the relationship between this base structure and the proposed military force structure together with a comprehensive identification of base operating support costs and an evaluation of possible alternatives to reduce such costs.

"(D) The Secretary of Defense shall also include in such report with respect to each armed force under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department -

- (i) the estimated requirements in members on active duty during the next fiscal year;
- (ii) The estimated number of commissioned officers in each grade on active duty and to be promoted during the next fiscal year; and
- (iii) an analysis of the distribution by grade of commissioned officers on active duty at the time the report is prepared." (Note: These data are contained in Chapter II.)

B. Content and Organization of the Report

The report includes the Department of Defense manpower requests for active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian strengths incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1982. To assist Congress in considering authorizing legislation for FY 1983, the report also includes strengths requested by the Department of Defense for that fiscal year.

The report is organized into two major parts plus two annexes which are submitted separately.

Part A. Defense Manpower Requirements (Chapters I through VII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the FY 1982 manpower program. Chapters III through VII contain the details on manpower requirements for each of the military services and the defense agencies.

Part B. Special Analyses and Data (Chapters VIII through XII). This part contains special analyses or data on five subjects related to the Defense manpower program. Chapter VIII discusses recruit quality. Chapter IX presents the productivity program within the Department. Chapter X discusses the cost of manpower. Chapter XI presents data on forces and manpower by location. Chapter XII contains an audit trail of the structure changes within the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) that have occurred since the FY 1981 DMRR. These chapters are included because of special interest or request by the Congress.

Base Structure Annex. The Department will submit a Base Structure Annex in compliance with the reporting requirement. This annex will relate our FY 1982 base structure to the force structure for that period and will provide estimates of base operating support costs. The Base Structure Annex is forwarded to Congress, under separate cover, at the same time as this report.

Unit Annex. As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided which describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force. The Unit Annex also is forwarded to Congress, under separate cover, at the same time as this report.

C. Total Force - Categories of Defense Manpower

Defense manpower is divided into three categories: active military, reserve components, and civilians. Each of these categories of manpower contribute to the total U.S. military capability, hence, they constitute the "Total Force". A brief description of each category of manpower follows.

1. Active Military. The active military are those men and women who man: the combat units, those units which engage enemy forces; the combat support units, those units which provide support in the combat theater; and the other support units, those units, primarily in the continental United States, which require military incumbents, such as training and recruiting units. These men and women are on call twenty-

four hours a day and receive full-time military pay. There are about two million active duty military personnel.

2. Reserve Components. Reserve component manpower is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It comprises three elements: Selected Reserve units, Pretrained Individual Reservists, and a training pipeline. Selected Reserve units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform a wartime mission. Members of Selected Reserve units train throughout the year and participate annually in active duty training.

Pretrained Individual Reservists include Individual Mobilization Augmentees, members of the Inactive National Guard, and Individual Ready Reservists. The Individual Ready Reserve generally consists of people who have served recently in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have some period of obligated service remaining on their contract. The majority of the members in the Individual Ready Reserve do not participate in organized training.

The Standby Reserve generally consists of members who have completed their statutory six-year military obligation and have chosen to remain in the Standby Reserve. The Retired Reserve consists of former Reserve members who have retired and have transferred to the Retired Reserve. Members of the Standby and Retired Reserves do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They, as well as retirees from the active forces, may be mobilized by authority of Congress.

The reserve component manpower requested by the Department of Defense is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress. The Selected Reserve numbers over 900,000 people.

3. Civilians. Defense Department civilians provide support services to the active and reserve military in all of those functions which do not require a military incumbent. Of a total population of about 1,000,000 civilians, 67 percent repair airplanes, ships, and tanks; provide logistical support; or operate and maintain military installations. Another 11 percent provide research and development support, medical support, and communication support. A more detailed breakout of Defense civilian activities is in Chapter II.

4. Manpower Mix. The Defense Department attempts to fill each job with the least expensive form of manpower. This means active military personnel are generally the last choice. Jobs not requiring military personnel are done by civilians or, except for policy jobs, by contract depending on which is determined to be less costly. Jobs requiring military personnel are filled by reserves unless the unit's mission requires a higher state of readiness than can be maintained in a reserve status.

Although the general principle is minimizing cost, other factors may alter the mix in any specific case. Among these other factors are the rotation base, providing jobs for active military personnel in the United States to offset repeated tours in foreign countries or at sea, and personnel availability from inability to recruit a military or civilian or maldistribution in the separate ceilings imposed on active, reserve, and civilian manpower.

D. Manpower Counting

The manpower figures used in this report reflect strengths as of the end of a fiscal year. This is the number of people on, or expected to be on, departmental rolls or receiving drill pay at that time.

In the manpower authorization request (Chapter II), we show average strengths for the reserve components as required by section 138(b) of title 10, United States Code. Additionally, fiscal year end strengths are given.

Beginning in FY 1981, personnel employed under the part-time career employment program established by section 3402 of title 5, United States Code are counted as a fraction of full-time based on the number of hours worked, as set out in section 3404 of that title. The FY 1981 and FY 1982 civilian end strengths given reflect this accounting change.

E. Defense Planning and Programming Categories

The Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain defense manpower requirements.

The DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the ten Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources which can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber squadrons but the base support personnel which sustain these units. The DPPCs, on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, base support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for the management of resources; however, the DPPC system is particularly well suited for explaining how manpower resources are used. The DPPCs are listed below.

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

1. Strategic

Offensive Strategic Forces
Defensive Strategic Forces
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

2. Tactical/Mobility

Land Forces
Tactical Air Forces
Naval Forces
Mobility Forces

3. Auxiliary Activities

Intelligence
Centrally Managed Communications
Research and Development
Geophysical Activities

4. Support Activities

Base Operating Support
Medical Support
Personnel Support
Individual Training
Force Support Training
Central Logistics
Centralized Support Activities
Management Headquarters
Federal Agency Support

5. Individuals

Transients
Patients, Prisoners, and
 Holdees
Trainees and Students
Cadets

DPPC DEFINITIONS ^{1/}

1. STRATEGIC

The DPPCs in the Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces which have as their fundamental objective deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces, bases overseas, and our allies.

Offensive Strategic Forces

This category contains program elements for land-based ICBMs; sea-based SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines and supporting ships; long-range bombers and refueling tanker aircraft; strategic cruise missiles; and operational headquarters for these forces.

Defensive Strategic Forces

This category contains program elements for interceptor aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems, including directly supporting communications, command control, and surveillance and warning systems, and for support to the civil defense preparedness program.

^{1/} All DPPCs include the reserve components as appropriate.

Strategic Control and Surveillance

This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS); airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems; satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems; and supporting radar and optical sensor systems.

2. TACTICAL/MOBILITY

The DPPCs in the Tactical/Mobility category consist of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy and Marine Corps), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy).

Land Forces

This group consists of DPPCs for Army and Marine Corps comprising division forces and theater forces.

Division Forces

This category contains program elements for Army divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces; and for Marine Corps combat and combat support units (including helicopter support units of the Marine Air Wings). Program elements for the procurement and stockpiling of Army and Marine Corps war reserve materiel are also included in this category.

Theater Forces

This category contains Army program elements for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Alaska, Berlin, Panama Canal Zone, Iceland, and the Caribbean; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other services; theater psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare units; and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar earmarked reinforcing units in Forces Command.

Tactical Air Forces

This category contains program elements for Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; direct support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units, and weapon system security units; multipurpose aircraft carriers; air-launched tactical missile systems; tactical air control systems; Fleet Marine Forces direct support aircraft; and operational headquarters for these forces. Also included are program elements for Air Force resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) and war reserve materiel.

Naval Forces

The DPPCs in the Naval Forces group include the Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and supporting forces.

ASW and Fleet Air Defense Forces

This category contains program elements for surface combatant ships (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates), fixed wing and helicopter ASW squadrons, attack submarines, mines and mine countermeasures, and directly supporting forces. Also included are program elements for air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ordnance and missiles.

Amphibious Forces

This category contains program elements for amphibious assault ships, supporting ships and tactical support units, coastal/river forces, special warfare forces, explosive ordnance disposal forces, and inshore undersea warfare forces.

Naval Support Forces

This category contains program elements for carrier-on-board delivery squadrons, fleet support ships, underway replenishment ships, construction forces, deep submergence systems, and fleet telecommunications. Also included are program elements for tactical intelligence, war reserve materiel, and the TRITAC program.

Mobility Forces

This category contains program elements for strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift, sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. Program elements for corresponding or supporting reserve component units are also included in this category. This category also contains program elements for tactical medical airlift squadrons, air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, integral command and control systems, aerospace rescue and recovery, Air Force special mission forces, and the non-management headquarters activities within the Joint Deployment Agency.

3. AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES

The DPPCs in the auxiliary activities category consist of those major Defense-wide activities conducted under centralized OSD control. Included are DPPCs in the intelligence, centrally managed communications, research and development, and geophysical activities categories.

Intelligence

This category contains program elements for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of

Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program including intelligence communications.

Centrally Managed Communications

This category contains program elements for the long-haul Defense Communications System, the military service communications systems, satellite communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center.

Excluded are program elements for base and command communications, intelligence communications, and communications systems dedicated to strategic, tactical or WWMCCS missions.

Research and Development Activities

This category contains all research and development (Program 6) program elements, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the FYDP projection and except for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical and Personnel Support. Also excluded are operational systems development and other programs elements not in Program 6 but containing research and development resources.

Geophysical Activities

This category contains program elements for meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Air Force and Navy weather services, navigational satellites, oceanography, and mapping, charting and geodesy activities.

4. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for both combat and support installations; centralized activities, services and organizations providing medical and personnel support; individual and force support training; central logistics; management headquarters; federal agency support; and other centralized support activities.

Base Operating Support - Combat Installations

This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Program 1, 2, and 4), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions.

Base Operating Support - Support Installations

This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and

development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands (Program 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. Also included in this category are all family housing activities. These program elements include resources for installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

Medical Support

This category contains program elements for medical care in DoD military medical facilities, including medical centers, hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, infirmaries, and laboratories; and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research and medical equipment and systems.

Personnel Support

This category contains program elements for provision of varied service in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career training and intern programs. This category also includes research and development program elements for human factors and personnel development research.

Individual Training

This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of service training commands. Program elements include those for recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

Excluded are program elements for training conducted in operational units, training of organized crews and units, education and professional development of DoD civilian personnel, off-duty and voluntary education programs, and combat development activities.

Force Support Training

This category contains program elements for Air Force and Naval advanced flight training conducted by combat commands; Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct support of submarine, surface combatant, surveillance, and mine warfare forces; fleet level training at fleet training centers, submarine schools, and anti-submarine warfare schools; and certain Army and Marine Corps force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, Air Force combat crew training squadrons, and Army jungle and arctic training facilities.

Central Logistics

This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities.

Supply Operations

This category contains program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, and centralized procurement offices and for military personnel support to DLA. Includes resources for POL pipeline and tanker operations and other resources specifically identified and measurable to centralized supply operations.

Maintenance Operations

This category contains program elements for the centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities, and logistic centers.

Logistics Support Operations

This category contains program elements for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance. Specifically included are program elements for industrial preparedness, second destination transportation, property disposal, production engineering and testing, construction planning and design, operation of printing plants, storage and disposal of inactive equipment, logistics administrative support, and other centrally managed logistic support services.

Centralized Support Activities

This category contains miscellaneous service program elements which provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions which do not fit other DPPCs. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, combat developments, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, Defense Documentation Center, personnel administration, finance centers, audio-visual activities, criminal investigations, claims, service-wide support, OSD, JCS, and DCAA activities, and other miscellaneous support.

Management Headquarters

The DPPCs in this category consist of five DPPCs for Management Headquarters as defined in DoDD 5100.73, "Department Management Headquarters": Defense Agencies, International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, Service Support - Combat Commands, and Service Support - Service Commands.

Management Headquarters - Defense Agencies

This category contains the management headquarters program elements for OSD, OJCS, and the defense agencies. The defense agencies are discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

Management Headquarters - International Military Organizations

This category contains the program elements for the military services' support of the headquarters of international military organizations. Examples are: NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.

Management Headquarters - Unified Commands

This category contains the program elements for the military services' support of the headquarters of the unified commands. Examples are: US European Command, Pacific Command, etc.

Management Headquarters - Service Support - Combat Commands

This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of the combat commands, i.e., those in FYDP Programs 1, 2, and 4. Examples are: US Army, Europe; US Navy, Pacific Fleet; Strategic Air Command; etc.

Management Headquarters - Service Support - Service Commands

This category contains the program elements for the management headquarters of the military service support commands, i.e., organizations in FYDP Program 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Examples include: Service Secretariats, Air Force Training Command, Navy Material Command, etc.

Federal Agency Support *

This category contains program elements for military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

5. INDIVIDUALS

The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not considered force structure manpower and consist of transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, and cadets.

Transients

This category contains only the Transient program element which consists of active duty military personnel in travel, leave enroute, or temporary duty status (except for training) while on Permanent Change of Station orders.

Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

This category contains only the Personnel Holding Account program element which consists of active duty military personnel who are dropped from the assigned strength of an operational or training unit for reasons of medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation nonavailability.

Trainees, Students, and Cadets

This category contains those personnel with the resource identification codes of Active Service Officer Students, Active Service Enlisted Students, Active Service Enlisted Trainees, and Service Academy Cadets/Midshipmen.

CHAPTER II


SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower strength trends.

A. National Security Objectives, Policy, and Defense Manpower

The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international environment in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength, to fight when necessary, and to terminate conflicts on terms compatible with US national security interests. To those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American foreign policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1982.

The Defense manpower program is related to national security policy as shown in the following diagram.



Defense manpower comprises active and reserve military and civilian personnel. The size of the manpower program is based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The force structure for FY 1982 continues to be based on DoD's Total Force Policy which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to our success in wartime. In structuring our forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve whenever feasible to maintain as small a peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy permit. Selected Reserve units are available upon mobilization to bring

the total force to its required combat capability. These reserve units must also be responsive to call-up for limited periods without a declaration of war or national emergency. Active units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization; for immediate deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed; and for forward deployment in peacetime as a deterrent against major conflict.

Civilians are the third component of the Total Force, and they provide 25 percent of the Department's manpower. In addition to providing civilian leadership, the Department of Defense's civilians repair ships, tanks, trucks, and airplanes; maintain military installations; operate communication systems; do research and development; perform intelligence analyses; operate the supply systems; and perform many other functions that do not require military personnel. The Department constantly strives to make the most efficient use of its civilian workforce in order to keep the size of the work force to the lowest level possible. Work is contracted out when it can be done for less than in-house. Programs for increasing productivity have a high priority in the Department. However, in spite of these actions, there are powerful forces at work to increase the number of civilians required. Recent emphasis on increases in readiness and sustainability require more civilians in maintenance and supply functions. Borrowed military manpower must be replaced by civilians in order for the military personnel to man combat units. Increased procurement activity will require more civilians. In fact, the increased tempo in the Department will require more civilians in nearly every phase of DoD's activities.

The table on the following page is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1981 and FY 1982 compared to those that existed at the end of FY 1980.

The defense manpower required to support these forces follows.

Summary of Major Force Elements

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Strategic</u>			
ICBM/SLBM	1,662	1,573	1,597
Bombers (PAA) ^{1/}	376	376	376
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) ^{1/}			
Active	487	487	487
Guard/Reserve	128	128	128
Interceptor Squadrons			
Active	6	6	5
Guard/Reserve	10	10	10
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)	40	35	34
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>			
Land Forces			
Army Divisions			
Active	16	16	16
Guard	8	8	8
Army Separate Brigade/Regiments			
Active	9	9	9
Guard/Reserve ^{2/}	28	29	29
Marine Corps Divisions			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
Tactical Air Forces ^{3/}			
Air Force Squadrons			
Active	104	104	107
Guard/Reserve	56	56	59
Navy Squadrons			
Active	84	84	83
Reserve	16	16	16
Marine Corps Squadrons			
Active	30	30	30
Reserve	8	8	8
Naval Forces ^{4/}			
Carriers (active only)	13	12	13
Attack Submarines (active only)	78	87	94
Surface Combatants			
Active	177	188	195
Reserve	16	9	9
Amphibious Assault Ships			
Active	64	61	61
Reserve	3	6	6
Patrol Ships (active only)	1	1	6
ASW Aircraft Squadrons			
Active	52	52	52
Reserve	17	17	13
Mobility Forces			
Airlift Squadrons			
Active	34	34	34
Guard/Reserve ^{5/}	54	54	53
Sealift Ships			
Nucleus Fleet	79	77	77
Commercial Fleet	51	45	45

1/ Primary aircraft authorized.

2/ Includes four Reserve Component Brigades that roundout active divisions and one infantry brigade for school support upon mobilization.

3/ Includes tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, special operations, airborne TACS and TACCS, tanker/cargo (KC-10), and electronic combat squadrons.

4/ Excludes ships assigned to Strategic, RDT&E and Support Activities.

5/ Includes 17 strategic airlift Reserve Associate squadrons.

B. Manpower Request

As required by Section 138(c) of title 10, United States Code, the Department of Defense submitted to the Congress proposed legislation prescribing for FY 1982 and FY 1983 the authorized end strengths for active duty military personnel, the authorized average strengths for the Selected Reserve, and the authorized end strength for civilian personnel (direct and indirect hire). The active duty strength requests are as follows:

Active Duty Military Personnel (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
Army	786.3	786.4
Navy	549.7	547.9
Marine Corps	188.1	188.1
Air Force	569.5	577.5
Total	2,093.6	2,099.9

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

The following table reflects the Department of Defense manpower request for the Selected Reserve expressed in average strengths. The table also includes the corresponding end strength and the appropriate wartime manning requirement. Strengths shown for FY 1982 and FY 1983 reflect the inclusion of 10,615 individual mobilization augmentees not previously counted as part of the Selected Reserve. Navy Reserve strength for FY 1983 includes 12,023 full-time active duty reservists in the Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR). The TAR program will be transferred from the active to reserve authorization.

Selected Reserve Manpower (Thousands)

	<u>Average Strength</u>		<u>End Strength</u>		<u>Wartime Requirement</u>
	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Army National Guard	392.8	403.4	397.7	406.7	446.1
Army Reserve	230.3	243.1	236.6	249.0	285.8
Naval Reserve	87.4	99.4	87.4	99.4 ^{1/}	112.7
Marine Corps Reserve	37.0	37.7	38.5	39.7	42.0
Air National Guard	98.0	98.8	98.3	99.2	100.8
Air Force Reserve	62.8	64.9	64.0	65.7	67.8
DoD Total	908.3	947.3	922.5	959.8	1,055.2

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} This figure includes 87,400 selected Reservists and 12,023 TARs transferred from the active authorization to the reserve authorization in FY 1983.

The following table shows the number of reserve personnel on active duty in support of the reserve components. This full-time manpower is included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report beginning with FY 1980.

Full-Time Reserve Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Army National Guard	11.4	12.5
Army Reserve	6.3	6.9
Naval Reserve	0.2	12.2 ^{1/}
Marine Corps Reserve	0.9	0.9
Air National Guard	3.3	3.4
Air Force Reserve	0.7	0.7
DoD Total	22.8	36.6

^{1/} This strength includes 12,023 Navy TARS which are transferred from the active to the reserve authorization beginning in FY 1983.

The Department requests authorization for total DoD direct and indirect hire civilian employment, in military functions, for end FY 1982 and FY 1983 as follows:

Civilian Authorization Request ^{1/}
Direct and Indirect Hires, Military Functions
End Fiscal Year Strength

	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1983</u>
Total DoD	994,900	994,900 ^{2/}

^{1/} Includes approximately 56,000 National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also members of the Selected Reserve.

^{2/} Public Law 95-437, Federal Employee Part-Time Career Employment Act of 1978, requires that, beginning in FY 1981, part-time career employees be counted as a fraction of a full-time employee based on the number of hours worked. The Defense authorization request and, accordingly, the strengths in this report reflect the fractional counting for part-time employees.

Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the DoD Appropriation Authorization Act for FY 1977, the requested civilian authorization includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent, and temporary employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian employees:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs. Excluded under this category are: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and worker trainee opportunity programs. Employment in these categories, based on past experience, will be about 8,500 in FY 1982 and FY 1983.

2. National Security Agency employees are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions. Excluded are employees performing civil functions administered by DoD including Corps of Engineer Civil Works; cemeterial activities; and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil functions employment at the end of FY 1982 and FY 1983 is planned to be about 33,000.

The composition of the total DoD civilian request for FY 1982 is shown in the following table by component, direct and indirect hire.

Composition of Civilian Authorization Request for FY 1982

	<u>Direct Hire</u>	<u>Indirect Hire</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	306,859	53,057	359,916
Navy	298,507	10,832	309,339
Marine Corps 1/	(16,483)	(2,993)	(19,476)
Air Force	230,824	13,129	243,953
Defense Agencies	79,810	1,882	81,692
Total DoD	916,000	78,900	994,900

1/ Marine Corps civilians are included in Department of Navy strengths.

C. Manpower Overview

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Employment
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Actual</u>				<u>FY 82 Budget</u>	
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military						
Active	2,687	3,547	2,061	2,050 ^{2/}	2,065	2,094
Selected Reserve	953	922	788	851 ^{2/}	885	923
Civilian 1/	1,176	1,393	1,017	990	994	995

1/ Direct and indirect hires.

2/ Includes full-time reservists on active duty, beginning in FY 1980.

1. Active Military Strengths. The FY 1982 authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,093,600. This request is 28,244 greater than the planned FY 1981 end strength. Most of the increases are in combat forces and training support. The following table shows the shift in military manpower away from auxiliary and support activities since FY 1973.

Percent of Active Military Strength

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>FY 82 Budget</u>	
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Strategic/Tactical/Mobility Forces	45.9	49.8	51.0	50.8
Auxiliary and Support Activities	39.7	34.9	34.4	34.1
Individuals*	14.4	15.3	14.6	15.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Includes trainees, students, cadets, transients, patients and prisoners.

Specific details of the force improvements are in the Service chapters.

Highlights of the active military manpower trends by Service are provided in the following Sections:

Army

The Army's active military end strength increases by 11,000 between FY 1981 and FY 1982. This change provides the increased transient strength to support a reduction in European tour lengths for unaccompanied first-term enlistees to 18 months; increased trainee strength to permit the extension of initial entry enlisted training from seven weeks to eight weeks; and increased accessions in FY 1982 required to support the activation on one armor and two mechanized infantry battalions and three multiple launch rocket batteries in FY 1983.

Navy

The Navy will operate 487 ships in the active force in FY 1982. Twenty-five new ships will join the fleet, including the nuclear carrier CARL VINSON, six nuclear submarines and eleven destroyers. Two submarines and three auxiliary ships will be decommissioned and five frigates will be transferred to the reserve. The number of active aircraft squadrons will remain 122. The thrust of manpower programs for the active forces will be increased retention among career petty officers.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps continues to integrate manpower management and readiness enhancing initiatives. Unit deployment and computer based assignment models improve uniform readiness and reduce turbulence. Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) units form an integral part of the newly created Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. During FY 1981 and FY 1982 Tactical/Mobility manpower will increase while the Individuals account manpower decreases.

Air Force

The Air Force continues to program for full equipage, modernization, and manning of its 26 active tactical fighter wings. The Air Force is increasing support to space programs, new weapon systems, and increased

handling in aerial ports. The Air Force active military manpower program increases in the Individuals and training accounts are due to significant USAF initiatives to more adequately fund these areas. Finally, to insure that military are used for only military essential functions, the Air Force is reviewing all military positions and converting significant numbers of non-military essential positions to civilians.

2. Guard and Reserve Strengths. Selected Reserve end strengths for the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force had a substantial growth of 43,000 in FY 1980. FY 1981 and FY 1982 budget projections include programmed increases in anticipation of improved recruiting retention.

The primary category of pretrained manpower, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), continued its steady increase during FY 1980 from its low point in 1978. This increase of over 70,000 will be improved further by the IRR reenlistment bonus which begins in FY 1981. The programs for the peacetime management and wartime utilization of the other categories of pretrained manpower, the Inactive National Guard, the Standby Reserve and retired personnel, are expanding and improving.

3. Civilian Manpower. Defense civilian employment has decreased steadily since the peak of the Vietnam War (FY 1968). By 30 September 1980, civilian employment was 185,000 less than in pre-Vietnam peacetime (FY 1964). Civilian manpower is programmed to increase slightly in FY 1981 and FY 1982.

The programmed FY 1981 end strength of 994,300 is 8,300 higher than that authorized in the FY 1981 Defense Authorization Act (PL 96-352). That Act also allows the Secretary of Defense to exceed the authorized end strength by 2 percent if he deems it necessary. The Secretary is required to notify Congress if any portion of the 2 percent is to be used; this report constitutes that notification. 7,700 of the 8,300 increase in civilian end strength is due to delays in the completion of in-house versus contract cost comparison studies planned for FY 1980. The remaining increase of 600 is due to programmatic changes that have taken place since the President's FY 1981 Budget submission.

For the past several years, each fiscal year, the Congress has authorized a civilian end strength for the Department. Beginning in FY 1982, the Congress will, for the first time, authorize operations and maintenance (O&M) funds. Since almost all of the Department's civilians are paid from the O&M account, the Department believes that the imposition of both a fiscal ceiling and a civilian end strength ceiling would be redundant and unnecessary. Therefore, the Department recommends that the Congress not impose a civilian end strength ceiling and instead allow fiscal constraints to govern the size of the civilian workforce.

D. Summary of Manpower Requirements

The following tables summarizes the FY 1982 Defense manpower programs and compares them to the FY 1980 and FY 1981 programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

TABLE 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>95.5</u>	<u>94.5</u>	<u>94.3</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	74.2	72.9	73.5
Defensive Strategic Forces	8.6	8.4	7.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	12.7	13.2	13.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>924.5</u>	<u>958.3</u>	<u>967.9</u>
Land Forces	544.8	559.5	556.6
Tactical Air Forces	167.3	176.1	182.8
Naval Forces	175.9	185.4	189.7
Mobility Forces	36.5	37.3	38.8
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>96.8</u>	<u>95.7</u>	<u>96.9</u>
Intelligence	32.3	30.6	31.0
Centrally Managed Communications	31.7	31.6	32.0
Research and Development	23.0	23.7	23.8
Geophysical Activities	9.8	9.8	9.9
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>617.2</u>	<u>613.6</u>	<u>617.8</u>
Base Operating Support	305.0	299.2	298.5
Medical Support	39.8	40.3	41.1
Personnel Support	31.3	30.5	31.3
Individual Training	93.4	94.9	95.9
Force Support Training	43.5	43.5	45.3
Central Logistics	18.7	19.3	19.7
Centralized Support Activities	44.3	44.8	44.8
Management Headquarters	38.5	38.4	38.6
Federal Agency Support	2.7	2.7	2.7
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure Allowance</u>	<u>1,734.5</u>	<u>1,761.8</u>	<u>1,776.6</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>315.7</u>	<u>303.6</u>	<u>316.8</u>
Transients	73.1	70.3	75.8
Patients, Prisoners, and Holders	16.1	15.2	14.6
Students, Trainees	213.0	204.8	213.1
Cadets	13.3	13.2	13.2
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,050.1</u>	<u>2,065.4</u>	<u>2,093.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	FY 1980 Actual	FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget	FY 1982 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>23.1</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	12.9	12.9	12.9
Defensive Strategic Forces	10.0	10.1	9.5
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>660.1</u>	<u>686.9</u>	<u>712.6</u>
Land Forces	499.5	521.4	544.6
Tactical Air Forces	57.9	61.8	64.2
Naval Forces	51.0	52.3	52.4
Mobility Forces	51.7	51.3	51.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>19.8</u>
Intelligence	5.4	6.1	5.8
Centrally Managed Communications	12.5	11.3	11.8
Research and Development	1.2	0.8	0.8
Geophysical Activities	1.3	1.5	1.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>113.8</u>	<u>121.5</u>	<u>132.6</u>
Base Operating Support	38.3	35.6	36.3
Medical Support	12.1	13.5	15.1
Personnel Support	4.4	5.1	6.1
Individual Training	38.3	40.7	46.6
Force Support Training	0.6	0.5	0.5
Central Logistics	4.2	5.4	5.3
Centralized Support Activities	11.3	16.2	16.6
Management Headquarters	4.5	4.3	4.8
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.2	0.8
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure Allowance</u>	<u>817.8</u>	<u>851.7</u>	<u>888.1</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>32.7</u>	<u>33.6</u>	<u>34.5</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holders	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	32.7	33.6	34.4
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>850.9</u>	<u>885.4</u>	<u>922.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1980 Actual	FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget	FY 1982
<u>Strategic</u>			
Offensive Strategic Forces	9.9	10.0	10.1
Defensive Strategic Forces	4.8	4.9	5.1
Strategic Control and Surveillance	3.4	3.1	3.0
	1.7	1.8	1.9
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>			
Land Forces	57.0	59.6	62.3
Tactical Air Forces	22.8	23.8	25.8
Naval Forces	14.4	14.9	16.0
Mobility Forces	0.7	0.8	0.8
	19.1	20.0	19.8
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>			
Intelligence	95.0	91.7	91.1
Centrally Managed Communications	6.5	6.7	7.1
Research and Development	10.1	10.9	10.6
Geophysical Activities	68.3	64.0	63.2
	10.1	10.2	10.3
<u>Support Activities</u>			
Base Operating Support	828.3	832.9	831.2
Medical Support	341.1	336.4	333.7
Personnel Support	20.8	21.0	21.0
Individual Training	19.6	22.0	22.8
Force Support Training	20.9	21.2	20.0
Central Logistics	4.5	4.4	4.4
Centralized Support Activities	334.2	335.4	336.4
Management Headquarters	52.8	56.1	56.4
Federal Agency Support	34.6	36.3	36.4
	*	0.1	0.1
<u>Total</u>	990.2	994.3	994.9

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

E. Additional Military Manpower Data

Public Law 96-107, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1980, amended Section 138(c) of title 10, United States Code to require the Secretary of Defense to submit the following data, by Service, in the annual Defense Manpower Requirements Report: (1) the estimated requirements in numbers on active duty during the next fiscal year; (2) the estimated number of commissioned officers in each grade on active duty and to be promoted during the next fiscal year; and (3) an analysis of the distribution by grades of commissioned officers on active duty at the time the report is prepared. These data are in the following tables.

TABLE I. ESTIMATED NUMBER OF SERVICE MEMBERS ON ACTIVE DUTY (FY 1982)
(Programmed End Strength)

<u>MILITARY CATEGORIES</u>	<u>SERVICES</u>				<u>Totals</u>
	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	
Commissioned Officers	86,960	62,778	16,889	99,712	266,339
Warrant Officers	13,840	3,116	1,213	0	18,169
Enlisted Personnel	681,200	479,281	169,998	465,371	1,795,850
Cadets	<u>4,300</u>	<u>4,525</u>		<u>4,417</u>	<u>13,242</u>
TOTAL MILITARY	786,300	549,700	188,100	569,500	2,093,600

TABLE II. ESTIMATED NUMBER OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN EACH GRADE IN THE ACTIVE FORCES AND THE NUMBERS TO BE PROMOTED DURING THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR (1982)

Grades	SERVICES											
	Army			Navy			Marine Corps			Air Force		
	End Str	Prom	End Str	End Str	Prom	End Str	End Str	Prom	End Str	End Str	Prom	Totals
0-7+	414	54	262	39	11	68	352	55	1,096 ^{1/}	159		
0-6	4,486	777	3,827	582	118	580	5,204	973	14,097	2,450		
0-5	10,746	1,858	7,268	1,056	332	1,487	12,299	2,414	31,800	5,660		
0-4	15,808	3,030	12,470	2,224	556	2,885	18,298	3,467	49,461	9,277		
0-3	29,480	7,090	18,133	4,192	1,035	4,791	33,756	5,117	86,160	17,434		
0-2	11,893	7,626	9,332	4,724	1,621	4,368	16,378	7,940	41,971	21,911		
0-1	14,133	0	11,486	0	0	2,710	13,425	0	41,754	0		
Totals	86,960	20,435	62,778	12,817	3,673	16,889	99,712	19,966	266,339	56,891		

^{1/} When the number of general and flag officers paid from Reserve, Guard, and Civil Works appropriations is added to this number, the total is 1119.

TABLE III. DISTRIBUTION BY GRADE OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (30 NOV 1980)

Grades	SERVICES									
	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force		Totals	
	Reg	Res 1/	Reg	Res 1/	Reg	Res 1/	Reg	Res 1/	Reg	Res 1/
0-11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
0-10	9	0	8	0	2	0	13	0	32	0
0-9	35	1	31	0	7	0	39	0	112	1
0-8	169	2	86	2	23	1	118	1	396	6
0-7	213	2	131	2	32	0	181	0	557	4
0-6	4,298	314	3,364	210	548	19	4,939	188	13,149	731
0-5	9,134	1,975	6,975	697	1,489	23	11,591	1,169	29,189	3,864
0-4	9,553	6,519	10,692	1,872	2,776	89	13,785	4,435	36,806	12,915
0-3	11,421	16,994	11,237	5,530	4,125	584	20,619	14,226	47,402	37,334
0-2	3,886	7,112	4,739	5,080	2,338	2,015	2,296	8,897	23,259	23,104
0-1	4,948	8,010	3,648	6,156	877	1,746	1,763	14,345	11,236	30,257
Totals	43,667	40,929	40,911	19,549	12,217	4,477	55,344	43,261	152,139	108,216

Note: Regular (Reg), Reserve (Res)

1/ Includes only officers paid from active military personnel appropriations and not those who are paid from reserve military personnel appropriations.

CHAPTER III
ARMY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Army's manpower requirements in terms of its active military, reserve, and civilian manpower components for FY 1982. The Army's manpower requirements derive from the force structure required to accomplish its missions within the national military strategy.

As an aid to understanding the Army's manpower requirements and to highlight principal elements of its manpower program, this chapter provides:

- a summary of the primary methods used to determine the strength needed to accomplish the assigned missions of the Army;
- a review of significant manpower trends;
- a discussion of current Army initiatives to improve its management of manpower; and
- a detailed review of Army manpower requirements and manning priorities by Defense Planning and Programming Categories including an explanation of substantial changes between fiscal years.

The Army request for active military, reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1982 and FY 1983 is as follows:

Army Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Active Military	786.3	786.4
Selected Reserve Units		
Army National Guard	397.7	405.7
Army Reserve ^{1/}	236.6	249.0
Civilian	359.9	364.1

^{1/} Includes 8.6 Individual Mobilization Augmentees in FY 1982 and 9.6 in FY 1983.

The Army needs a manpower base sufficient to:

- Recruit, train, and maintain the total Army during peacetime for wartime responsiveness.
- Provide for timely and rapid expansion up to and including full mobilization and full deployment of the total Army in support of combat operations.
- Permit rapid expansion to support the deployed force and accommodate a mobilization surge, if necessary, to increase the force beyond 24 divisions for total mobilization.

An analysis of these requirements indicates:

a. Aggregate trained military manpower available in the event of mobilization is inadequate. Selective Reserve actual strength for end FY 1980 was 573,211, which is significantly below the wartime requirement of 714,500 for FY 1980 and is even further below the FY 1982 wartime requirement of 731,900. This shortfall underlines the need for special emphasis on procuring and retaining the necessary manpower in the active Army, Selected Reserve, and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to achieve the required levels.

b. The Army's capability to meet the full spectrum of Defense objectives for the 1980's may be difficult to achieve due to civilian reductions. The Army's authorized civilian manpower has been reduced by about 50,000 (from 409 to 360 thousand) during the period FY 1974 to FY 1982. This represents a 12 percent drawdown while currently documented work loads will increase by about 16 percent by 1986. Greater dependence upon the civilian component continues for support in training, supply, logistics, medical, procurement, scientific, and technical areas as well as managerial expertise to realize and meet the range of options in support of objectives. Civilian manpower is a critical pillar of the total Army. Force readiness could be improved significantly if civilian end strength were increased and the additional civilians used to replace military in support positions, thus allowing the military to be assigned to combat units. Constraining civilian end strength has a direct impact on force readiness and the soldier's quality of life. For example:

- (1) Borrowed military manpower (BMM) and other troop diversions increase to fill the work load shortfall.
- (2) Work force vacancies are created at the time of mobilization when BMM returns to its units. This is especially critical in terms of need when trained civilians are unavailable to fill critical support functions.
- (3) Morale of soldiers is lowered because they are not doing what they enlisted for.
- (4) Soldiers perceive that they are not being supported (i.e., less maintenance being performed, training support suffers, quality of life issues degraded) with the direct result of reduced readiness.

2. Major FY 1982 Force Structure Changes

a. Active Component

In Europe the combat support capability of US forces will be enhanced by the activation of one Missile Maintenance Company and one Corps Combat Support Aviation Company with Black Hawk aircraft, and the conversion of other divisional aviation units to the Black Hawk configuration. Additionally, increased capability will be provided to satellite communications, ammunition supply, transportation, and other service support units.

In CONUS the intelligence collection capability of CONUS-based forces will be improved by activating six Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) battalions, two CEWI companies, and two tactical exploitation battalions. Other improvements include the activation of one armor battalion in the 7th Infantry Division (to be stationed at Fort Irwin), one PATRIOT air defense battalion, and one combat aviation battalion. Combat support capability is improved by the activation of four tactical support companies and one Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) company, and the conversion of two 105mm field artillery battalions to a 155mm configuration.

While recognizing the need to enhance its combat and support forces, the Army must operate within a constrained resource environment. Competing demands for scarce active duty manpower have led to the reduction of the authorized level of organization (ALO) of four divisions and two brigades in CONUS and a modest reduction of European divisional and brigade authorizations (no change to current ALO). This brings all CONUS Active Army divisions (with the exception of the 82nd Airborne and the 24th Mechanized), brigades, and armored cavalry regiments to ALO 2 (roughly 92 percent of wartime requirements). Air Defense Artillery (ADA) spaces have been reduced in Europe to permit the sites on which the current units are located to be reconfigured to accept the introduction of new ADA systems.

In Korea, the previously planned inactivation of a HAWK battalion in FY 1981 and another battalion in FY 1982 will continue. The equipment and the mission of these units will be assumed by the Republic of Korea Army.

b. Reserve Components

In FY 1982 the Army National Guard (ARNG) will activate one CEWI Aerial Exploitation Battalion and two NBC Defense Companies and will convert one 155 mm field artillery battalion to an 8 inch battalion and eight 105 mm battalions to 155 mm.

The Army Reserve (USAR) will activate two divisional CEWI Battalions and five separate Brigade CEWI Companies in FY 1982.

B. Manpower Requirements Determination

1. General

Army manpower requirements are derived from analysis of wartime combat and support structures and essential peacetime support requirements. In meeting these requirements, the manning levels, the mix of units among active and reserve component forces, and the mix of military and civilian personnel are established within the constraints of resource availability.

a. Manpower Requirements Within TOE Units. Manpower requirements for Army units are developed through analytical techniques that take into account the nature of the mission. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) provides manpower and equipment levels for standard unit wartime mission accomplishment. The manpower requirements for a TOE unit are determined as follows:

- The mission and desired capabilities of the unit are determined, and the organizational entities required for mission accomplishment (e.g., firing sections, rifle squads, maintenance teams, mess teams) are identified.

- The number of combat type positions required in a TOE is dictated by tactical and organizational doctrine, the firepower desired, and/or the number of weapons included. Each weapon has a set number of operators (e.g., one man per rifle in a rifle squad, ten men per 155 mm field artillery firing section). Rifle squads or firing sections are aggregated into units to produce the optimal combat capability.

- The number of personnel required for TOE service and support activities (mess, maintenance, supply) is determined by the application of standard staffing criteria. These criteria are based on engineering data, tests, and experience. They are based on the assumption that in the wartime environment individuals will be available for duty twelve hours per day, seven days per week. Standard staffing criteria are revised and updated on a three-year cyclic basis.

A TOE prescribes the required structure, manpower, and equipment for five organizational options (from full manning to cadre levels) for a particular type of unit. These options provide a model for fielding the unit at full or reduced capability. A unit organized at full TOE capability is defined as having the minimum essential personnel and equipment for sustained operations. The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) is the authorization document for an actual unit. It shows the actual organizational option selected from the TOE, as amended by changes, to fit the unit to a specific geographical or operational environment and reflects manpower and equipment constraints. The approved MTOE document is the authority for the unit to requisition personnel and equipment.

b. Manpower Requirements Within TDA Units. Organizations developed to accomplish specific local support missions for which no appropriate TOE is available are displayed in Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA). TDA units are usually non-deployable units organized to fulfill mission, functional, and work load obligations at a fixed support establishment in CONUS or overseas.

The organizational structures of TDA units are developed to attain minimum essential staffing, the most effective use of personnel, and the most efficient operational capability. TDA units, unlike TOE units, may include civilian manpower.

Manpower requirements in TDA units are determined by manpower surveys conducted at least once every four years. Survey teams use functional analyses that relate performance to current functions and work load, organizational analyses to eliminate organizations that duplicate functions or interrupt a sequential flow of actions, and position analyses that use engineered standards to address the essentiality of the type and number of positions to the job to be accomplished.

TDA authorizations may be equal to or less than the recognized requirements as determined by the allocation of available resources. When authorizations are less than requirements, the reduced capability is defined in the unit's capability statement. Personnel and equipment requisitioning is based on authorizations, as it is in TOE units.

Most TDA activities substantially change their structure upon mobilization and thus need a new authorization document -- a mobilization TDA. Mobilization TDAs reflect increased or decreased work loads due to new missions. Savings in manpower are due to reduced or eliminated functions, longer work weeks, and the utilization of such additional assets as Mobilization Designees, Mobilization Augmentees, and (borrowed) military manpower diverted from uncommitted or late deploying units. Upon mobilization, unless otherwise stated in the mobilization message, MOB TDAs will replace their peacetime counterpart.

2. Manpower Management Improvements

a. General. Succeeding paragraphs address ongoing initiatives designed to improve those aspects of the manpower management process that relate specifically to the determination of requirements.

(1) Requirements Determination Initiatives

The Army has several initiatives designed to improve the manpower requirements determination process. Ongoing improvements include the following:

(a) Improvements in Army Staffing Criteria. A comprehensive program designed to improve the Army's manpower requirements determination process is being developed and tested. The improvement, which is based upon the use of work measurement techniques to develop staffing standards for Army-wide functions, is intended to replace the

current manpower survey program. A test application of this concept is being conducted on the civilian personnel function. A second application of this new methodology is scheduled to begin during the second quarter of FY 1982. Current Army plans include four such surveys each year. A collateral effort involves the use of summary level standards developed by the Army's work measurement effort and involves their adaptation to the manpower requirements determination process. To date, three such efforts have been submitted to HQDA for evaluation. Both the functional manpower evaluation and the expanded work measurement program will provide the supportable criteria needed to develop and defend the Army's manpower needs.

(b) Manpower Requirements Determination Procedure and Organization. A major effort is underway to develop, test, and implement functional manpower standards on an Army-wide basis. These standards will be integrated into the planning, programming, and budgeting process. The civilian personnel function is now being tested. Implementation of a comprehensive program will commence in FY 1981.

(c) Improvements to the Manpower Authorization Criteria (MACRIT) Program. In Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units, manpower requirements are determined by tactics, doctrine, and MACRIT. MACRIT basically addresses those non-supervisory positions subject to work load measurement (e.g., mechanics).

MACRIT are derived by dividing the time required to perform a work load measurable function by the time that the soldier is available to perform that function in a wartime environment. Both terms of this ratio are aggregates of numerous variables. In order to more accurately assess the individual impacts of these variables and produce a more refined and auditable MACRIT, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command has undertaken a pilot project to develop a computer simulation model. The model will be sensitive to input data from various combat scenarios that reflect current war plans, strategies, and battle field conditions.

Progress to date has been satisfactory with a demonstration of a maintenance function model on 21 October 1980. Very simply the model consists of three modules which interact in the following manner. The first module is a work load generator (e.g., damaged and destroyed equipment); the second is a resource pool (replacement parts, time to repair); the third is an output analysis which compares the first two modules and recommends the optimum manpower necessary to maintain an acceptable level of operational equipment. The anticipated completion date of the project is early in FY 1982.

Twenty-nine manyears have been approved for improving MACRIT in FY 1981. The bulk of these resources are devoted to the computer simulation effort. Personnel are working on modeling techniques, scenario writing, and research on availability factors and indirect productive time factors. An additional 13 manyears are programmed for FY 1982. In addition to the simulation model, these resources will be used to improve the field data collection in support of both the simulation effort and current MACRIT studies.

(d) Improved Techniques for Identifying Positions as Military or Civilian. An analysis is underway to develop quantitative techniques for identifying spaces as military or civilian positions. In addition, objective criteria will be established to determine whether the military positions should be enlisted or warrant or commissioned officers. An Army-wide test and analysis of the test will provide the basis for a final position identification handbook for use by Army commands and agencies. Final staffing will be completed in FY 1981. If the concept is acceptable, position identification will be phased in beginning in FY 1982.

(2) Manpower Management Information Systems. As acknowledged by the Army, an integrated manpower management information system is needed to improve management. Some of the more significant initiatives in this area are as follows:

(a) The Manpower Evaluation Tracking System (METS). METS is a three-phase program to monitor the utilization of manpower resources. It compares data from the Army's manpower, personnel, and financial accounting systems. This procedure will allow the Army to validate that manpower and related dollars are being used for the purposes for which they were justified and authorized. During Phase I, which was completed in FY 1980, the essential system structure was established to demonstrate both the feasibility and the capability of the METS project. During Phase II, scheduled for completion in FY 1982, METS will provide data to manage military manpower at the grade/skill level and evaluate civilian manpower under the new full-time equivalents concept. During Phase III, METS will be expanded to provide automated, remote access to the system by major commands and interested agencies.

(b) FORECAST. Active Army military manpower is presently programmed at an aggregate of officer and enlisted levels using a modeling system called Enlisted Loss Inventory Model - Computation of Manpower Programs Using Linear Programs (ELIM-COMPLIP). Although a highly successful tool, ELIM-COMPLIP is limited in that it actually models only the enlisted force and cannot discriminate by grade or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Officer computations are done externally and are manually entered into the ELIM-COMPLIP system so that they are available for the various reports that the system produces. A five-year project effort is underway to develop a more comprehensive system called FORECAST -- a multi-level, modular, integrated ADP system which will enable projection of active Army military strength (officer and enlisted) both in aggregate terms and by grade, skill, and unit. The system will provide an integrated approach for improved planning, programming, and budgeting and will better enable the Army to test the effects of alternative policies on the force. The system will be capable of operation in peacetime, partial mobilization, and full mobilization modes. As of end FY 1980, a prototype of the MOS level subsystem was finalized. During FY 1981, the production version of the MOS level subsystem will be completed and will be placed in operation in FY 1982. This new module will provide detailed skill and grade information that is consistent and integrated with the total active Army system.

(3) Mobilization. Several initiatives are underway that will have a direct impact on the mobilization manpower requirements determination process. These are:

(a) The alignment of unit deployment schedules and equipment availability.

(b) A time-phased casualty generation and estimation model to assess deployed manpower replacement requirements.

(c) A mobilization base requirements model to determine the CONUS base force structure and manpower required to mobilize, train, deploy, and sustain the total Army after mobilization.

These models, in tandem with the Total Army Analysis model (TAA) that generates the deployed and deploying force requirements for programming, will refine and more precisely quantify the true manpower requirements essential for full mobilization.

(4) Mission Area Analysis (MAA). Mission Area Analysis is an approach by which the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) process is integrated into a single cycle evaluation of the Army's requirements to perform its missions. This approach was partially introduced in late 1980 to affect the development of the FY 1983 - FY 1987 program. Mission Area Analysis is being applied to improve the planning function of the PPBS and to begin to shift staff focus from the current or near term force analyzed on a functional basis to a focus on the long term Army-wide requirements analyzed on a mission basis.

During the MAA process, various initiatives compete for priority with all related functional issues. This competition is based on their relative utility in resolving deficiencies in present capability. For instance, all manpower issues compete first against one another and finally against non-manpower initiatives according to their ability to improve Army capabilities. As the PPBS tools become better tuned to assist the MAA process and as the Army becomes more adept at viewing requirements across the traditionally established functional lines, the relative value of manpower initiatives will be better defined in terms that are quantifiable and mission-related.

C. Significant Program Highlights

1. Active Component

a. General. Recruiting efforts in FY 1980 enabled the active Army to make a major recovery from the FY 1979 end strength shortfall. The active Army reached a FY 1980 end strength of 776,536, a level 2,536 above the initial Army target and 164 under the Congressional authorization. This improved posture was achieved by increasing non-prior service enlistments from 142,156 in FY 1979 to 173,228 in FY 1980 and reenlistments from 80,732 in FY 1979 to 82,956 in FY 1980. Full recovery from the FY 1979 recruiting shortfall in terms of unit strengths, however,

is not anticipated until FY 1981 when the new soldiers recruited in FY 1980 complete their training and enter units of the Army. During FY 1980 the average manning of units in the field was 16,900 below peacetime requirements. This undermanning is projected to drop to 900 on the average during FY 1981 but rise again to about 3,000 on the average in FY 1982. However, the Army will find it more difficult to achieve its programmed end strengths in FY 1981 and beyond because of limitations on recruitment of non-high school graduates and test score category IV personnel. The FY 1981 Appropriations Act requires that 65 percent of all non prior service (NPS) male personnel enlisted into the Army must be high school graduates. In addition, the law was amended to require that not more than 25 percent of all NPS personnel enlisted into all the Armed Forces in FY 1981 can be Category IV (The Army has set its share of this restriction at 30 percent.); in FY 1982 this restriction remains at 25 percent but applies to each Service, rather than to the Armed Forces as a whole; in FY 1983 and subsequent years, the limit drops to 20 percent for each Service. In order for the Army to achieve its programmed end strengths within these Congressional restrictions, it must receive the resources requested for manpower initiatives planned for FY 1982 and beyond aimed at the recruiting and retention of soldiers.

b. Enlisted Procurement. Before FY 1977, the Army achieved virtually 100 percent of its quantity objectives while increasing the percent of High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG). Congress acted favorably on Army requests for recruiting resources for FY 1974 and FY 1975. Additionally, the economy of the nation was generally recessionary with a high level of teenage unemployment. In 1976, recruiting resources were reduced and pay levels were eroded at the time of an expanding national economy. These reductions continued through FY 1978. The Army, at first, was able to come close to meeting 100 percent of its recruiting requirements through increased recruiting experience and efficiency. By the first quarter of FY 1977, however, an improved economy, the erosion of pay and the historical benefits of military service, and inadequate recruiting resources began to show their effect in a downturn in the numbers of HSDG.

By FY 1979, internal actions and the carry-over effect of earlier expenditures were no longer sufficient to overcome the unfavorable trends in resources and environmental factors adversely affecting recruiting. The result was an active component end strength shortfall of 15,400 in FY 1979 and the lowest number of test category I-III A and HSDG accessions in the volunteer era. In FY 1980, with strong resource support from Congress, a recessionary economy, and improved recruiting management, the Army stopped the downward trend in HSDG accessions and essentially achieved its authorized end strength. However, it did not attract as many HSDG as desired. Actual active Army recruiting performance and projected requirements are shown in the table below.

	QUANTITY (thousands)					
	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>	<u>FY 1979</u>	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>
Total Accessions	180.7	134.4	142.2	173.2	145.4	152.8
% of objective	99.2	98.1	89.3	100.2		
NPS Male	153.4	106.5	112.1	136.0	102.8	110.2
% of objective	100.3	97.4	86.0	101.2		
NPS Female	15.0	17.5	17.2	22.2	24.6	25.6
% of objective	100.4	99.5	91.5	94.9		
PS	12.3.	10.4	12.9	15.0	18.0	17.0
% of objective	86.2	103.0	128.7	100.3		
	HSDG (in thousands)					
HSDG (M&F)	99.7	91.4	82.8	85.8	96.0	96.0
% NPS (M&F)	59.2	73.7	64.1	54.3	75.4	70.7

As the tables above show, in FY 1981 and beyond, not only must the end strength be achieved but also the number of HSDGs must be increased significantly from those achieved in FY 1979 and FY 1980. These tasks must be accomplished in a difficult recruiting environment characterized by a declining target population and increasing competition from other Services, colleges, universities, and civilian employers for the same youth population.

A non-high school graduate (NHSG) is twice as likely to leave the Army before completion of his/her first term of enlistment as is a high school graduate. As a group, male HSDG enlistees contribute 1.38 times as many man-years to the Army's strength as male NHSDG enlistees do during the period of the first and second enlistments. This results from the reduced attrition and higher reenlistments of HSDGs.

To attract the required numbers of HSDGs, the active Army has implemented a Recruiting Action Plan which targets the recruiting effort towards HSDGs. This plan includes a systematic high level review of the recruiting process to ensure that the Army's needs for recruiting resources are properly identified and presented. Highlights of this plan include a balanced resource package in terms of recruiters, advertising, enlistment options, and incentives designed to create a resource and incentive environment similar to that attained in FY 1975 and FY 1976, the years the Army achieved its highest numbers of HSDG accessions. The Army has also developed a plan to ensure total Army support for the recruiting mission and to carry the Army's need to the civilian community.

Because of delays in obtaining the additional recruiting resources that the Army requested for FY 1980 and the resultant decrease in the number and quality of accessions, additional resources have been requested for FY 1981. The Army considers the following actions necessary to achieve its long-term recruiting objective: the two-year enlistment option, a non-contributory educational incentive, greater utilization and flexibility for enlistment bonuses, modernization of the recruiting force, and a continuous commitment to pay comparability. These actions, along with greater involvement at all levels of the Army in the recruiting issue, are required to get back on track in active Army recruiting.

c. Officer Procurement. Procurement goals for active commissioned and warrant officers are shown below:

Active Officer Procurement Goals

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Programmed	11725	11523	10774
Actual	10874		

Although the active Army fell short of its programmed goal in FY 1980, the overall officer end strength increased by 1,329 over FY 1979 due to 729 fewer losses than projected.

Much of the future leadership of this country is on the college campus. The Expand the Base Program extends Army ROTC to 97 additional campuses in FY 1981 and FY 1982. This provides access to approximately 35,000 additional students. In FY 1980, 41 extension centers were added. In FY 1981, an additional 48 extension centers and eight host institutions will be added.

The Army ROTC scholarship is an incentive that generates interest and attracts high grade personnel to the ROTC program. Congress, recognizing the success of Army ROTC in its use of scholarships, increased the Army's scholarship authorization from 6,500 to 12,000. In FY 1981 and FY 1982, the Army will award the first 2,000 of these scholarships as two-year awards. With initiatives such as these, Army ROTC production is expected to increase over the next several years. In FY 1980, 6,343 officers were produced. In FY 1981 and FY 1982, it is projected that 6,642 and 6,900 officers, respectively, will be commissioned through ROTC. By FY 1985, Army ROTC has been given the goal of producing 10,500 officers per year.

Between FY 1980 and FY 1981, ROTC opening enrollment increased from 63,667 to 69,663, an 8.6 percent increase. In FY 1982, it is projected that enrollment will increase by 11 percent to an opening enrollment of 78,407.

Overall active Army officer retention has gradually improved since FY 1977. On the positive side, 2,703 officers were voluntarily separated in FY 1980 compared to 3,438 who resigned in FY 1977. FY 1980 company grade losses were 4,226 compared to 4,871 in FY 1977. On the negative side, voluntary retirements were up from 1,877 in FY 1977 to 2,638 in FY 1980.

In FY 1980, the active component experienced a shortage of 3,740 basic branch captains. This shortage was a result of insufficient lieutenant accessions during FY 1973 through FY 1976 rather than decreased retention. Although some shortage of captains is expected in FY 1981, this problem will be minimized through fully qualified promotion selection policies, reduction of the time-in-service requirement to 3-1/2 years, selective continuation on active duty, and voluntary recall of reserve component captains to active duty.

The most serious officer retention problem is the attrition of active component warrant officer aviators at the time they complete their initial service obligation. At the end of FY 1981, it is estimated that the Army will be short 892 warrant officer aviators. Shortage projections for FY 1982 through FY 1987 are in the 700-800 range. To reduce this shortage, the Army is pushing for legislation to equalize warrant officer flight pay with that of commissioned officers; cross training warrant officer pilots into fixed wing specialties to reduce the monotony of assignments; selecting more applicants for appointment to warrant officer with prior military service, as they tend to remain on active duty longer than those without prior service; and voluntarily recalling reserve component warrant officer aviators to active duty.

FY 1981 will usher in the transition to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). DOPMA will modernize the officer management system and make all Services compatible. The Army is programmed to reach the new DOPMA grade levels by year end FY 1982.

Initiatives in FY 1981 include the further development, refinement, and implementation of the total Army Officer Force Management Plan. This plan will establish the total Army officer objective force for the 1980s.

FY 1982 Active Officer Accessions

<u>Source</u>	
Basic Branch Officers	6976
USMA	(900)
ROTC	(4963)
OCS	(730)
Recall and miscellaneous	(383)
Army Medical Department (less ROTC and OCS)	2230
Chaplains	82
Judge Advocates General	226
Warrant Officers	1260
TOTAL	10,774

d. Enhanced Enlisted Grade Structure. One of the keys to an effective fighting force is having a qualified NCO of the right grade and MOS in every TOE position. As the Army implements its planned force modernization and supports such new requirements as full time manning, the need for NCOs in the Top 5 grades will increase.

To provide the necessary NCOs the Army recently revised its Enlisted Force Management Plan (EFMP). The plan establishes long range management goals designed to meet the requirements of the force and reduce turbulence. It focuses on the management of the career force, those with more than three years of experience, rather than on the first-term force. The revised plan, with a career content of 49.9 percent, calls for a Top 5 strength of 273,500 to support the additional force structure, accommodate the increased experience level, and maintain adequate promotion opportunity. This is 14,000 larger than the 1978 EFMP it replaces. The Army is budgeting for a Top 5 strength of 263,661 in FY 1982 and is programming a steady increase through FY 1986 when it is anticipated it will reach its objective.

e. Women in the Army. Army policy provides women the opportunity to serve in 94 percent of all officer, warrant officer, and enlisted specialties. This results in approximately 50 percent of all positions being open to women. It also permits women to be assigned to all units except battalion and smaller size units of infantry, armor, cannon field artillery, short range air defense artillery, and combat engineers. Army policy accepts the fact that women will serve in locations throughout the battlefield, will be expected to defend themselves and their units from attack, and will be exposed to the same risk of injury, death, or capture as their male counterparts. Men and women assigned to the same specialty are provided identical initial entry and advanced skill training.

The current Army program is to achieve an active end strength of 87,500 enlisted women by FY 1986 and to commission specific numbers of women officers each fiscal year through FY 1986. Female officer/warrant officer current and projected strengths are:

	30 September 80	<u>Female Officers/Warrant Officers</u>		
		<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>
Active 1/	7,609	8,528	9,230	11,531
USAR 2/	3,864	5,748	6,753	9,485
ARNG 2/	1,357	1,666	1,871	2,613
TOTAL	12,830	15,942	17,854	23,629

1/ Excludes USMA cadets.

2/ Specific numbers have not yet been established for the reserve components.

In spite of increased numbers of female recruiters and intensive management of the female recruiting market, the Army has been unable to recruit the numbers and types of women required since FY 1978. FY 1981 recruiting performance to date indicates another shortfall. The current and programmed female enlisted strengths are:

	30 September 80	Enlisted FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1986
Active	61,351	69,000	75,000	87,500
USAR 1/	25,267	25,600	27,500	36,000
ARNG 1/	15,383	17,698	18,849	20,000
TOTAL	102,001	112,298	121,349	143,500

1/ Specific numbers have not yet been established for the reserve components.

f. Force Design. In 1976, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) began what has now evolved into a major effort to redesign the Army's organizations for the 1980's, Division 86. Division 86 focuses on the Army's heavy (armored and mechanized) divisions. Its goal is to develop the optimal structure for employing the many new systems entering the inventory over the next decade. Division 86 has also served as the medium for developing and institutionalizing a methodology for future force design endeavors. This approach is now being applied to design the conceptual heavy corps (Corps 86) and the infantry division (Div 86). Most recently, TRADOC has begun a study of Echelons Above Corps (EAC). Collectively, these force design initiatives are known as Army 86.

g. Force Modernization. Programming manpower for modernization is a complex issue requiring a systematic approach. Actions underway in this area use an Army model as a vehicle for integration of manpower with new modernization systems. Significant elements include: the requirement that each System Acquisition Review Council address manpower requirements along with the system itself; the establishment of an Army Force Modernization Office in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff; and the establishment of affordability teams in various staff agencies. Affordability teams focus on the manpower impacts of new systems to include the detailed planning by the Military Personnel Center of the skills, training, and lead times required to man the new systems. Special attention is given to battlefield automation systems to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the larger number of highly skilled manpower requirements which are associated with these systems.

h. Training. Detailed analyses have shown the necessity for additional Initial Entry Training (IET) to improve soldier performance in battlefield survival skills. Although some expansion of enlisted IET will take place in FY 1981, full expansion will not occur until FY 1982. A more demanding Program of Instruction has been developed which extends the basic training portion of IET by one week, lengthens the training day, specifies new training tasks, provides for repetitive instruction, and establishes a more comprehensive end-of-course test. Expanded IET improves further the development of well-trained, motivated, and disciplined soldiers.

For officers, the education, training, and professional development requirements for Warrant Officers through Colonel are undergoing a thorough job/task analysis. This analysis has a scheduled completion date of 1986. Concurrently, a Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) will be established at Fort Leavenworth in FY 1981 to train staff officers between their seventh and ninth years of service, and officer basic courses will be expanded starting in FY 1982. Military Qualification Standards (MQS) are under development to define explicitly what officers must know and be able to do within their specialties from precommissioning through the first ten years of service.

Unit training is the number one peacetime mission of the Army. Primary focus should be on providing the opportunity for maneuver battalions to train as they will fight. However, the acreage required to create such a battlefield, the positioning of sufficient opposing forces to create a realistic threat, and the documentation required for realism are impractical at Army installations where combat units are now stationed. Consequently, an Army National Training Center (NTC) is being established as the principal tool for enhancing unit training. The NTC will provide the Army a training area where a total combat environment can be simulated and thus will increase the Army's combat readiness. By the end of FY 1984, 42 CONUS-based heavy combat battalion task forces will rotate each year to the National Training Center for two weeks training.

The Center will be phased into full operation over the next four years. Approximately 300 military and civilian personnel were on site by the end of 1980. By the end of FY 1981 a total of 2,400 military and 382 civilians will be assigned to the Center. Additional personnel will be assigned to Ft. Irwin in FY 1982, bringing the final installation complement to 2,840 military and 740 civilians, of which 1,867 military are in existing or programmed TOE units.

2. Reserve Components

a. Strength Trends. In FY 1971 the ARNG and USAR strengths were about 400,000 and 260,000 respectively. However, by FY 1978 due largely to the Army's inability to replace people who joined in the late 1960's and early 1970's (many of whom were draft motivated), this strength declined significantly. Both the USAR and ARNG have shown significant increases in strength in FY 1979 and FY 1980. In FY 1982 both, however, will remain below their required wartime units strength levels of 446,100 for the ARNG and 285,800 for the USAR.

Reserve Component Strengths

FY	Congressionally Authorized Average Paid Strength	ARNG	
		Actual Average Paid Strength	Actual End of Year Paid Strength
1977	390,000	358,793	354,706
1978	382,000	347,646	340,996
1979	362,200	343,677	345,528
1980	355,700	353,189	366,585
1981	371,300		
1982	392,800 (Requested)		

FY	Congressionally Authorized Average Paid Strength	USAR	
		Actual Average Paid Strength	Actual End of Year Paid Strength
1977	212,400	190,361	189,420
1978	211,300	188,880	185,753
1979	195,750	186,843	192,539
1980	197,400	198,352	206,626
1981	204,500		
1982	230,300 (Requested)		

(1) ARNG. During the period of declining strength, a concerted effort to man the force began that reached all levels and units of the Army National Guard. As part of this effort, an enlistment and reenlistment incentive program was implemented in early FY 1979. Stabilization of the strength trend was apparent by mid-year FY 1979, and a steady strength increase began. FY 1980 proved to be an extremely successful period. This success has been attributed to the incentive program and other initiatives which included cash bonuses for enlistment and reenlistment; educational assistance for enlistment; shorter optional enlistment terms; incremental initial active duty training options; and increased use of full-time support, particularly of the unit level. The reenlistment/extension bonus was awarded to the people in the highest priority units, which represented 15 percent of the enlisted Army National Guard structure, while enlistment incentives were awarded to people in high priority units, which represented 47 percent of the enlisted structure spaces. The positive effects of these programs were obvious because those units authorized to award incentives increased in strength at a significantly higher rate than units not authorized incentives. Such programs are expected to continue the upward trend in strength so that the ARNG can reach an aggregate paid strength of 385,776 by end FY 1981 and 397,651 by end FY 1982.

Total ARNG enlistments for FY 1980 were 96,106 (49,334 non-prior service and 46,772 prior service), 102 percent of the programmed objective. The recent upward trend in manpower reflects an increase in NPS enlistments relative to prior service enlistments. This is attributable to a highly motivated and professional ARNG Full-Time Recruiting Force as well as the continued emphasis placed on incentive programs, improved

enlistment options (expansion of split training to cover all military occupational specialties), and increased recruiting resources (additional recruiter vehicles and communication support). In addition, extension of enlistments increased by 3,000 from FY 1979 to a total of 83,135. Rates for extensions were up in both categories (First termers--53.4 percent and Careerists--71.0 percent) exceeding the ARNG goal of 50 and 68 percent respectively. The overall rate of 68.2 percent as compared to the 64.6 percent rate in FY 1979 further exemplifies the successful enlistment/reenlistment effort of FY 1980. The reenlistment portion of the Selected Reserve Incentive Program is being expanded in FY 1981 to include critical skills in units not already designated for the bonus. This will increase the coverage from the current level of 15 percent of the ARNG structure strength to 54 percent by FY 1981, and that percentage will continue to increase through FY 1986.

Equally important to the achievement of increased manning within the ARNG is the reduction of losses. The AFNG is making significant strides in reducing both ETS (expiration of term of service) and non-ETS losses through its attrition management initiatives. In 1980 guidance was disseminated to all states to screen their first term potential attrition losses. The screening program was designed to preclude the loss of individuals being considered for separation if the individual:

- Has completed basic training or at least eight weeks of one-station-unit training.

- Has not completed military service obligation (MSO).

- Is not serving on any type of active duty for training.

Individuals meeting these criteria who have remaining statutory or contractual obligation to the ARNG will be transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) or retained in the Inactive National Guard (ING) in lieu of discharge. Discharge is used when it is the only reasonable course of action in dealing with Guard members who are unwilling or unable to satisfactorily fulfill training requirements.

With the approval of the FY 1981 Appropriations Bill, the Inactive National Guard and the Individual Ready Reserve will be offered a reenlistment bonus for non-obligors with fewer than ten years of total service. The bonus is designed to promote the reenlistment of between 15 and 25 percent of the eligible personnel who would otherwise be mobilization losses.

(2) USAR. The FY 1980 end-year paid strength increased by approximately 14,000 over FY 1979. The USAR's desired end strength goal in peacetime is 260,000. Strength gains are expected to continue in FY 1981 and FY 1982. The increase in end strength can be attributed to a variety of actions. The recruiting force has used the incentives available to enlist and retain personnel in the high priority units and personnel with critical skills. The benefit of these incentives is reflected in strength gains between November 1978 and July 1980 of 13.1 percent in units that offer both enlistment and reenlistment

incentives, and 8.2 percent gains in units that offer the enlistment incentive only, as compared to a 4.6 percent gain of units that offer no bonuses. In FY 1980, 59,311 soldiers enlisted in the USAR, 100.5 percent of the objective. Although 53,553 losses were programmed in FY 1980, the application of the reenlistment incentives and other non-quantifiable factors reduced actual losses to 46,414. The combination of enlistments and improved retention accounts for the increasing strength in the USAR. In FY 1981 and FY 1982 all of the incentives which contributed to the FY 1980 successes will continue. The incentive programs for FY 1981 and FY 1982 call for an increase in the educational bonus from \$2,000 to \$4,000 over a six year period, expansion of the units eligible to receive bonuses under the Selected Reserve Incentive Program provisions for an affiliation bonus, and a new bonus program in FY 1982 for prior service personnel.

One of the Army's most serious concerns is that, should we have to mobilize today, not nearly enough trained personnel would be readily available to meet manpower requirements. The primary source of rapidly available, pre-trained assets is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The strength of the IRR was approximately 205,000 at the end of FY 1980, which is below the IRR inventory objective. The forecast is for the strength to increase approximately 50,000 by the end of FY 1982 because of initiatives implemented during FY 1981 and earlier. These initiatives include reenlistment bonuses, transfer to IRR in lieu of discharge of some soldiers who fail to complete their active service commitment, extension of the period of obligated service for women, and other management actions designed to contribute to IRR strength. A portion of the remaining manpower requirement could be made up by the Standby Reserve and retired personnel. These topics are discussed in the mobilization manpower section of this report.

b. Officer Procurement

(1) During FY 1980, several new Army National Guard (ARNG) officer procurement programs were initiated while existing programs were expanded. In one new program junior officers and warrant officers leaving active duty are contacted in an effort to encourage them to join the ARNG. Implementation of the College Student Program, which authorized State Adjutants General to enlist college sophomores attending non-ROTC colleges, provides the State OCS Programs with additional personnel to meet ARNG unit requirements for junior officers. It interfaces with the Minority Recruiting Effort in opening up untapped resources of minority colleges that are not associated with the Army ROTC program. The ARNG has also fielded a Chaplain Candidate Program. This program recruits seminary and theological students and will assist in alleviating chaplain shortages. Other expanded programs include Unlimited Overstrength for Certain Army Medical Department Personnel, Direct Appointment, 25 Percent Company-Grade Overstrength, and Reserve of the Army Medical/Dental Student Commissioning. It is anticipated that implementation of these programs will greatly assist the ARNG in achieving its FY 1982 goal of 38,788 officers.

(2) The USAR must acquire about 7,100 officers annually to maintain current strength levels. Most of these officers will come from the IRR. In order to obtain the officer accessions to meet current and projected needs, ROTC output for officers assigned Reserve forces duty will have to increase. The USAR has also developed and fielded a Chaplain Candidate Program to meet its requirements for chaplains.

c. Initiatives to Reduce Manpower Shortfall in Units. To increase reserve component unit strength in peacetime, the Army in FY 1981 and FY 1982 is increasing the full-time recruiter force and the recruiting and advertising budgets, continuing the US Army Recruiting Command's mission to recruit for the US Army Reserve, increasing man-day spaces for recruiting and retention functions by troop program unit members, maintaining the "split training" program geared to appeal to students and seasonal workers (This program permits non-prior service personnel to enlist in the Ready Reserve with initial active duty training split into two separate increments up to one year apart.), continuing to offer shorter enlistment terms, and initiating an aggressive attrition control program. The Army is also offering enlistment and reenlistment incentives for reserve component personnel in selected units and critical skills. Eligible enlistees may select a cash bonus of \$1,500 or educational assistance of up to \$4,000 for enlisting in certain designated units; reenlistees with nine or fewer years of service can receive a reenlistment bonus of either \$1,800 for a six-year reenlistment or \$900 for a three-year reenlistment in a designated unit. In FY 1981, an affiliation incentive of \$25 a month for each month of remaining military service obligation that an individual spends in a Selective Reserve unit has been initiated, and a test program for loan forgiveness for educational assistance has been instituted. Also legislative authority has been requested for the initiation in FY 1982 of a prior service enlistment incentive of \$1,800 for a six-year enlistment.

d. Initiatives to Increase Manpower in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The size of the IRR should continue to grow in FY 1981 as women, who enlisted in FY 1978 and for the first time incurred a six-year service obligation, complete their three-year active duty tours and begin to enter the IRR. To increase the strength of the IRR even more, the Army is offering a \$600 reenlistment incentive in FY 1981 for personnel reenlisting in the IRR in designated military occupational specialties critical to mobilization needs. In FY 1982 there are no new programmed initiatives to increase this pool of trained manpower.

e. Initiatives to Improve the Management of Manpower Assets. The Army is improving the management of its manpower assets in FY 1982 through the following actions:

(1) Programming additional positions for the Reserve Components Personnel Administration Center to be filled by members of the Individual Ready Reserve. This results in better and more training opportunities and professional development for IRR personnel.

(2) Increasing full-time manning towards a goal of eight percent of the authorized strength to provide the resources for improved management, administration, and planning of training. This allows units to make maximum use of unit assemblies for training. As part of the Army's Full-Time Support Program, reserve component (RC) personnel in full-time military status will continue to be added during FY 1981 to RC Roundout units, early deploying mission essential units, and essential early mobilizing units to improve RC readiness and response time. Active component military are also included in this program.

(3) In accordance with OSD directions to all Services, the Army is developing an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program with a 1 October 1981 implementation target date. The IMA concept will permit rapid fill and increased operational capability of Active Army units in an emergency. Ready Reserve volunteers--Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)--will be assigned to active unit wartime-required positions not authorized at peacetime levels of organization. IMA will be available under the President's authority to mobilize units and members of the Selected Reserve (100,000 call-up).

After transfer of Mobilization Designees (Category D) to the Selected Reserve as IMA, first priority for assignments of additional IMA will be to active Rapid Deployment--Army (RDF-A) units, active units in the continental US base needed to deploy the force, and active units that deploy early in a general war scenario.

Other than annual training funds now programmed for mobilization designees in IRR Category D, resources for IMA training have yet to be identified. Volunteers will be expected to live within commuting distance of their assigned unit to broaden training opportunities. However, even with this advantage, gaining commanders will have a difficult task in establishing programs to integrate IMA into unit training. Each IMA must be provided sufficient days of training each year to permit participation in unit tests and exercises and to maintain skill development. The unit commander will have to be given flexibility to be able to meet the training needs of each individual in support of the unit's mission. The additional training burden and administrative requirements must be offset with sufficient resources to avoid degradation of unit peacetime readiness requirements.

Success of this program will depend upon the establishment of an expanded reserve training mission by Army major commanders, and the provision of adequate resources to permit them to administer and train the reserves assigned to their commands.

f. Army Affiliation Program. The Army plans to add high priority RC units to the Affiliation Program during the period FY 1981 through FY 1983. This expansion should bring the total of RC affiliated units to over 500. This expansion program complements the CAPSTONE program which aligns active and reserve component units into their wartime structure to enhance peacetime planning and training for a smoother transition to wartime operations.

g. Technician Conversion Program. A two year test program, which was terminated by Congress on 30 June 1980, was designed to measure the reserve's ability to attract and retain qualified personnel in a full-time military status. The Army goal of filling 4,437 such positions in this program (3,161 Guard, 1,276 Reserve) was met despite difficulty in attracting Guard members/Reservists to blue-collar jobs. The Army has recommended continuation of the technician conversion program as provided by the FY 1981 budget (2,473 Guard, 436 Reserve) with the flexibility to determine the mix and size of employment categories (military and civilian) to best support Guard and Reserve missions for FY 1982 and beyond. The Army recommendation is included in the DoD report which was submitted to Congress in December 1980. The House Appropriation Bill directed that no further fill of technician positions take place before 31 March 1981, and after that date only if approved by reprogramming. The present program does not provide additional civilian end strength to replace the budgeted reduction for the FY 1981 conversion program. The Army plans to request reprogramming approval to complete the budgeted FY 1981 conversion program.

h. Mobilization Manpower. In the event of a major conflict, such as a NATO/Warsaw Pact war in Europe, active and reserve component units would require substantial augmentation to achieve full wartime strength. Additional large numbers of pretrained individuals would also be required as casualty replacements until inductees could be trained and transported to the theater of operations. These individuals would come mainly from three sources whose combined output is presently insufficient to meet the time-phased requirements: training base output, which would be at a low level until almost 100 days after the current Selective Service System began to produce inductees; members of the Individual Ready Reserve and the Standby Reserve (the combined strength of which stopped its sustained decline in 1980); and personnel drawn from the CONUS base and later deploying units. In addition, the Army is also conducting a pilot test of a system for the post-mobilization recall of retired personnel for use in CONUS installations to meet the expanding personnel requirements of the Army's mobilization base. The program will be expanded in 1981 when approximately 80,000 retirees will receive preassignment orders directing them to report to specific mobilization stations after media announcements of mobilization. An appeal for volunteers from among former soldiers could also provide additional pretrained personnel who would require minimum retraining.

During FY 1980, the Selective Service System was funded to conduct registration of males in the 19-to 20-year-old groups. This registration will continue during FY 1981 to encompass 18-year-olds. The institution of peacetime registration will serve to reduce significantly the time required to deliver the first inductees for training and, consequently, provide trained inductees to the force much earlier.

Appeals would be made for non-prior service volunteers in an effort to keep the training base operating at capacity until the Selective Service System produced sufficient inductees. Dependence on this uncertain source will be reduced as the Selective Service System is revitalized.

Exercise PROUD SPIRIT, in coordination with civil exercise REX 80B, was held during the period 6-18 November 1980. It was designed to review mobilization and deployment procedures for the US Government. Significant problem areas identified as a result of these exercises were the lack of sufficient active or reserve health professionals (i.e., doctors, nurses, medical technicians) to satisfy peace or wartime needs and the lack of enabling legislative authority to stop the losses of required military personnel in a timely manner in civil or mobilization situations short of declared war. Solutions to these problems are under study.

3. Civilian Component

The Army seeks the best use of its military - civilian manning and contracted manning to support mission accomplishment. Army policy has been to use civilians or cost effective contract services rather than military personnel except where prohibited by law or where military personnel are required for training, discipline, rotation base, and combat effectiveness. Reductions of Army civilian manpower have made this policy difficult to implement.

For FY 1980, actual civilian end strength, which included 1,600 temporaries for Cuban Refugee Support and 800 summer hires, was 360,508. The authorized level for FY 1980 was 361,739, which included a restoration of 2,639 spaces for Commercial and Industrial-Type Activities based on decisions made to retain the functions in-house. The direct hire, full-time permanent employment level was 286,381 or 4,779 below the adjusted authorization of 291,100. This shortfall in employment is a direct result of the Presidential Hiring Limitation implemented on 29 February 1980.

The FY 1981 civilian strength is currently budgeted at 360,633. This level represents a 1,600 civilian end strength reduction for the Army's portion of the FY 1981 Authorization Conference Report, which reduced the Department of Defense by 4,000 civilians, as well as an additional reduction which occurred during the final phases of the FY 1982 budget process. As an indication of the Army's need for additional civilian manpower, borrowed military manpower (BMM) and other troop diversions (personnel performing duties other than their normally assigned duties) have risen and are calculated to be in the 25,000 to 28,000 range. If additional civilian end strength were provided the Army, most of these military diversions could be returned to their units to improve combat effectiveness, unit cohesion and individual training. In FY 1981 the Army calculates that it would need 10,000 additional civilian spaces to begin to replace this BMM and improve force readiness.

FY 1982 data indicate that the civilian work force is still shrinking in size, relative to the work loads imposed. The FY 1982 civilian strength is currently budgeted at 359,916. Force structure changes; force modernization initiatives; volunteer Army support; and new missions, such as the Panama Canal support; and single manager responsibility for conventional ammunition have all caused increased work loads. In order to continue the initiatives of the FY 1981 program without major staffing difficulties, an additional 30,000 civilian spaces (an increase of 20,000 spaces over the FY 1981 requirement) are required for FY 1982. During

FY 1983 through FY 1986, the Army calculates that the civilian work force requirement will increase to 425,000 spaces to accommodate current initiatives (i.e., improved wholesale logistics, reduction of the supply and maintenance backlog, increased near term readiness, as well as increased flexibility required for modernization).

Civilians are an essential element to the total Army Force. They provide vital support for readiness, sustainability, and mobilization capabilities in such areas as intelligence, communications, research and development, training, administration, medical, logistical, and reserve component support. The bulk of installation operations, essential depot maintenance, and distribution of equipment is performed by civilians in support of the peacetime, mobilization, and wartime Army mission areas. Currently, Army data indicate that there are reduced capabilities in these areas due to civilian manpower constraints. These shortfalls not only reduce support of near-term readiness but may adversely impact on the ability of the Army to carry out its peacetime mission, the transition to war. Existing manpower levels are inadequate to support even the initial phases of mobilization. At mobilization, the 14,000 to 16,000 soldiers who are borrowed labor plus the 10,000 to 12,000 other troop diversions from combat, combat support, and combat service support units required to fill validated civilian positions will return to their parent units. This will leave installations in an emergency situation without the required numbers of trained civilian workers to support mobilization requirements. During exercise PROUD SPIRIT/MOBEX 80, the Army demonstrated a requirement to increase substantially the civilian work force during the early phases of mobilization. More analysis of this problem is necessary before specific solutions can be prepared.

4. Commercial and Industrial-Type Activities (CITA) Program. The purpose of the Commercial and Industrial-Type Activities program, prescribed by the March 1979 OMB Circular A-76, is to increase the reliance on the private sector for goods and services. All Army functions must be reviewed to determine if in-house operation is required for certain defined reasons, such as national defense. If it is not required, a rigorous cost comparison analysis must be performed to determine if in-house or contract operation is more cost-effective to the Government. If the results indicate contracting out to be more advantageous to the government, the activity must be converted to contract operations by the private sector.

In FY 1979, 20 CITA cost studies were completed. For FY 1980, the Army announced to Congress that about 300 cost studies in activities containing over 7,000 civilian and 1,600 military spaces would be performed. New legislative requirements, coupled with litigation and union negotiations, as well as the long lead times to perform cost studies, caused most of the FY 1980 program to slip to FY 1981. The final results of the FY 1979 schedule and the FY 1980 schedule as of 17 December 1980 are shown below.

	NUMBER OF DECISIONS	AUTHORIZED SPACES AT ANNOUNCEMENT	
		CIVILIAN	MILITARY
<u>FY 1979</u>			
In-House	10	227	14
Contract	10	339	0
Total	20	566	14
<u>FY 1980</u>			
In-House	30	1155	212
Contract	42	2566	603
Total	72	3721	815

All of the FY 1979 and most of the FY 1980 decisions shown above are small, single function studies, such as laundries, bus service, and custodial services. However, in FY 1980, one of the cost studies the Army completed was a package of 19 functions containing over 600 civilian and 400 military spaces, largely in the Directorate of Industrial Operations, at Fort Gordon, GA. This was the first major study of grouped functions at a typical Army installation. The bid of the winning contractor represented a nearly \$32 million cost advantage to the government in just under five years. Also in FY 1980, the conversion to contract operation of the St. Louis Area Support Center in Granite City, Illinois was initiated, involving over 150 civilian and a few military spaces. Major in-house decisions resulted from a packaged study of installation support at Jefferson Proving Ground (335 civilians, 2 military) and a single function study function of ammunition operations at Red River Army Depot (272 civilians, 5 military).

The Army experienced a significant delay in FY 1980 in obtaining authority to announce the FY 1981 cost study schedule to Congress. When this authority was finally obtained and the required announcement made in December 1980, it was too late to complete the required studies in FY 1981 and the program was redesignated as the FY 1982 program. When completed, it is projected to result in a cumulative savings of more than 4,000 civilian and 1,900 military spaces.

D. Army Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

The following tables display Army manpower by DPPC for FY 1980 through FY 1982. Selected Reserve strengths throughout this chapter include reservists on full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserves.

ACTIVE ARMY MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>462.1</u>	<u>472.2</u>	<u>468.7</u>
Land Forces	461.9	472.0	468.6
Division Forces	(423.4)	(433.2)	(431.8)
Theater Forces	(38.5)	(38.8)	(36.8)
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>24.7</u>	<u>23.9</u>	<u>24.1</u>
Intelligence	8.5	8.1	8.1
Centrally Managed Communications	10.4	9.6	9.7
Research and Development	5.8	6.1	6.2
Geophysical Activities	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>172.4</u>	<u>168.6</u>	<u>171.8</u>
Base Operating Support	63.1	59.0	59.1
Medical Support	17.0	16.6	17.1
Personnel Support	13.2	12.4	12.9
Individual Training	40.0	39.8	41.1
Force Support Training	2.3	2.5	2.9
Central Logistics	6.8	7.4	7.7
Centralized Support Activities	20.2	21.4	21.5
Management Headquarters	9.6	9.4	9.5
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u> ^{1/}	<u>659.6</u>	<u>665.2</u>	<u>665.1</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>117.0</u>	<u>110.1</u>	<u>121.2</u>
Transients	23.3	23.4	27.2
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	7.7	7.5	7.3
Students, Trainees	81.6	74.9	82.4
Cadets	4.4	4.3	4.3
<u>Total</u>	<u>776.5</u>	<u>775.3</u>	<u>786.3</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} Manpower totals in the force structure reflect the temporary undermanning that occurs on 30 September of a fiscal year. Explanation and distribution of this undermanning is at paragraph D1, this chapter.

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (ARNG)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>322.6</u>	<u>336.0</u>	<u>346.0</u>
Land Forces	<u>322.6</u>	<u>336.0</u>	<u>346.0</u>
Division Forces	(310.2)	(323.1)	(332.7)
Theater Forces	(12.4)	(12.9)	(13.3)
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>27.4</u>	<u>32.3</u>	<u>34.2</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>17.3</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>18.5</u>
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support	1.8	1.9	2.1
Individual Training	3.7	3.8	3.9
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	4.4	8.3	9.3
Management Headquarters	*	*	*
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>350.0</u>	<u>368.3</u>	<u>380.1</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>16.6</u>	<u>17.5</u>	<u>17.5</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	16.6	17.5	17.5
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>366.6</u>	<u>385.8</u>	<u>397.7</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (USAR)
(End Strength in Thousands) **

	<u>FY 1980 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>151.6</u>	<u>158.6</u>	<u>170.9</u>
Land Forces	150.6	157.6	169.8
Division Forces	(135.7)	(142.0)	(152.2)
Theater Forces	(14.9)	(15.6)	(17.6)
Mobility Forces	1.0	1.0	1.1
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Intelligence	0.3	0.3	0.3
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>47.0</u>	<u>50.3</u>	<u>57.0</u>
Base Operating Support	3.1	3.2	3.4
Medical Support	6.6	6.7	7.3
Personnel Support	1.5	1.6	1.6
Individual Training	33.2	35.6	40.4
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	2.5	3.1	3.1
Management Headquarters	0.1	0.1	0.5
Federal Agency Support	-	-	0.6
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>199.1</u>	<u>209.4</u>	<u>228.3</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>8.3</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	7.4	7.4	8.3
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>206.6</u>	<u>216.8</u>	<u>236.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

** Includes pay Group D positions in paid drill strength.

ARMY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	*	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>24.1</u>	<u>25.1</u>	<u>27.1</u>
Land Forces	22.8	23.8	25.8
Division Forces	(21.6)	(22.6)	(24.3)
Theater Forces	(1.2)	(1.2)	(1.4)
Mobility Forces	1.3	1.3	1.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>30.9</u>	<u>26.5</u>	<u>25.9</u>
Intelligence	1.6	1.5	1.6
Centrally Managed Communications	4.3	4.4	4.3
Research and Development	25.0	20.6	20.0
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>305.4</u>	<u>309.0</u>	<u>306.8</u>
Base Operating Support	154.5	154.2	152.6
Medical Support	13.7	13.6	13.5
Personnel Support	7.2	8.0	8.3
Individual Training	12.4	12.5	11.3
Force Support Training	1.1	1.1	1.2
Central Logistics	74.3	75.0	75.2
Centralized Support Activities	29.2	30.3	30.4
Management Headquarters	13.1	14.1	14.1
Federal Agency Support	-	0.1	0.1
<u>Total</u>	<u>360.5</u>	<u>360.6</u>	<u>359.9</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

1. Determination of Active Military End Strength.

a. Active Army military strength fluctuates periodically, reflecting the seasonality of gains and losses. As discussed earlier, the Army strives to recruit HSDGs. High school graduates are available primarily in the summer months. Hence, the Army strength declines through the spring and then increases during the prime recruiting months of June, July, and August. The problem is to develop a manpower program that will adequately man the units of the Army, on average, within the constraint of attainable end of year strengths. This process includes determination of the flow of gains and losses, unit manning, and end strength for the last day of the fiscal year. The problem is complicated by the fact that not all soldiers are available to man the force. Incoming personnel are delayed from a unit assignment until completion of initial entry training. Additional personnel are between troop unit assignments (e.g., transients). The end strength requested is that at which units of the Army are adequately manned on the average. More precisely, the end strength developed minimizes the total of the weighted absolute values of the monthly over and under strengths. If a value had been chosen to provide full manning at the end of FY 1982, additional trained soldiers would have been requested.

b. Because of the seasonality of gains and losses, the average manning is a better indicator of how the units of the Army have been or will be manned over time than year-end figures. For instance, the FY 1979 year-end undermanning was 30,200; the average undermanning was 17,100. For FY 1980, the year-end undermanning was 12,600; the average was 16,900. These two fiscal years have relatively high undermanning (far exceeding internal management thresholds) because, during FY 1979, the Army did not obtain the number of accessions needed to reach its authorized end strength. The FY 1979 shortage continued into FY 1980 but is projected to get better in FY 1981 when the force is projected to be undermanned by about 10,100 people at year's end but only undermanned by about 900 people on the average throughout the year. The FY 1982 force is expected to be undermanned by about 9,600 people at the end of the year, but only undermanned by about 3,000 people on the average during the year.

c. The projected temporary undermanning for 30 September was computed for and deducted from each DPPC category according to the ratio of that DPPC's programme manpower to the total programmed for all DPPCs. This acknowledges the undermanning and provides the best estimate of its projected distribution. The following table shows the undermanning on 30 September by DPPC for budget years FY 1981 and FY 1982.

Active Military Undermanning By DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	*	*
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	*	*
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	7.2	6.8
Land Forces	7.2	6.8
Division Forces	(6.6)	(6.3)
Theater Forces	(0.6)	(0.5)
Mobility Forces	*	*
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	0.4	0.4
Intelligence	0.1	0.1
Centrally Managed Communications	0.1	0.1
Research and Development Activities	0.1	0.1
Geophysical Activities	*	*
<u>Support Activities</u>	2.6	2.5
Base Operating Support	0.9	0.9
Medical Support	0.3	0.2
Personnel Support	0.2	0.3
Individual Training	0.6	0.6
Force Support Training	*	*
Central Logistics	0.1	0.1
Centralized Support Activities	0.3	0.3
Management Headquarters	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>9.7</u>

2. Strategic Forces

a. Defensive Strategic Forces

Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

* Fewer than 50 spaces

Manpower supports the Army Ballistic Missile Defense Program.

b. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1

Manpower supports national level command centers.

3. Tactical/Mobility Forces

a. Land Forces

(1) Division Forces

Division Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	423.4	433.2 ^{1/}	431.8 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	310.2	323.1	332.7
USAR	135.7	142.0	152.2
<u>Civilian</u>	21.6	22.6	24.3

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 6.6 as of 30 September 1981.
^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 6.3 as of 30 September 1982.

Manpower is assigned to or in support of the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments, and tactical support units.

The programmatic increase in FY 1981 active military over the FY 1980 actuals includes increases of 3,130 to restore the 6th CBAC to the force, 982 for European readiness, 1,593 for REFORGER and 2 + 10 combat units, 1,180 for ranger battalions, 1,026 for field artillery battalions, 264 for SOTAS support and nuclear security, and 1,560 for miscellaneous increases as reflected in TAA 85.

The active military decrease of 1,400 in FY 1982 results from the delay in the Army's program to increase the number of howitzer sections per battalion from 18 to 24 in divisional field artillery battalions due to facility constraints in Europe which limited additional manning increases.

The reserve component increases in FY 1981 and FY 1982 are a part of the increased total paid strength to improve readiness.

Increases in civilian end strength in FY 1982 result from an increase of 3,300 spaces transferred from the base operations account, offset by a loss of 2,000 spaces associated with the programmed contracting out of POMCUS equipment maintenance, an increase of 300 spaces to reduce maintenance backlog, an increase of 500 spaces to enhance TDA unit maintenance capability, and a decrease of 300 spaces transferred to other program accounts to more accurately reflect their utilization.

The following table shows active and reserve combined arms organizations programmed for end FY 1982.

Combined Arms Organizations In Division Forces End FY 1982

	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Divisions (Brigades)</u>			
Armored	4 (12)	2 (6)	6 (18)
Mechanized	6 (16)	1 (3)	7 (19)
Infantry	4 (10)	5 (15)	9 (25)
Air Assault	1 (3)		1 (3)
Airborne	1 (3)		1 (3)
	16 (44)	8 (24)	24 (68)
<u>Separate Combat Brigades</u> 1/ 2/			
Armored	1	4	5
Mechanized	0	9	9
Infantry	1	7	8
	2	20	22
<u>Cavalry Brigade</u>			
Air Combat	1	0	1
<u>Cavalry Regiments</u>			
Armored	3	4	7

1/ Four reserve component separate brigades round-out two light infantry and two infantry (Mech) divisions in the active component.

2/ Excludes the 33rd Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) provided for school support and three active and four reserve infantry brigades that are part of theater forces.

(2) Theater Forces

Theater Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	38.5	38.8 ^{1/}	36.8 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	12.4	12.9	13.3
USAR	14.9	15.6	17.6
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.2	1.4

1/ Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.6 as of 30 September 1981.

2/ Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.5 as of 30 September 1982.

Manpower is assigned to theater-wide and specialized units such as three active and four reserve component separate infantry brigades; certain supply, maintenance, and security activities in support of NATO; and theater-level psychological warfare and civil affairs units and related support.

The active military decrease of 2,000 spaces in FY 1982 results from the Army's conversion of current HAWK/HERCULES Air Defense Artillery weapons systems to the replacement PATRIOT system. The 200 civilian personnel increase in FY 1982 results from an increase of 100 civilians to support the XM-1 tank modernization and an additional 100 civilians to support M60A3 tank modernization efforts. The USAR and ARNG increases are part of overall increases in paid drill strength to improve readiness.

b. Mobility Forces

Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2
Reserve Component			
USAR	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.3	1.4

Manpower included in this category supports CONUS ocean terminal operations, DoD traffic management and engineering services, and accountability and maintenance of the Defense Railway Interchange Fleet.

The increase in civilian personnel in FY 1982 is due to the restoral of 100 spaces for functions determined by the CITA review process to remain in-house.

4. Auxiliary Activities.

a. Intelligence

Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.5	8.1 ^{1/}	8.1 ^{2/}
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.5	1.6

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1981.
^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1982.

Manpower supports Consolidated Cryptologic Activities, the General Defense Intelligence Program, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

The increase of 100 civilian personnel in FY 1982 was directed by the Director Central Intelligence in his review of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program.

b. Centrally Managed Communications

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.4	9.6 ^{1/}	9.7 ^{2/}
<u>Civilian</u>	4.3	4.4	4.3

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1981.
^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1982.

Military reductions in FY 1981 are a result of decreases in the force structure of 200 in Korea and 100 in Taiwan, the conversion of a signal group to a signal brigade which freed 100 spaces, and the reduction of 100 spaces in units which maintain communications in the Far East.

The reduction of civilian personnel in FY 1982 results from a series of miscellaneous minor changes, totaling less than 50 spaces, which results in a net rounding decrease.

Research and Development Activities
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.8	6.1 ^{1/}	6.2 ^{2/}
<u>Civilian</u>	25.0	20.6	20.0

1/ Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1981.

2/ Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1982.

Manpower directs contractor efforts and in-house programs in areas of basic and applied research and exploratory, advanced and engineering development. Manpower supports design and fabrication of experimental prototype articles and systems, conducts tests and evaluations, operates and maintains Army R&D facilities as well as providing administrative support to R&D programs.

The decrease in civilian personnel is due to a transfer of 300 spaces to logistics functions to better reflect their proper utilization, loss of 100 spaces for projected CITA contracting out success, and a 200 space reduction taken in an omnibus civilian end strength reduction to meet FY 1982 end strength controls.

d. Geophysical Activities

Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1

Manpower is assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency.

5. Support Activities

a. Base Operations Support

Base Operating Support Manpower
Combat Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	27.8	25.8 ^{1/}	25.2 ^{2/}
<u>Civilian</u>	78.0	75.5	74.5

^{1/} Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.4 as of 30 September 1981.

^{2/} Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.4 as of 30 September 1982.

Manpower supports the Army's combat mission commands: US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth US Army-Korea, US Army Forces Command, and the US Army Western Command.

The decreases in military personnel in FY 1981 result from a programmed reduction of 300 spaces in Korea, 400 spaces saved by contracting non-critical military police functions, 400 spaces saved as a result of reductions in authorized strength in land force units, 100 spaces reduced as a result of the transfer of testing measurement and diagnostic equipment calibration and repair activities associated with the Korea withdrawal, 300 spaces reduced as a result of numerous small programming actions to more accurately reflect actual utilization, and 100 spaces reduced by delays in prior programs associated with POMCUS stocks in Europe.

Decreases in military manpower in FY 1982 are associated with an increase of 1,000 spaces to support 55 forward deployed and CONUS stationed combat units, a reduction of 1,300 military spaces associated with CITA contracting out efforts, and miscellaneous reductions of 300 spaces reflected in TAA 86 and force modernization efforts.

The base operations account increased by 300 civilians as a result of the Army's actions to increase near term readiness of conventional forces, and by 200 civilians to support increases in field artillery battalions. Army projected CITA contract reviews decreased base operations by 800 civilian personnel, and reductions to Air Defense Artillery structure in Patriot/Hawk/Hercules units caused an additional 300 civilian space reduction. Delays in the Army's effort to increase Quality of Life programs have reduced support to combat installations by 700 civilian spaces. The inactivation of an air defense battalion resulted in a reduction of 100 civilian personnel.

Base Operating Support Manpower
Support Installations
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	35.3	33.1 ^{1/}	33.8 ^{2/}
Reserve Component			
ARNG	17.3	18.0	18.5
USAR	3.1	3.2	3.4
<u>Civilian</u>	76.5	78.7	78.1

1/ Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.5 as of 30 September 1981.

2/ Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.5 as of 30 September 1982.

Manpower is for Army support-oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, US Army Communications Command, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, US Army Military District of Washington, and US Army Health Services Command.

The reduction of military spaces in FY 1981 is due to a reduction of 500 spaces in contracted non-critical military police functions, a loss of 400 spaces associated with planned reductions in Korea, a reduction in FY 1980 of 980 military in support functions associated with the inactivation of combat service support units in Europe which were restored in FY 1981, an increase of 100 spaces to restore the manning to the 197th Infantry Brigade, and an increase of 200 spaces previously delayed for support of force structure increases in Europe that could not be accommodated in Europe because of constrained facilities.

The increase in military in FY 1982 is due to an increase of 100 spaces to support the National Training Center, 300 spaces to restore training and force readiness initiatives, 100 spaces to expand initial entry training, and 100 spaces to support the Defense Enrollment and Eligibility Reporting System.

Increases in Reserve Components in FY 1981 and FY 1982 are a portion of the increase in paid drill strength to support improved force readiness.

Civilian manpower reductions in FY 1982 are a result of a series of increases and decreases. This account was increased by the transfer of 1,200 civilians from individual training accounts, 1,000 spaces from missions accounts, and 200 civilians from research and development accounts to more correctly reflect their proper utilization. In addition, 100 spaces were added to support the Kunia intelligence and communications facility, and 100 spaces were added to support the National Training Center.

Offsetting these increases were reductions which included a base operations restructuring which moved 3,300 civilians to division forces. Three hundred civilian personnel were moved to logistics accounts to reduce maintenance backlogs in projected FY 1982 levels, 1,200 civilian spaces were reduced due to projected successful CITA contract efforts, 300 civilians were reduced in a realignment of AIF manpower to logistics accounts, and 2,000 spaces were lost as a result of adjustments needed to meet civilian end strength ceilings.

b. Medical Support Activities

Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.0	16.6 ^{1/}	17.1 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	0.2	0.2	0.2
USAR	6.6	6.7	7.3
<u>Civilian</u>	13.7	13.6	13.5

^{1/} Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.3 as of 30 September 1981.

^{2/} Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1982.

Manpower supports all Army non-tactical health care activities.

The increase of 500 military personnel in FY 1982 supports increased requirements at the National Training Center (200 spaces), training and force readiness initiatives (100 spaces), decisions affecting hospitals and the transfer of veterinary functions from the Air Force to the Army (100 spaces), and an internal reprogramming to better align manpower with actual utilization (100 spaces).

Increases in US Army Reserve strength reflect a 600 space increase in reserve component evacuation hospitals in FY 1982.

Civilian personnel changes include an increase of 100 spaces to support force modernization, an increase of 100 spaces to support in-house contract determinations in the Army's CITA program, a decrease of 200 spaces because of delays in making a M198 field artillery howitzer conversion, and a 100 total reduction brought about by a series of small miscellaneous manpower decisions.

c. Personnel Support Activities

Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.2	12.4 ^{1/}	12.9 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	1.8	1.9	2.1
USAR	1.5	1.6	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	7.2	8.0	8.3

1/ Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1981

2/ Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1982

Manpower is used in the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC program, counterintelligence and investigative activities, Army personnel processing activities, and off duty education programs.

The increase in active military personnel in FY 1982 is due to an increase of 400 recruiters to seek out additional category I-III male enlistments and 100 spaces to support DoD institutional testing programs.

Army National Guard increases in FY 1982 reflect a slightly larger recruiter force required to support the increased paid drill strength.

The civilian end strength increase in FY 1982 reflects a plus-up of 200 civilian personnel to support an increase in the Military Enlistment Processing Command staffing and an increase of 100 civilians to support US Army Reserve medical department recruiting.

d. Individual Training Activities

Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	40.0	39.8 ^{1/}	41.1 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	3.7	3.8	3.9
USAR	33.2	35.6	40.4
<u>Civilian</u>	12.4	12.5	11.3

1/ Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.6 as of 30 September 1981

2/ Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.6 as of 30 September 1982

Manpower supports the conduct of individual training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the student/trainee portion of the Individuals account.

The military personnel increase in FY 1982 is due to 1,600 soldiers added to support Army systems modernization efforts for new weapons systems, in addition to 100 soldiers added to support the activation of new Patriot Air Defense Battalions; and 700 spaces added to support an expansion of ROTC, Non-Commissioned Officer Educational System (NCOES), and the training base.

Reserve Component strength increases include an increase of 100 ARNG paid drill strength, while the USAR has been increased by 800 to reflect paid drill strength increases for readiness.

The decrease in civilian personnel is due to a realignment of 1,200 audiovisual spaces from individual training to the base operations (support installations) account.

e. Force Support Training Activities

Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.3	2.5 ^{1/}	2.9 ^{2/}
<u>Civilian</u>	1.1	1.1	1.2

^{1/} Undermanning is less than 50

^{2/} Undermanning is less than 50

Manpower supports the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, and the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany.

The increase in military personnel is caused by an addition of 300 soldiers to support NCOES.

Civilian increases constitute fewer than 50 spaces but result in a rounding adjustment.

f. Central Logistics Activities

Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active ^{1/}	6.8	7.4 ^{1/}	7.7 ^{2/}
<u>Civilian</u> ^{2/}	74.3	75.0	75.2

^{1/} Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1981

^{2/} Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1982

Manpower in this category serve in supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command and United States Army Europe.

Increases in military personnel in FY 1982 are due to 200 spaces transferred to this account to better reflect the alignment of the Force Development Information System with the distribution of spaces submitted by commands and 100 spaces to support the fielding of the XM1 tank.

Civilian personnel increases in FY 1982 reflect a transfer of 200 Army Industrial Fund spaces from base operations.

g. Centralized Support Activities

Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	20.2	21.4 ^{1/}	21.5 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	4.4	8.3	9.3
USAR	2.5	3.1	3.1
<u>Civilian</u>	29.2	30.3	30.4

^{1/} Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.3 as of 30 September 1981

^{2/} Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.3 as of 30 September 1982

Manpower supports joint and international activities (less management headquarters), combat development, counterintelligence reserve activities, public affairs, personnel administration, criminal investigations, OSD activities, and foreign military sales.

The active military increase in FY 1982 is due to rounding that involves less than 50 spaces.

The ARNG increase is for full-time personnel to improve readiness in high priority units, for conversion of selected technical positions to full-time military, and to provide ARNG support to active Army headquarters in the development and implementation of policies affecting the ARNG.

Civilian personnel increases of 100 spaces in FY 1982 support the statutory requirement associated with discharge review actions and correction of military records.

h. Management Headquarters Activities

Management Headquarters Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.6	9.4	9.5
<u>Reserve Component</u>			
USAR	0.1	0.1	0.5
ARNG	*	*	*
<u>Civilian</u>	13.1	14.1	14.1

* Fewer than 50 spaces

Manpower is assigned to defense agencies, international military organizations, unified commands, service support-combat commands, and service support-support commands.

USAR increase supports the overall increase in paid drill strength to improve readiness.

i. Federal Agency Support Activities

Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1
Reserve Component			
USAR	-	-	0.6
Civilian	-	0.1	0.1

Manpower is assigned to DoD and non-DoD agencies in support of various functions. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis unless they support the mission of DoD.

USAR increase is part of increased manpower to increase readiness.

6. Individuals

The Individuals accounts are estimates of manpower required for transients, holdees (patients, prisoners, separatees), trainees, students, and US Military Academy cadets.

a. Transients

Transients Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	23.3	23.4	27.2

Transient strengths are based on the projected levels of non-prior service accessions; separations; retirements; and operational, rotational, and training moves.

The military increase in FY 1982 provides the increased transient spaces to support the reduction in the European tour length to 18 months for unaccompanied first term three-year enlistees.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Patients, Prisoners and Holdees
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.7	7.5	7.3

c. Trainees, Students, Cadets

Trainees, Students, and Cadets
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	81.6	74.9	82.4
Cadets	4.4	4.3	4.3
Reserve Component Trainees/Students ^{1/}			
ARNG	16.6	17.5	17.5
USAR	7.4	7.4	8.3

^{1/} Reserve component increases reflect increases in overall recruiting efforts from activities and incentive programs begun in FY 1979 and continuing in FY 1981 and FY 1982.

Active military and reserve components increases are a reflection of the increased trainee strength needed to permit the extension of initial entry enlisted training from seven to eight weeks, as well as increased accessions who are still in training at the end of FY 1982 to support activations of armor and mechanized infantry battalions and multiple launch rocket batteries in FY 1983.

CHAPTER IV
NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes the Navy's manpower requirements in terms of its active military, reserve, and civilian manpower components for FY 1982. Navy's manpower requirements derive from the force structure required to accomplish Navy missions within the national military strategy.

The Navy request for active military, reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1982 and FY 1983 is as follows:

<u>Navy Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>		
Active	549.7	547.9
Reserve Components	87.6	99.6 ^{1/}
<u>Civilian</u>	289.9	292.4

^{1/} Includes 12,023 full time active duty reserves in the TAR program. These people were shown in the active component prior to FY 1983.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The number of ships in Navy's operating force increases from 542 in FY 1981 to 559 in FY 1982. The size of the active fleet increases from 468 ships to 487 ships while the naval reserve fleet remains at 45 ships. The level of civilian manned ships of the naval fleet auxiliary force decreases from 29 ships in FY 1981 to 27 ships in FY 1982. The net increase of 17 ships reflects the improvements being made during this period in fleet modernization and improved operational capability. Specific total ship force changes between FY 1981 and FY 1982 are as follows:

a. Active Fleet. The FY 1981 edition of this report projected that the Navy would have 477 ships at the end of FY 1981. The current estimate of 468 results from delays in delivery of seven ships (three SSNs, one destroyer, one frigate, and two patrol hydrofoils) and early decommissioning of two patrol gunboats. The number of carriers increases from 12 to 13 during FY 1982 with the addition of the newest nuclear carrier, CARL VINSON (CVN-70). Attack submarine force levels increase by seven as a result of the commissioning of six new SSN-688 class submarines,

the conversion and transfer of three former SSBNs to the attack submarine force, and the retirement of two diesel submarines. The fleet ballistic missile force declines by one submarine as a result of the aforementioned conversion of three SSBNs to attack submarines and the scheduled commissioning of two additional TRIDENT submarines.

The number of surface combatant ships increases by seven following the delivery of nine frigates and two guided missile destroyers from new construction and the transfer of four frigates (FF-1052 class) to the naval reserve fleet. Amphibious ships remain constant at 61. The number of patrol ships increases by five following the commissioning of five new guided missile patrol combatants (hydrofoils).

Changes in the support force include the introduction of a destroyer tender and two oilers from new construction and decommissioning of an older destroyer tender, a submarine tender and an oiler.

b. Naval Reserve Fleet (NRF). In last year's report, NRF ship totals for FY 1981 (42 ships) reflected planned decommissioning of FRAM I destroyers. Congress directed retention of a minimum of eight FRAM I destroyers in the NRF until newer ships are transferred from the active fleet, so the baseline for FY 1981 in this year's report is 45 ships. In FY 1982, while the total of NRF ships remains at 45, the mix of ships changes with the decommissioning of four FRAM I destroyers and the introduction of four FF-1052 class frigates from the active fleet. In subsequent years, additional FRAM I destroyers will be retired as newer ships are transferred from the active fleet.

c. Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force. This fleet of Naval service force ships manned by civilian crews ended FY 1980 with 26 ships, one more than predicted in last year's report. During FY 1981, five ships will be added to the fleet and two retired. Two more ships will be retired during 1982.

d. Naval Aviation Forces. The number of active and reserve Navy fighter and attack squadrons will remain at 70 between FY 1981 and FY 1982. Total Navy active and reserve ASW squadrons will decrease from 69 in FY 1981 to 65 in FY 1982. Four SH-3D helicopter squadrons were added to the reserve force by Congress in 1981. They will be deactivated in 1982.

B. Manpower Requirements Determination

1. Operating Forces.

The determination of operating force manpower requirements is accomplished by the Navy's Ship and Squadron Manpower Document (SMD/SQMD) programs. Details concerning the techniques and methodology used in both of these programs were provided in previous Defense Manpower Requirements Reports.

The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) program identifies the manpower for a specific ship predicated on ship configuration, computed workload, required operational capabilities, and projected operational environment.

The level of manpower determined is that which is essential to the operation, maintenance, and support of a ship under stated conditions of readiness. The SMD program covered 92 percent of all ships at the end of FY 1980.

The Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) program documents manpower requirements for aviation squadrons based on manpower staffing standards which relate workload to the operating tempo defined in the Required Operational Capability and Projected Operational Environment statements. The SQMD program has initial documentation completed for 98.5 percent of all active duty aviation squadrons. The SQMD program schedule provides for annual updates of Fleet Readiness Squadrons and certain miscellaneous squadrons and biannual updates for all other squadrons.

2. Shore Support Establishment.

The Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS) is the requirements determination system for all manpower (military and civilian) in the shore support establishment. SHORSTAMPS methodology has been described in previous reports.

By the end of FY 1982 SHORSTAMPS will cover about 50 percent of the shore establishment. Twenty-one percent is presently covered. Coverage goals for the future are shown below.

SHORSTAMPS Coverage Goals

	<u>Percent of Coverage</u>	<u>Number of Spaces Covered (000s)</u>
FY 1982	52	277.6
FY 1983	59	313.5
FY 1984	68	365.1
FY 1985	69	370.8
FY 1986	70	371.2
FY 1987	70	372.3

As the percentage of the shore establishment covered grows, SHORSTAMPS will become increasingly valuable in the programming and budgeting process. The primary benefit will be the ability to defend manpower requests in terms of workload. Where manpower is denied, the impact can be demonstrated in terms of work that cannot be performed. In addition, SHORSTAMPS will identify workload which can be met using either military billets or civilian positions. This will permit greater flexibility at all levels in the allocation and use of manpower resources.

3. Manpower Requirements and Hardware Procurement (HARDMAN)

The HARDMAN project will provide manpower and hardware planners with the capability to conduct man-machine tradeoffs early in the acquisition process and thus control manpower requirements growth and equipment life cycle costs. New manpower and training requirements determination and review procedures are being integrated into the weapons system acquisition process. These actions will enable manpower and training resource

limitations to be explicitly considered during systems design. They will enable the supportability of new hardware to be assessed before acquisition decisions are made. A management information system has been developed that will enable manpower planners to project outyear manpower requirements and track each new weapons system through the acquisition process. HARDMAN development is proceeding on schedule.

4. Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS)

The Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) defines and identifies full mobilization manpower requirements. Its primary objective is to display mobilization workload and the resulting qualitative and quantitative manpower requirements for a variety of scenarios. In NAMMOS, workload planning factors for aggregated functional areas are used to determine scenario-dependent manpower mobilization requirements. In FY 1981 and beyond, NAMMOS will conduct an annual review of critical mobilization requirements and analyze in-depth mobilization training, rapid deployment force augmentation, host nation support, and overall personnel attainability. The NAMMOS requirements determination process is compatible with methodology employed in SHORSTAMPS. The system will facilitate structuring and integrating mobilization requirements from all sources.

C. Significant Program Highlights

1. Active

The Navy's personnel challenge for 1982 is to achieve annual retention rates of approximately 60 percent for mid-grade petty officers and commissioned officers. The Navy demands long hours under arduous working conditions and prolonged separation from family, while the civilian sector pays premium wages for the same skills the Navy needs. When the Navy member is confronted with an enlistment decision at the mid-career point, civilian life is seen offering greater rewards from the standpoint of compensation, leisure time and quality of life. Because of the Navy's recent inability to retain people at the mid-career point, the shortage of experienced technicians and middle managers has become acute. The Navy cannot substitute inexperienced recruits to offset the loss of these experienced people. The solution to this problem is to do a better job of retaining those people in whom the Navy has invested expensive training resources and who have gained the necessary sea experience. In order for the Navy to be able to do this, initiatives have been taken in compensation and in quality of life in the Navy.

a. Measures of Active Manpower Readiness. The Navy has five measures of the health of Navy manpower: retention, recruiting, attrition, desertion, and personnel readiness.

Retention

Officers. Retention in several key communities is well below that required. Nuclear submarine officer rates continued their downward trend. Pilot retention has also declined steadily from a high of 62 percent in FY 1977 to 30 percent in FY 1980. Compensation issues are the primary reason for the exodus of these exceptionally expensive resources. Surface Warfare Officer and Naval Flight Officer retention rates increased last year.

	Officer Retention Rates			
	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80	REQUIRED ^{1/}
Surface Warfare	38%	31%	39%	60%
Pilot	46%	31%	30%	60%
Naval Flight Officer	54%	60%	71%	60%
Nuclear Submarine	38%	42%	36%	60%

^{1/} This rate is required to maintain the size and experience mix of the officer corps. Higher rates are required to make up current shortages of midgrade officers.

It is expected that sea pay and submarine pay improvements will have a significant and positive effect on officer retention.

Enlisted. In FY 1980 the retention rates showed a slight decrease in the first term, a moderate increase in the second term and little change in third term and beyond. Although the turnaround in second term rates is encouraging, the actual number of reenlistments was still about 3,000 below goal. Navy attributes the second term increases to fleet expectations of compensation improvements and the general slowdown in economic conditions. As can be seen below, considerable improvement is needed to reach the first and second term rates required to adequately man the fleet.

	Enlisted Retention Rates				
	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80	REQUIRED
First Term	36.9%	40.3%	37.5%	36.7%	45.0%
Second Term	53.4%	47.3%	45.3%	50.5%	60.0%
Third Term & Beyond	93.0%	92.0%	91.4%	91.6%	96.0%

Recruiting

Officers. Active officer procurement goals are shown in the following table:

Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals

	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82
Plan	8,168	8,430	7,453
Actual	6,729	-	-

The failure to meet the FY 1980 goal reflects the Navy's continuing difficulty in recruiting nuclear, engineering and technical people. The situation is expected to improve, however, as a result of actions taken to strengthen procurement for these areas. The number of officer recruiters has been increased and scholarship support is being established for the nuclear program.

Enlisted. As shown below, for the first time since FY 1976, Navy attained its enlisted recruiting goal last year.

Recruiting Performance

<u>FY</u>	<u>GOAL</u>	<u>ATTAINED</u>	<u>DIFFERENCE</u>
1976	103,325	103,587	+ 262
1977	116,314	111,557	- 4,757
1978	94,735	89,009	- 5,726
1979	93,390	88,345	- 5,045
1980	99,299	99,351	+ 52
1981	106,238	-	-

Navy attributes its success to a number of factors: a revised recruiting policy, numerous Navy management initiatives, increased recruiting assets, and recessive economic conditions. Navy is guardedly optimistic about its ability to achieve its FY 1981 goal. However, if economic conditions improve significantly, Navy may once again be put at a competitive disadvantage to private sector employment opportunities.

Attrition

First term attrition declined in FY 1980 for the third year in a row, thus validating Navy's ongoing counter-attrition program.

First Term Attrition

	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>
Percentage	11.6	10.2	9.3
First Term Attrition	31,324	27,155	24,756

Desertion

The desertion rate also declined in FY 1980 for the third consecutive year, but remains unacceptably high. There was an eleven percent improvement over FY 1979, indicating efforts to correct the desertion problem are starting to take effect.

Desertion Rate

	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>
Deserter Incidents	13,949	13,552	12,131
Rate per 1000	30.2	29.6	27.0

Personnel Readiness

Navy unit readiness is a measure of each ship or aircraft squadron's ability to accomplish its combat missions. Readiness ratings encompass material condition, mobility, sustainability, and the capability of combat systems. Interwoven among these but addressed as an entity are the numbers and skills of the people who man the ships and squadrons. Readiness degradation due to personnel shortages has become a critical concern. Operating restrictions have been placed on ships and submarines because they were not adequately manned in particular ratings or paygrades.

Flying hours have been reduced for the same reason. With force levels programmed to grow in the future, the manning problem, unless corrected, will worsen.

Several management actions have been taken to enhance manning at sea. All male seamen and firemen are assigned directly to sea from initial training. Programs granting early release to attend school have been cancelled. Shore tours have been shortened by 3-6 months for 12 ratings. Critical skills have been concentrated in deploying units. Finally, contingency plans have been developed to augment deployed ships, if required, with personnel currently assigned ashore. Some of these actions run counter to retention efforts, but are required to mitigate the severe shortage of experienced petty officers.

b. Compensation. In FY 1981, Navy received the largest compensation improvement since the initial establishment of "comparability" under the AVF. An 11.7 percent pay raise reduced the growing disparity between civilian and military wages. The Variable Housing Allowance and additional compensation initiatives for those possessing particularly valuable skills (such as Submarine Career Incentive Pay and increased Aviator Career Incentive Pay) will improve retention, especially in the career force. These actions will improve readiness. The recently passed expanded sea pay initiative will directly and immediately increase both quantitative and qualitative manning in the fleet by encouraging sea-experienced personnel (particularly petty officers) to remain in sea duty billets for longer periods.

Insufficient time has passed to allow an in-depth assessment of the effects of the improvements. First quarter retention rates are higher than those from FY 1979 and FY 1980. Some of this gain results from an abnormal number of enlistment extensions at the end of FY 1980. As second and third quarter statistics become available, a more accurate assessment can be accomplished. However, indications are that additional compensation improvements will be required to fully man the fleet. Current rates of travel expense reimbursement, for instance, do not cover the costs being incurred by those transferred on government orders.

c. Workload initiatives. The Navy's petty officer shortfall affects directly and adversely the quality of shipboard and squadron maintenance. With the objective of reducing the burden on particularly overtaxed ratings, several maintenance initiatives are being implemented. The following provides the status of the more significant programs.

Organization Level Maintenance Assistance

This effort provides assistance to ship's crews by private contractors to accomplish low skill, repetitive jobs such as side painting and bilge cleaning. The pilot program was very successful and the effort is being expanded.

Commercial Industrial Services

This program provides contractor support to Intermediate Maintenance Activities for accomplishing necessary maintenance, thus reducing the overtime hours required of Naval personnel.

Shipboard Cleaning Equipment

This initiative replaces present shipboard cleaning equipment with more efficient and less manhour intensive products.

Corrosion Control

Closely paralleling the shipboard cleaning program, this initiative utilizes greatly improved preservation and corrosion control techniques to reduce the hours spent on these maintenance tasks.

Planned Maintenance System

Two methods are ongoing to streamline maintenance requirements and procedures. The first is a review of requirements to eliminate those found excessive. The Reliability Centered Maintenance program is a structured analytical approach to determine maintenance needs.

By reducing to a minimum tedious and repetitive tasks, the Navy can allow its skilled technicians to pursue more meaningful assignments. This will enhance job satisfaction and in turn increase retention of petty officers who are in critically short supply.

d. Navy Women. The numbers of women officers and enlisted personnel continue to show steady growth. During FY 1980 enlisted women's end-strength increased from 24,751 to 29,806. The percentage of women in the total Navy enlisted force rose from 5.4 percent in FY 1979 to 6.9 percent in FY 1980. The trend for enlisted women's end-strength is shown below:

	<u>Enlisted Women</u>						
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
End-Strength	5,723	19,210	20,937	24,751	29,806	35,423	39,349
Percentage	1.1	4.2	4.5	5.4	6.9	7.6	8.3

The number of women officers also increased in FY 1980 from 4,358 to 4,877 (6.9 percent in FY 1979 to 7.7 percent in FY 1980). The trend for women officer's end-strength is shown below:

	<u>Women Officers</u>						
	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
End-Strength	3,185	3,791	3,980	4,358	4,877	5,117	5,465
Percentage	4.3	6.0	6.4	6.9	7.7	7.9	8.3

In compliance with 10 USC Section 6015, women in the Navy are not permanently stationed in ships or aircraft assigned a combat mission. Women may be assigned temporary additional duty to any ship provided a combat mission is not anticipated during the period of assignment. If a combat mission is assigned, women on temporary duty are to be removed as quickly as possible. Women are not assigned to overseas activi-

ties with a primary combat mission and their numbers may be restricted at activities having combat service support or immediate fleet support or augmentation responsibilities. Finally, due to their close relationship to combat, 13 of the Navy's 100 ratings are closed to enlisted women and women cannot enter two officer communities, submarine and special warfare.

Within the constraints of the law, however, Navy is able to assign women to shipboard, aviation and overseas duty. At the end of FY 1980, 120 women officers were aboard 29 non-combatant ships and 694 enlisted women were assigned to 10 of those same ships. The women at sea program has been very successful with women performing shipboard duties comparable to their male counterparts. Women are also active in Naval aviation. By the end of FY 1980 Navy had 39 women pilots (2 jet, 22 propeller and 5 helicopter), 17 female pilot trainees and 2 women Naval flight officer trainees. Additionally, 15 percent of Navy enlisted women were serving in aviation occupations. Women are also assigned appropriate duties overseas. At the end of FY 1980, almost 7,000 enlisted women were serving outside the continental United States.

Navy plans call for continued increases in both women officers and enlisted personnel. These expansion plans will be accomplished in keeping with total Navy officer and enlisted strength planning, within the constraints of the law and without a negative impact on sea/shore rotation for men.

e. Enhanced Training Or Decrewing During Overhaul

As a means of combatting the shortage of critical skills in operational ships, the Navy implemented a pilot program to test the related concepts of markedly reducing the crews of ships in overhaul and enhancing the training of crews whose ships were in overhaul.

Decrewing During Overhaul

An extensive test involved decrewing CONYNGHAM. With the exception of a small liaison team of about 25, the entire crew was transferred to operational ships and shore based intermediate maintenance activities. The objective was to distribute the skills of CONYNGHAM's crew to operational billets. When CONYNGHAM returned to operational status, it was remanned by a new crew. It was expected that the primary benefit of decrewing would be increased skills in the fleet and that increased overhaul expense would be the primary cost. CONYNGHAM completed overhaul in August 1980. The pilot program evaluation will be completed in February 1981 when the control ships complete their overhauls and CONYNGHAM completes refresher training. Preliminary conclusions indicate that CONYNGHAM's overhaul was successful, but the cost of the overhaul was increased by about \$10.5M. Skill gains to operational ships resulting from CONYNGHAM decrewing were less than expected. The additional time required to overhaul CONYNGHAM and certify a new crew extended the time the ship was unavailable for operational use. In addition to the fiscal aspects of the CONYNGHAM program, the impact on readiness, crew morale and training is also undergoing comprehensive evaluation.

Enhanced Training

A complementary test program was conducted in the FOX and THOMAS C. HART. To permit the crew to expend more manhours on training, both on and off ship, in order to increase skill levels onboard, a portion of the industrial work normally accomplished by ship's force was assigned to the shipyard. This increased the overhaul costs by about \$5M. The results were impressive. Far more individual and team training than would normally occur was conducted by the crews while the ships were undergoing overhaul. Particularly significant was the reduction in ship's force working hours achieved by both ships during their overhauls. Both ships returned to operational status with well trained and highly motivated crews.

Pending complete analysis, it now appears that the most effective solution will be to selectively decrew critical skills while using the overhaul period to strengthen the training of ship's company by assigning work normally done by ship's force to the shipyard.

2. Reserve

In the FY 1981 Appropriations Act, the Congress directed certain changes to the mission of the Naval Reserve. The Navy is to submit an implementation plan no later than April 1, 1981. This section defers a discussion of the Naval Reserve to that plan.

3. Civilian

a. Overview. The FY 1982 Navy civilian end strength request of 289,863 is 2,989 below the FY 1981 level of 292,852. Major decreases between FY 1981 and FY 1982, other than the 3,730 positions to be contracted out as presented below, include a net decrease of 309 in Military Sealift Command ship manning requirements and a decrease of 669 positions at naval air rework facilities.

Major increases from FY 1981 to FY 1982 include 1,022 for Naval Shipyards, including service life extension work on the carrier SARATOGA, 183 positions for quality of life programs to improve military retention, 200 positions for increased ancillary medical support, 245 positions to perform increased ordnance industrial workload, and 403 positions at fleet operating stations and ship repair facilities for improved base maintenance and ship overhaul, repair, and maintenance.

b. Civil Services Reform Act. The major CSRA programs established in DON are the Senior Executive Service (SES), the Merit Pay System (MPS) and the Basic Performance Appraisal System (BPAS). The SES provisions apply to 451 senior executive positions in DON. The system, designed to provide more effective management, links compensation and retention to performance appraisal and achievement of organizational objectives. Approximately 700 SES members and Flag and General Officers have been trained in the system and in June 1980 the first annual appraisal cycle was completed. Similar to SES, the MPS is an objectives-based, compensation-related, performance appraisal system for GS-13 through GS-15 civilian supervisors and managers. Implementation of the system is well underway. Over 18,000 MPS members have received training

in the system and the first appraisal cycle will be completed in June 1981. BPAS, which provides a new performance appraisal system for GS-12 and below DON employees, has been developed and will be fully operational by October 1981, meeting CSRA requirements for complete implementation. Currently emphasis is being placed on training employees and supervisors in the implementation of the system.

Other projects stemming from CSRA are those in support of EEO objectives, including development and implementation of the Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program (FEORP). This program aims at elimination of areas of underrepresentation of minority employees and compliance with the Uniform Guidelines Act.

4. CITA

More than two years are now required to complete all phases of the CITA contracting out review and implementation process. Because of delays, the Navy has not been able to achieve all of the budgeted civilian personnel reduction of 5,961 positions by end FY 1981 made under the assumption that contracting out would prove more cost effective and reflected in the FY 1981 President's Budget. Accordingly, the FY 1981 column of the FY 1982 President's Budget reflects a net contracting savings estimate of 2,782, or a restoration of 3,189 positions. It is anticipated that 3,730 positions will be contracted in FY 1982.

In order to reduce delays in commercial/industrial reviews and permit more efficient use of resources by focusing on potential major cost savings, the Navy recommends that Section 502 of Public Law 96-342 be repealed, that the \$100,000 threshold for contracting out without a detailed cost study contained in A-76 be raised to \$500,000, and that a simplified cost study procedure be substituted for functions under \$500,000.

D. Navy Manpower Requirements By Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC).

This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes which dictate year-to-year adjustments in overall Navy strength. The tables on pages IV-12 through IV-14 display Navy active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian manpower by DPPC over the period FY 1980 through FY 1982. Following these tables, each subcategory is discussed separately.

NAVY ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1980 Actual	FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget	FY 1982
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>21.0</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>18.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	19.6	16.9	17.0
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.4	1.5	1.6
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>237.3</u>	<u>248.9</u>	<u>257.7</u>
Land Forces	2.6	3.1	3.2
Tactical Air Forces	59.0	60.6	65.0
Naval Forces	175.3	184.8	189.1
Mobility Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>21.9</u>	<u>22.4</u>
Intelligence	6.8	7.5	7.6
Centrally Managed Communications	6.2	6.7	6.9
Research and Development	5.8	6.0	6.0
Geophysical Activities	1.8	1.8	1.8
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>147.2</u>	<u>143.9</u>	<u>145.5</u>
Base Operating Support	66.0	63.5	64.6
Medical Support	10.6	9.8	10.0
Personnel Support	7.6	7.3	7.5
Individual Training	26.4	27.5	26.5
Force Support Training	13.6	13.0	13.7
Central Logistics	6.8	6.5	6.6
Centralized Support Activities	6.6	6.9	7.0
Management Headquarters	8.4	8.5	8.6
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.0	1.0
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u> ^{1/}	<u>426.1</u>	<u>433.0</u>	<u>444.1</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>101.2</u>	<u>104.5</u>	<u>105.6</u>
Transients	25.8	25.7	26.2
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	5.9	5.7	5.3
Students, Trainees	64.9	68.5	69.5
Cadets	4.5	4.5	4.5
<u>Total</u>	<u>527.2</u>	<u>537.5</u>	<u>549.7</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} Manpower totals in Force Structure categories reflect a temporary undermanning that occurs on 30 September of each fiscal year. An explanation of this undermanning is in paragraph D.1 of this chapter.

NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1980 Actual	FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget	FY 1982
<u>Strategic</u>	0.4	0.4	0.4
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	56.2	59.8	60.0
Land Forces	1.4	1.9	1.9
Tactical Air Forces	2.8	4.5	4.5
Naval Forces	51.0	52.3	52.4
Mobility Forces	0.9	1.0	1.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	6.5	5.1	4.7
Intelligence	3.9	4.3	3.9
Centrally Managed Communications	1.9	0.4	0.4
Research and Development	0.5	0.1	0.1
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.3	0.3
<u>Support Activities</u>	23.0	21.2	21.2
Base Operating Support	10.0	6.2	6.1
Medical Support	2.6	3.6	4.2
Personnel Support	0.4	0.8	0.8
Individual Training	0.4	0.5	0.5
Force Support Training	0.6	0.5	0.5
Central Logistics	3.7	5.2	4.8
Centralized Support Activities	1.6	1.4	1.1
Management Headquarters	3.3	3.0	3.1
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	86.1	86.5	86.3
<u>Individuals</u>	0.9	0.9	1.3
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	0.9	0.9	0.9
Cadets	-	-	-
Mobilization Augmentees	-	-	0.4
<u>Total</u>	87.0	87.4	87.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

NAVY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	1.1	1.4	1.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>6.6</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	0.3	0.3	0.3
Naval Forces	0.7	0.8	0.8
Mobility Forces	5.2	5.8	5.5
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>32.7</u>	<u>32.7</u>	<u>32.5</u>
Intelligence	1.0	1.1	1.2
Centrally Managed Communications	1.4	1.5	1.5
Research and Development	29.2	29.1	28.8
Geophysical Activities	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>249.1</u>	<u>251.7</u>	<u>249.2</u>
Base Operating Support	73.9	74.4	72.2
Medical Support	3.5	3.5	3.6
Personnel Support	1.2	1.3	1.3
Individual Training	3.2	3.3	3.2
Force Support Training	1.6	1.6	1.6
Central Logistics	149.4	150.4	150.2
Centralized Support Activities	8.0	8.3	8.3
Management Headquarters	8.3	8.8	8.8
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>289.2</u>	<u>292.9</u>	<u>289.9</u>

Note: Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

1. Manning Adjustments

End of Fiscal Year 1980 (30 September 1980) data reflect the actual distribution of personnel by DPPC. New accessions do not join the force in an even flow throughout the year because the pool of potential new recruits is largest in the summer. Further, in order to accommodate the family needs of the career force, a higher proportion of PCS moves occur in the summer months. These factors result in significant seasonal manning imbalances between the force structure and the individuals accounts (where new accession students and transients are reflected).

Adjustments have been made to FY 1981 and FY 1982 manpower requirements displays to reflect an end-of-fiscal year basis. This has been done in order to permit a valid comparison between actual FY 1980 totals and programmed FY 1981 and FY 1982 required strength. The seasonal adjustment is an estimate of the undermanning of the force structure and the overmanning of the individuals accounts (which are programmed on the basis of average student loads and PCS move requirements during the fiscal year) which occurs on 30 September. The adjustments have been spread proportionately across all DPPC categories as outlined in the table below. These seasonal adjustments are offsetting and therefore have no numerical impact on Navy's manpower authorization request in these years.

Active Military Manning Adjustments by DPPC (00s)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>-5.1</u>	<u>-5.1</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-4.7	-4.6
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-
Strategic Control & Surveillance	-.4	-.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-70.0</u>	<u>-70.2</u>
Land Forces	-.9	-.9
Tactical Air Forces	-17.0	-17.7
Naval Forces	-52.0	-51.5
Mobility Forces	-.1	-.1
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>-6.8</u>	<u>-6.7</u>
Intelligence	-2.4	-2.4
Centrally Managed Communications	-2.2	-2.2
Research and Development	-1.7	-1.6
Geophysical Activities	-.5	-.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>-3978</u>	<u>-3900</u>
Base Operating Support	-17.0	-16.7
Medical Support	-3.0	-3.0

Personnel Support	-2.1	-2.1
Individual Training	-7.8	-7.3
Force Support Training	-3.7	-3.7
Central Logistics	-1.8	-1.8
Centralized Support Activities	-1.8	-1.8
Management Headquarters	-2.4	-2.3
Federal Agency Support	-.3	-.3
Total Force Structure Adjustment	-121.7	-121.0

2. Strategic

The Strategic category consists of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces which have as their fundamental objective deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, its military forces, bases overseas, and allies. Within the Navy, the majority of manpower in this category are associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The TRIDENT program, strategic operational headquarters, and communication/ADP support are also included.

Navy Strategic Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.0	18.3	18.6
Reserve Components	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.6	1.6

The reduction of Navy Strategic manpower requirements between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is the result of phased reduction of 1,600 in the manning of those SSBN's that will be transferred to the general purpose forces in FY 1982 and another 1200 reduction from the submarine tender PROTEUS, which is being transferred to the general purpose forces. In FY 1982, improved manning of VQ squadrons (+100) and additional TRIDENT shore support of 200 account for the 300 increase over FY 1981 strategic manpower.

The majority of the increase in civilian manpower in this category is in support of TRIDENT program requirements, principally related to the Refit Facility in Bangor, Washington.

3. Tactical/Mobility

The Tactical/Mobility manpower requirements are associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and sup-

porting units. Within the Tactical/Mobility category, Navy manpower is contained in the separate subcategories of Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, Naval Forces, and Mobility Forces. Each of these subcategories is addressed below.

a. Land Forces. Navy Land Forces include doctors, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to Marine Corps divisions, regiments, and air stations. The following table shows Navy manpower committed to Land Forces.

Navy Land Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.6	3.1	3.2
Reserve Components	1.4	1.9	1.9

Active military manpower requirements in support of Marine Corps land forces remain stable during the period with minor increases in the Marine divisions and force service support groups accounting for an increase of approximately 100. An apparent increase in requirements between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is the result of undermanning of Land Force requirements occurring at the end of FY 1980.

Selected Reserve support of Marine forces has been restructured to reflect changing requirements, causing the difference between FY 1980 and FY 1981.

b. Tactical Air Forces. The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons, multipurpose aircraft carriers, and tactical air operational headquarters units. The following table reflects Navy manpower associated with Tactical Air Forces.

Navy Tactical Air Forces Manpower^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	59.0	60.6	65.0
Reserve Components	2.8	4.5	4.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.3	0.3	0.3

^{1/} Includes manpower for aircraft carriers and associated air wings.

Navy Tactical Air Force manpower requirements increase significantly during this period. Most of this increase (3,400) is to offset serious undermanning in carriers and tactical air units in FY 1980. Introduction of the carrier CARL VINSON in FY 1982 causes an additional growth of about 1,000.

Most of the large decrease in Reserve Components between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is a result of inability to man newly established units to augment aircraft carriers (1000). The remainder (700) reflect expected improvements in manning Reserve TACAIR and fighter and attack augment units.

c. Naval Forces. This subcategory includes manpower related to antisubmarine warfare and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and support forces. As the largest subcategory of active military and reserve manpower in the Navy, it includes virtually all ship manpower requirements except the FBM manpower reflected in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower shown under Tactical Air Forces. The following table depicts in the Naval Forces subcategory.

Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	175.3	184.8	189.1
Reserve Components	51.0	52.3	52.4
<u>Civilian</u>	0.7	0.8	0.8

The increase of 9,500 between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is a continuation of the Navy's effort to improve manning levels in the fleet. The increase also includes 4,300 requirements for new ships entering the fleet. The FY 1982 increase includes 1900 new requirements and 2,400 to improve manning throughout the fleet. New manpower requirements in the area of antisubmarine warfare and fleet air defense increase by approximately 3,400 as a result of the commissioning of 16 surface combatants and nine attack submarines. Offsetting the increase is the decommissioning of two diesel submarines and a submarine tender and the transfer of four frigates to the Naval Reserve fleet.

The Naval Forces increase of 1,030 Selected Reserve requirements between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is the result of force level changes and redistribution of requirements generated by NAMMOS. Three ships are added to the reserve amphibious force (+500), support to active and reserve service force ships increases (+600), and minesweeper manning is improved (+200). These increases are partially offset by the decommissioning of seven reserve FRAM destroyers (-700). The increase in FY 1982 is the net change caused by replacing four FRAM destroyers with FF-1052 class frigates.

The civilian increase in FY 1981 reflects minor adjustments in the Ship Support Improvement Program and Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities.

d. Mobility Forces. Included in this subcategory is Navy strength associated with its required airlift and sealift capability as well as port terminal and traffic management operations. Navy manpower in the Mobility Forces category is shown below.

<u>Navy Mobility Forces Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.3	0.3	0.3
Reserve Components	0.9	1.0	1.2
<u>Civilian</u>	5.2	5.8	5.5

Active Navy manpower requirements in this category remain stable over the period shown.

The increase of 200 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1981 represents enhanced manning, while the FY 1982 increase is a result of new requirements identified by NAMMOS.

The FY 1981 increase in civilian Mobility Forces manpower reflects restoration of full civilian mariner manning required for fleet support ships which were undergoing overhaul in FY 1980. Increased civilian mariner manning is also required for HMS LYNESS, being acquired from the Royal Navy. The decrease in FY 1982 reflects NFAF ship inactivations and a net reduction in ship operations.

4. Auxiliary Activities

Strength included in the category of Auxiliary Activities is associated with Department of the Navy programs which come under centralized DoD control. The various programs include Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development, and Geophysical Activities. Each of these programs constitutes a separate category of manpower as detailed below.

a. Intelligence. This category contains strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), including intelligence communications.

Navy Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active ^{1/}	6.8	7.5	7.6
Reserve Components	3.9	4.3	3.9
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.1	1.2

^{1/} Not included in the above totals are military personnel in combat related intelligence units.

Between FY 1980 and FY 1981, Navy active military requirements in the Intelligence category actually increase by 200 as reflected in last year's report. The additional difference of 500 between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is a result of seasonal undermanning in this category. In FY 1982 manpower requirements increase by approximately 170, of which about 100 support the General Defense Intelligence Program at overseas activities.

The apparent increase of 400 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1981 is a result of undermanning during FY 1980. The FY 1982 decrease is required in order to meet higher priority requirements.

The civilian increases in FY 1981 reflect Congressional adjustments and increased ocean surveillance and intelligence support. The latter also accounts for the FY 1982 increase.

b. Centrally Managed Communications. This subcategory reflects strength associated with the Defense Communications System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications systems, communications security and other related communications units. The following table reflects Navy strength associated with these communications requirements.

Navy Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.2	6.7	6.9
Reserve Components	1.9	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.4	1.5	1.5

Between FY 1980 and FY 1982, active military requirements in this category increase by approximately 700. This increase is caused by a variety of minor increases at numerous Navy communications sites.

The decrease of 1,500 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1981 is the result of changes necessary to man other higher priority Selected Reserve units.

The increase in FY 1981 civilian spaces is rehiring for positions not filled at the end of FY 1980.

c. Research and Development. The Navy's R&D community consists of headquarters, laboratories, RDT&E project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. The largest segment of people are in the R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, involving land, sea, air, and undersea operations. Work is performed at 31 Navy RDT&E installations, including eight medical laboratories and 12 industrially-funded facilities. The following table depicts Navy's R&D strength.

Navy Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.8	6.0	6.0
Reserve Components	0.5	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	29.2	29.1	28.8

The difference between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is due to undermanning experienced at the end of FY 1980. Active Navy manpower requirements between FY 1981 and FY 1982 remain stable in this category.

The decrease of 400 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1981 is the result of the need to achieve priority manning of other Selected Reserve units.

The civilian manpower reductions in FY 1981 and FY 1982 reflect contracting initiatives and anticipated productivity improvements.

d. Geophysical Activities. The Navy's geophysical effort includes the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities. These activities employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, as well as a small headquarters staff.

Navy Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.8	1.8	1.8
Reserve Components	0.2	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.1	1.1	1.1

The increase of 100 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1981 reflects the priority manning of Naval Oceanographic Service units.

5. Support Activities

This category includes strength associated with base operating support requirements of combat and support installations. Also included are medical and personnel support, individual and force support training, logistics, management headquarters, federal agency support, and other centralized support activities.

a. Base Operating Support. Strength in this subcategory provides for the operation and maintenance of installations for both combat and support forces. Base Operating Support for combat forces provide for strategic, tactical, and airlift and sealift commands, including supporting base communications and air traffic control. Base Operating Support for support forces provide for auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

Navy Base Operating Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	66.0	63.5	64.6
Reserve Components	10.0	6.2	6.1
<u>Civilian</u>	73.9	74.4	72.2

The active military manpower requirement for Base Operating Support decreases by approximately 2500 between FY 1980 and FY 1981 with reductions in Air Stations (-600), Naval Stations (-800), Naval Support Activities (-200) and training (-500) comprising the majority of the reduction. The remaining 100 reduction is from various support installations. In FY 1982,

the increase of 1,100 is the net of several changes: improved manning in station hospitals (+400), expanded support at Diego Garcia (+400), additional support to Navy Reserve Centers (+100), strength increases to Air Stations (+100), minor increases for Naval Support Activities (+100), and minor increases within the over 1000 BOS units and components (+300). Offsetting part of these increases is a 300 manpower reduction resulting from contracting out the Base Operating Support at NAF Midway in FY 1982.

The decrease of 3,900 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1982 is a result of changes required to man other Selected Reserve units.

Civilian increases in FY 1981 for Diego Garcia, Family Service Centers, child care, fleet maintenance, and fire inspection are offset by contracting initiatives in the training support area. The reduction in FY 1982 is principally due to additional contracting initiatives.

b. Medical Support. Navy manpower requirements included in this category represent strength required to provide medical care in DOD military medical facilities and to qualified individuals in non-DOD facilities. Navy Medical Support requirements are shown in the following table.

<u>Navy Medical Support Manpower</u> (End Strength in Thousands)			
	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.6	9.8	10.0
Reserve Components	2.6	3.6	4.2
<u>Civilian</u>	3.5	3.5	3.6

The active Navy manpower reduction of approximately 800 between FY 1980 and FY 1981 occurs at Regional Medical Centers (-500) and Regional Dental Centers (-300). Requirement increases at Regional Medical Centers (+ 125) and Regional Dental Centers (+ 50) account for the change between FY 1981 and 1982.

The increase of 1,600 Selected Reserve from FY 1980 to FY 1982 is a result of the need to priority man medical support units.

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1982 is to expand the Family Advocacy Program and to increase ancillary support personnel to improve physician productivity.

c. Personnel Support. This strength category includes manpower requirements associated with Navy recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, reception centers, disciplinary barracks,

centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career training and intern programs. This category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

Navy Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.6	7.3	7.5
Reserve Components	0.4	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.3	1.3

The active duty adjustments shown in this table are the result of Navy efforts to improve recruiting performance.

The increase of 400 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1981 is the transfer of Personnel Mobilization Team augment units from the category of Centralized Support Activities to Personnel Support and manning these units to full strength.

The civilian increase in FY 1981 expands the Navy Campus for Achievement Program to cover 85 percent of the Navy population. These people provide Navy-wide management of off-duty education.

d. Individual Training. This category contains the strength required to conduct and support formal military and technical training as well as professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category encompass recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care, individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category conducts and supports training of students and trainees of the active Navy in both PCS and TAD (temporary duty) status and Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in PCS status are carried in the Individuals category; those in TAD status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

Navy Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.4	27.5	26.5
Reserve Components	0.4	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	3.2	3.3	3.2

The increase of active military manpower in this category between FY 1980 and FY 1981 results from an increase in instructor-intensive courses required to support new and more complex weapons systems, an expansion of training for first-term personnel to replace career personnel losses, an upgrade of the military supervision and instruction provided to trainees, and the correction of long-standing shortages of military instructors. The substantial reduction shown between FY 1981 and FY 1982 is concentrated in flight training positions. It results from the decisions to consolidate undergraduate flight training (-850), to contract aircraft maintenance (- 500), and to retire the T-28 aircraft (-300). The increase in the Reserve Component is to support flight training. Civilian manning variations result from the undergraduate helicopter training consolidation controversy.

e. Force Support Training. Force Support Training requirements are for units which provide training to organized crews or teams in conjunction with the performance of a specific mission. Civilian support in this area consists of maintenance and clerical support for fleet air training units.

Navy Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.6	13.0	13.7
Reserve Components	0.6	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.6	1.6

A small increase in active Force Support Training manpower between FY 1981 and FY 1982 reflects increased instruction and maintenance requirements associated with introduction of new flight simulator equipment at various readiness training locations. The decrease of 600 active military requirements between FY 1980 and FY 1981 results from the deactivation of an F-4 readiness training squadron and reduced requirements in other squadrons.

The decrease of 100 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1981 is a result of priority manning requirements in other areas.

f. Central Logistics. Manpower requirements reflected in this category represent Navy strength associated with supply operations, maintenance operations and logistic support operations.

Navy Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.8	6.5	6.6
Reserve Components	3.7	5.2	4.8
<u>Civilian</u>	149.4	150.4	150.2

The decrease in Navy active military manpower requirements between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is the transfer of automatic data processing from Logistics Support Activities to information automation in Centralized Support Activities. The increase between FY 1981 and FY 1982 reflects increased requirements associated with procurement of the AEGIS combat weapon system and at the Air Project Management Office.

The increase of 1,200 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1981 is a result of priority manning in this area. NAMMOS indicates that the requirement will be reduced by 300 the following year.

The following table summarizes Navy manpower by type of logistic operation during the period FY 1980 through FY 1982.

Central Logistics Manpower by Type of Operation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Supply Operations	1.6	1.7	1.8
Maintenance Operations	3.8	3.7	3.7
Logistic Support Operations	1.4	1.1	1.1
Total	6.8	6.5	6.6
Reserve Components			
Supply Operations	1.0	0.8	0.8
Maintenance Operations	1.5	2.4	2.3
Logistic Support Operations	1.2	1.7	1.5
Total	3.7	5.2	4.8
<u>Civilian</u>			
Supply Operations	21.4	21.2	20.4
Maintenance Operations	114.6	115.7	116.2
Logistic Support Operations	13.5	13.5	13.5
Total	149.4	150.4	150.2

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

(1) Supply Operations. This category includes the Supply Depots, Inventory Control Points and procurement activities that provide support to the fleet and contract expertise for the acquisition of ship and aircraft systems. The decline in civilian spaces through FY 1982 is due almost entirely to planned contracting efforts at the supply depots and ICPs.

(2) Maintenance Operations

Naval Air Rework Facilities. The air rework facilities perform depot level maintenance of aircraft and components, manufacture critical nonavailable parts, and provide technical assistance to intermediate maintenance organizations.

Naval Shipyards. The Naval shipyards provide logistics support for assigned ships and service craft, perform work in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking, and outfitting ships and craft, and perform manufacturing research, development and test work. The civilian manpower increase in Maintenance Operations for FY 1982 occurs in the shipyards and reflects workload phasing throughout the year. The civilian workforce is expected to be about 67,540 in FY 1981 and 68,560 in FY 1982.

Ordnance Activities. Ordnance activities are responsible for receiving, renovating, maintaining, storing and issuing ammunition, explosives, expendable ordnance items and weapons and ordnance material,

providing technical, engineering and logistics support for combat systems, components, and support systems and equipment, and proofing, testing, and evaluating underwater weapons. They manage underwater acoustic ranges and range equipment and provide engineering support for weapon system acquisition. Increased civilian employment to 19,293 in FY 1982 from an FY 1980 level of 18,008 provides for a reduction in the maintenance backlog, reduced repair times, and increased quality control.

Maintenance Support Activities. The maintenance support activities plan, design, test and deliver combat direction system computer programs for the operating forces. They also support fleet computer program development and maintenance and provide technical assistance to the shore establishment. Civilian manning at the maintenance support activities is essentially level through FY 1982.

(3) Logistics Support Operations. Logistics Support is made up a variety of logistics and technical support activities. Included are the Navy Publications and Printing Service, technical and engineering support activities of the Naval Air, Sea, and Electronics Systems Commands, and the Navy Regional Data Automation Command.

g. Centralized Support Activities. This category includes non-management headquarters strength in unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

Navy Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.6	6.9	7.0
Reserve Components	1.6	1.4	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.0	8.3	8.3

Active manpower requirements in this category increase between FY 1980 and FY 1981 as a result of the transfer of automatic data processing to the account. The increase in FY 1982 is due to an increase in personnel administration activities.

The decrease of 500 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1982 is a result of transferring Personnel Mobilization Team augmentation units to the category of Personnel Support.

The civilian manpower increase in FY 1981 is for the management of Direct Case Foreign Military Sales reimbursable support, expansion of the deserter apprehension program and implementation of a standard organization for all Regional Data Automation Centers.

h. Management Headquarters. This category reflects management headquarters strength required to support defense agencies, international military organizations, and unified, combat, and service commands.

Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.4	8.5	8.6
Reserve Components	3.3	3.0	3.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.3	8.8	8.8

The increase of active military manpower between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is caused by undermanning of Management Headquarters requirements experienced at the end of FY 1980. Between FY 1981 and FY 1982, the 100 increase is growth in service support command headquarters including fleet and type commander headquarters.

The decrease of 300 Selected Reserves from FY 1980 to FY 1981 and the increase between FY 1981 and FY 1982 are the result of NAMMOS generated requirements.

The increase in civilian end strength for FY 1981 is attributed to new or expanded requirements associated with SHORSTAMPS, contract administration, and aviation maintenance management.

i. Federal Agency Support. The Federal Agency Support subcategory includes Navy manpower strength assigned to other federal departments and agencies, normally on a reimbursable basis.

Navy Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.1	1.0	1.0
Reserve Components	*	*	*
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

* Fewer than 50.

The changes of 100 shown in the table reflect rounding of the numbers which result from several minor manpower changes in FY 1980 and FY 1981.

6. Individuals

Navy maintains Individuals accounts so that the units of the force structure, on the average, will be manned at their authorized strength over the course of the fiscal year. As indicated in previous sections, there are seasonal variations in manning. The end of year numbers reflect these variations. The Individuals account consists of estimates of the numbers of transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, trainees, students, and Naval Academy midshipmen.

a. Transients

Navy Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	25.8	25.7	26.2

Transient requirements are a function of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move program. Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during PCS travel, which includes travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute. Approximately 75 percent of total transient time represents leave taken en route between duty stations. Navy personnel are encouraged to use accrued leave during PCS moves to reduce non-available time at assigned activities.

Changes in this category, including a decrease of 100 from FY 1980 to FY 1981 and an increase of 500 between FY 1981 and FY 1982, are attributable to changes in Navy's PCS move program. The totals shown reflect projected manpower enroute between duty stations at the end of the fiscal year. Transient manpower at this time is normally somewhat higher than the average transient strength throughout the fiscal year as a result of the greater number of PCS moves required to accommodate the training needs of Service members and peak training move requirements.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Navy Patients/Prisoners/Holdees Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.9	5.7	5.3

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

The reduction of 400 active Navy manpower in this category between FY 1981 and FY 1982 reflects anticipated improvement in the quality of recruit accessions resulting in a lower prisoner requirement in FY 1982.

c. Trainees, Students, and Midshipmen

Navy Trainee/Student/Midshipmen Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	64.9	68.5	69.5
Midshipmen	4.5	4.5	4.5
Total	70.4	72.8	73.1
Reserve Components			
Trainees/Students	0.9	0.9	0.9
Mobilization Augmentees	-	-	0.4

Trainees, students, and midshipmen manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals. Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military training and initial skill training. Students are individuals undergoing specialized, flight, and professional training. Midshipmen are individuals attending the United States Naval Academy. The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans.

The increase of active military manpower in this category between FY 1980 and FY 1981 reflects substantial growth in recruit strength and follow-on general skill training requirements associated with the overall growth in the size of the active Navy between these years. A comprehensive discussion of trainee and student loads is included in the separately published Military Manpower Training Report.

The increase in reserve manpower between FY 1981 and FY 1982 reflects growth in the Individual Mobilization Augmentee program.

CHAPTER V

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes Marine Corps active and reserve military and civilian manpower requirements, presents the manpower levels requested for FY 1982 and FY 1983, depicts manpower trends, discusses initiatives, and explains the changes from year to year.

Inherent in the statutory missions and functions set forth in the National Security Act of 1947 is the requirement for the Marine Corps to provide rapidly deployable forces for contingency missions in support of the national strategy. To support those missions and functions, the Marine Corps maintains a Fleet Marine Force posture as follows: one Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) composed of a command element, a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing and a force service support group located on the East Coast of the United States with primary commitment to the defense of NATO; one MAF forward deployed and oriented to the Pacific area; and a third MAF stationed on the West Coast of the United States, which is capable of meeting worldwide contingency requirements or reinforcing forward deployed forces, including those committed to NATO. Elements from all three MAFs could be rapidly joined to provide a composite MAF for contingencies in Southwest Asia or elsewhere.

The Marine Corps Reserve provides the initial and primary source of trained units and individuals for augmentation and reinforcement of the active forces when additional capability beyond that available in the regular component is required.

While the minimum structure of the active Marine Corps is specified by law, the manpower requirement to support that structure is not. Additionally, the specific composition of the Marine divisions and Marine aircraft wings and the size and composition of the combat service support units are a matter of Marine Corps internal determination. The manpower levels requested in FY 1982 and FY 1983 are less than required to fully support all contingency plans. The requested levels are shown in the following table.

Marine Corps Manpower Requirement
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Active Military	188.1	188.1
Marine Corps Reserve	38.5	39.7
Civilian Personnel	19.5	19.5

The active force structure is selectively manned to maximize combat capability. As a result, manning of support activities is programmed at the minimum necessary to provide acceptable support to the combat forces and to manage the resources of the bases and the training establishment. This level is feasible because Fleet Marine Force units provide augmentation personnel who fulfill a significant portion of the base operating support work load requirements. Additionally, the requirement for Individual Training manpower is reduced through on-the-job and field skill training programs which currently provide approximately 20 percent of Marine Corps' initial skill training. The number of Marines receiving the preferred formal school is programmed to increase.

The extent to which the active forces are selectively manned can be shown by the total number of personnel that would be required to fully man the force structure represented in the Unit Identity and Status Reporting System (UNITREP). This system is used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to report the readiness of authorized forces. To fully man Marine Corps units and tables of organization would require a strength of about 210,360, considerably more than the 188,100 currently authorized.

The majority of Fleet Marine Force units are authorized manning at less than 100 percent of requirements during peacetime. Selected units are reduced to zero manning. Unmanned units are not eliminated from the total structure requirement because they would be activated and manned by reassigned active duty or mobilized reserve personnel in time of emergency.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The Marine Corps, while undergoing some organizational changes to accommodate available resources, continues to stress the combat capability and readiness of its Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) and reserve forces. Force structure changes for FY 1981 and FY 1982 include small structure and manning increases to the infantry and artillery battalions, increased battalion and squadron level NBC defense personnel, decreased tactical and support aviation squadron manning, improved manning of ground antiaircraft defense missile battalions and batteries, and increased manning of force service support groups.

B. Manpower Requirements Determination

1. General

The first step in developing manpower requirements is to determine the general forces needed to accomplish Marine Corps roles and missions in the national military strategy. A "planning force" is then constructed within the Joint Strategic Planning System in terms of MAFs. The planning force, which is fiscally responsible but not fiscally constrained, can be described as the force level necessary to execute the national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The UNITREP structure is derived from planning force levels after consideration

of the force structure requirements immediately necessary for war. The authorized strength requested represents Marine Corps decisions, in light of fiscal and manpower availability constraints and readiness requirements, of the appropriate manning level of the force. Once the basic framework of the force structure has been decided, determination of the requirement for manpower focuses on the structure of the infantry battalion.

Design of the infantry battalion begins with analysis of the capabilities that are essential to accomplish the missions and functions of the Marine Corps. The analysis involves research on new weapons technology, equipment experiments, war games using manual and computer simulation techniques, field tests, and military judgment.

The infantry battalion structure and the number of such battalions, together with mission requirements, form the basis for determining the type and quantity of other combat, combat support, and combat service support units required to form the Marine division. The objective is to form a ground combat element consisting of infantry, tank, assault amphibian vehicle, artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and command and control units, and to integrate this force with aviation and combat service support elements to produce Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) for amphibious or other combined arms operations.

Manpower requirements for aviation units of the Marine aircraft wing are established by evaluating the support which must be provided to the ground combat forces. Computer simulated war games, historical data, and military judgment are used to estimate the number of sorties required daily to support an infantry battalion in combat. Each aircraft type has a specific sortie capability which, when divided into the sortie requirement, determines the number of each type of aircraft required. The crew ratio (crews per aircraft in wartime) and the direct maintenance and ordnance support factors estimate the manpower required to fly and maintain each aircraft. Considerations regarding the necessary span of control, the geographic distribution of supported forces, and the available assets establish the number of aircraft to be assigned to each squadron. The number of aircraft per squadron provides the basis for determining the additional command and control and support manpower required in each squadron. Squadrons are then task organized into Marine aircraft groups and wings according to specific mission requirements.

The Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs) of the Fleet Marine Force are composed of specialized units, such as supply, maintenance, engineer, motor transport, landing support, dental, and medical battalions, which are essential to the combat service support of the MAF. When the size of the forces and the density of equipment of the task organized MAGTF have been established, the combat service support required is determined using criteria that incorporate maintenance, service, and supply concepts.

Determination of the manpower requirement for support activities is more complex because of the great variety of activities performed, the

many one-of-a-kind situations that exist, and the interdependence of the military, civilian, and contractor portions of the work force. Specific details of the total force manpower requirements for support activities are contained in the discussion of the appropriate DPPC in Section D of this chapter.

Total force manpower requirements of all organizations are critically examined on a regular cycle. This assures that the structure and related manpower requirements support the national strategy to the fullest extent possible and that the constrained manpower levels permit the Marine Corps to meet its assigned missions at an identified level of risk.

2. Management Improvements

The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives with those designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. Two major improvements - unit deployment and a computer based assignment system - continue to provide increased stability for units and the individual Marine. These actions, in turn, provide additional leadership and training continuity in units and contribute to improved readiness.

The Marine Corps' unit deployment program, designed to enhance uniform readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence, permits Marines assigned to tactical aviation squadrons and infantry battalions to be homebased in CONUS or Hawaii while deploying for periods of approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean commitments. The fourth and fifth phases of this program commence ground unit deployments from CONUS to replace like units in the Western Pacific. The program is scheduled for full implementation by the end of FY 1982. Reductions in requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and in the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours have already been realized from this program.

To support the unit deployment program, the Marine Corps is proceeding with development of a computer-based planning and assignment system designed to provide cost effective, equitable allocation of first-term manpower resources among all units in the Fleet Marine Force. Inventory projection and tour optimization models, planned for full implementation during FY 1981, will provide uniform readiness through an optimization procedure which reconciles first-term requirements with first-term assets in a manner consistent with approved manning policies.

Manual implementation of the models on a limited basis is being used to aid manpower managers. Seven computer models and an extensive manpower data base comprise the heart of the system. The system will provide comprehensive training and allocation plans to maximize personnel stability and to support the unit deployment program. The system will calculate a Marine Corps personnel distribution plan designed to optimize readiness in the FME.

C. Significant Program Highlights

1. Active Military Manpower

a. General. Last year, the Marine Corps requested a FY 1981 end strength of 185,200. Subsequent to the request, compensation initiatives, economic factors, and the cumulative effects of reduced attrition and increased reenlistments resulted in fewer losses than anticipated. In light of this, the Marine Corps requested approval for a FY 1980 end strength of 188,500 and additional funding for a revised FY 1981 end strength of 188,100. The higher manpower strength levels were approved by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. The request for FY 1982 remains 188,100. This increase in end strength from levels projected in last year's report is reflected in improved manning of certain combat service support and aviation units in the Fleet Marine Forces.

b. Enlisted. The Marine Corps FY 1980 enlisted end strength was 99.7 percent of the authorized level of 170,865. Enlisted recruiting attainment and goals are shown in the following table.

Active Marine Corps Enlisted Recruiting Goals
Total (Non-Prior Service/Prior Service)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Plan	43,684 (41,884/1,800)	42,584 (40,384/2,200)	42,184 (39,984/2,200)
Actual	44,282 (41,807/2,475)	-	-

The Marine Corps achieved 101.8 percent of the combined prior service and non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals. The difference of 77 personnel in the plan and actual non-prior service figures shown above resulted from management actions taken in light of increased prior service accessions. Since the prior service applicant normally wants to immediately enlist, many late year non-prior service applicants were deferred until the beginning of FY 1981. The Marine Corps recruited 14,769 three-year, 26,919 four-year, and 119 six-year enlistees. For FY 1981 and beyond, all enlistments will be for three or more years, with a goal of 70 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality accessions by enlisting 78 percent high school graduates in FY 1980. High school graduates are the best source of quality manpower in terms of retention, trainability, and amenability to discipline. For FY 1981 and FY 1982, the Marine Corps remains committed to a goal of 75 percent high school graduate non-prior service accessions.

c. Officer. Active officer procurement objectives are shown in the following table.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Goals

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Plan	1,948	1,850	1,908
Actual	1,895	-	-

Officer strength as a result of these procurement plans remains stable at 18,100 in FY 1981 and FY 1982. This structure permits the Marine Corps to retain the most promising officers, maintain a normal promotion flow, provide the necessary leadership for combat forces and training programs, and support the requirement for rapid expansion in time of emergency.

d. Women in the Marine Corps. Women Marines are assigned to billets commensurate with their capabilities to the maximum extent practicable. Such utilization is based on both the roles and missions of the Marine Corps and the necessity to provide women with rewarding careers. The Marine Corps does not classify women in combatant Military Occupational Specialties and restricts the numbers of women who may be assigned to deployable combat units.

Women Marine Strength Total (Enlisted/Officer)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Active	6,706 (6,219/487)	7,051 (6,523/528)	7,935 (7,389/546)
Reserve Component	869 (826/43)	891 (841/50)	926 (865/61)

2. Marine Corps Reserve

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) is organized into a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing, and a force service support group which make the Fourth Division/Wing Team (4th DWT). The organizational structure of the SMCR is designed to complement the active forces.

Upon mobilization, the SMCR will either provide units to reinforce or augment the active force or will provide a balanced air-ground team from brigade to division/wing size for service with the fleet or to reinforce MAFs already committed. The actual employment will depend on the situation existing during mobilization.

SMCR wartime requirements call for 41,995 personnel. The wartime requirements provide personnel to fully man the 4th DWT and ancillary mobilization manpower requirements. Without considering active force mobilization requirements, the SMCR wartime requirement will be

met by 31,384 Selected Reservists (excludes reservists at initial training), 4,300 active duty support personnel, and 6,311 Individual Ready Reservists.

The Marine Corps Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) pool consists of honorably released active duty Marines who have a remaining statutory military obligation or have opted to extend their Ready Reserve contract. Members of the IRR may be recalled to active duty by the President in time of national emergency or when otherwise authorized by law. The end FY 1980 IRR strength was 55,000.

In order to maintain the number of IRR individuals in a rapid recall status, transfers of individuals from the IRR to the Standby Reserve at the end of their fifth year of obligation are only made upon request, in accordance with Section 269 Title 10, U.S. Code. Individuals with critical military skills are retained in the IRR for their full period of obligated service. IRR strength is projected to increase to approximately 57,000 by the end of FY 1982.

The policy change discussed above will cause a concomitant reduction in the strength of the Standby Reserve to approximately 1,500 at the end of FY 1982. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment active and reserve forces in a national emergency declared by the Congress. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

The SMCR average strength authorization for FY 1982 is 37,000. This strength supports the force structure contained in the UNITREP and ancillary mobilization personnel requirements. The end strength authorization also includes reservists on Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) and full-time active duty personnel for administration and training of reserves.

Recruiting goals and attainment for the SMCR are as follows:

	<u>Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals</u> (Non-Prior Service)		
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Plan	7,746	7,800	7,800
Actual	8,067	-	-

For FY 1980, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve attained 107 percent of the planned enlisted end strength of 30,972. Continuing improvements in the gain to loss ratio during FY 1980, including a 52 percent first term reenlistment rate for non-prior service personnel, lower IADT attrition and the introduction of incentive payments for prior service reenlistments, enabled the SMCR to end FY 1980 with a total paid strength of 35,449.

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Prior Service)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Plan	4,440	4,675	6,000
Actual	4,045	-	-

For FY 1980, the SMCR attained 91 percent of the prior service enlistment goal. This marked the third consecutive year that the goal was not attained (average decline of 16 percent against requirements over the three years). The downward trend cannot continue if the SMCR is to maintain the prior/non-prior service ratio needed to have the expertise, maturity, and grade manning required by the structure.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the SMCR are the same as for the active force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes from officers who have completed their initial obligated active service of three years or more.

3. Civilian Manpower

The Marine Corps employs civilians to meet the manpower requirements of support activities to the maximum practicable extent consistent with the need to use military personnel by reason of law, security, discipline, rotation, and operational readiness. The civilian work force is closely integrated with military manpower to accomplish workload requirements. Accordingly, a reduction in civilian strength without a concomitant reduction in workload would require an offsetting increase in military manpower or contractual services to maintain functional capabilities.

4. Commercial Industrial Type Activity (CITA)

In FY 1979 the Marine Corps expanded emphasis on contracting for services. Since FY 1979 a total of 539 military and 973 civilian positions have been considered for cost study analysis under this program. Thus far it has been determined that 412 military and 92 civilian positions do not meet the cost study criteria and these were dropped from further consideration, 5 military and 166 civilian positions are to remain in-house and 12 military and 41 civilian positions are to be contracted. It is anticipated that the remaining 110 military and 674 civilian positions will be considered during FY 1981 (36 military and 309 civilian) and FY 1982 (74 military and 365 civilian).

D. Marine Corps Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)

The following tables display, by DPPC, the actual Marine Corps manpower distribution for FY 1980 and manpower requirements for FY 1981 and FY 1982.

MARINE CORPS ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	*	*	*
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	*	*	*
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>106.2</u>	<u>110.4</u>	<u>110.7</u>
Land Forces	80.3	84.4	84.8
Tactical Air Forces	25.4	25.5	25.3
Naval Forces	0.6	0.6	0.6
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Intelligence	0.7	0.7	0.7
Centrally Managed Communications	*	*	*
Research and Development Activities	0.8	0.8	0.8
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>43.6</u>	<u>42.4</u>	<u>42.7</u>
Base Operating Support	21.4	20.5	20.7
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	4.7	4.6	4.6
Individual Training	7.7	7.6	7.7
Force Support Training	3.2	3.0	2.9
Central Logistics	0.8	0.8	0.8
Centralized Support Activities	2.4	2.4	2.4
Management Headquarters	2.2	2.3	2.3
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.3	1.3
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>151.4</u>	<u>154.5</u>	<u>155.1</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>37.0</u>	<u>33.6</u>	<u>33.1</u>
Transients	8.1	7.7	7.7
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	1.7	1.4	1.4
Students, Trainees	27.1	24.5	24.0
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>188.5</u>	<u>188.1</u>	<u>188.1</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(END PAID-DRILL STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 1980 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1981 <u>FY 1982 Budget</u>	FY 1982 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces			
Defensive Strategic Forces			
Strategic Control and Surveillance			
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>31.2</u>	<u>32.5</u>	<u>33.5</u>
Land Forces	24.9	25.9	26.6
Tactical Air Forces	6.3	6.6	6.9
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Intelligence			
Centrally Managed Communications			
Research and Development Activities			
Geophysical Activities			
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.9</u>
Base Operating Support	-	-	-
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	-	-	0.8
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	0.1	0.1	0.1
Management Headquarters	-	-	-
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>31.2</u>	<u>32.6</u>	<u>34.4</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holders	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	4.2	4.1	4.1
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>35.4</u>	<u>36.7</u>	<u>38.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces			
Defensive Strategic Forces			
Strategic Control and Surveillance			
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>
Land Forces			
Tactical Air Forces			
Naval Forces			
Mobility Forces			
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>
Intelligence			
Centrally Managed Communications			
Research and Development Activities			
Geophysical Activities			
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>19.5</u>	<u>19.5</u>	<u>19.5</u>
Base Operating Support	14.6	14.4	14.4
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.2
Force Support Training	*	*	*
Central Logistics	2.7	2.7	2.7
Centralized Support Activities	1.3	1.3	1.3
Management Headquarters	0.6	0.6	0.6
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>19.5</u>	<u>19.5</u>	<u>19.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Less than 50.

1. Determination of Active Military End Strength

The Marine Corps' internal manpower management process utilizes authorized strength based on an average strength projected for force unit manning. Authorized strength for a given unit differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning. The projected undermanning for 30 September of the force structure, aggregated by DPPC, is subtracted from the DPPC authorized strength for this report.

Military Undermanning by DPPC (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-1.7</u>	<u>-1.7</u>
Land Forces	-1.2	-1.2
Tactical Air Forces	- .5	- .5
Naval Forces	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>- .1</u>	<u>- .1</u>
Intelligence	*	*
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-
Research and Development Activities	*	*
Geophysical Activities	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>		
Base Operating Support	-	-
Medical Support	-	-
Personnel Support	-	-
Individual Training	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	-	-
Management Headquarters	-	-
Federal Agency Support	-	-
Total	<u>-1.8</u>	<u>-1.8</u>

* Less than 50.

2. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Marine Corps Tactical/Mobility Forces include Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, and Naval Forces. About 110,700 Marines (59 percent of the Corps) will be assigned to this category in FY 1982. Tactical/Mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military personnel are included in these units.

With the exception of those reserve personnel undergoing initial active duty for training and on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to Tactical/Mobility Forces.

a. Land Forces. Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting force service support groups. Additionally, this category includes helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays Land Forces for FY 1980 to FY 1982.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	80.3	84.4	84.8
Reserve Components	24.9	25.9	26.6

Actual active force strength in FY 1980 largely reflects the temporary undermanning on 30 September 1980 associated with the seasonal fluctuation of recruiting input. The strengths in FY 1981 and FY 1982 provide for the addition of force structure, primarily for air defense, and increased manning levels of helicopter and logistics units.

Increases in FY 1981 and FY 1982 reserve component numbers reflect strength improvements resulting from exceeding the FY 1980 non-prior service recruiting goals, higher retention, and lower initial training attrition. Increases also reflect programmed growth necessary to meet wartime requirements and to support mobilization.

b. Tactical Air Forces. Tactical Air Forces manpower includes air crews and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with reserve component support, Marine security detachments in aircraft carriers, and various command, control, and support functions.

The Tactical Air Forces manpower requirement is as follows:

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	25.4	25.5	25.3
Reserve Components	6.3	6.6	6.9

The active force manpower reduction in FY 1982 is associated with lower manning levels in F-4 squadrons. The reserve manpower program will support seven fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons with appropriate air control, maintenance, and expeditionary support.

The reserve component strength increases in FY 1981 and FY 1982 reflect the reserve structure growth previously discussed in Land Forces Manpower.

c. Naval Forces. The Marine Corps request for Naval Forces includes personnel assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in Tactical Air Forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders and missile support ships, and Marine Corps staff billets for Naval operational and amphibious commands and ships.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.6	0.6	0.6

3. Auxiliary Activities

The Marine Corps program for the Auxiliary Activities category totals approximately 1,600 active military personnel, most of whom are in either Intelligence or Research and Development. The Marine Corps has no reserve or civilian manpower in the Auxiliary Activities category.

a. Intelligence. The manpower in the intelligence category supports the national intelligence effort under the Director of the National Security Agency. The manpower program also provides for a small number of personnel (less than 50) who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval Intelligence Centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.7	0.7	0.7

The Marine Corps contribution to the Intelligence function represents an effort to use cryptologic personnel in peacetime in a manner which will allow them to receive valuable training and experience through work in their occupational specialty. Under wartime conditions approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Amphibious Force.

b. Research and Development. Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.8	0.8

Most of the Marines who perform this function are assigned to the Development Center of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command located at the Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. A significant subordinate organization of the Development Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, is a tenant activity at the Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts include the development of the organization, doctrine, tactics, techniques, equipment, and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force in amphibious operations. All development activity is closely coordinated with the other services to avoid duplication. Marines assigned to research and development activities conduct studies which identify required operational capabilities, manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Additionally, they review and revise Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Some Marines are also assigned in a liaison capacity to developmental activities of the other services.

c. Other Auxiliary Forces. In FY 1982, fewer than 50 Marines will be assigned to the remaining Auxiliary Forces categories. The Marines in the Centrally Managed Communications category support the Military Affiliate Radio System and the Defense Communications Agency. The Marines in the Geophysical Activities category are assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency as instructors in schools attended by Marines.

4. Support Activities

a. Base Operating Support. The following table displays the total manpower request for this category and provides detail regarding the sub-categories of Combat Installations and Support Installations.

Marine Corps Base Operating Support
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
	<u>Total of Sub-Categories</u>		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.4	20.5	20.7
<u>Civilian</u>	14.6	14.4	14.4
	<u>Combat Installations</u>		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.5	15.5	15.6
<u>Civilian</u>	10.3	10.1	10.1
	<u>Support Installations</u>		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.9	4.6	4.8
<u>Civilian</u>	4.3	4.3	4.3

In the Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category, the increased active military reflects the addition of food services and family assistance personnel to bases in FY 1982. The civilian request in this sub-category decreases in FY 1982 as a result of the proposed conversion of Civil Service positions to contract services. This is offset by increases for the conversion of non-appropriated fund and reimbursable family housing positions to Civil Service.

The FY 1980 actual strengths included Marines temporarily attached in a restricted or limited duty status and a number of Marines who entered the initial skill training pipeline during the prime summer recruiting months. A portion of those individuals were assigned to Marine Corps bases for their training. Such personnel will be used as replacements in base or co-located Fleet Marine Force units upon completion of their training.

Base Operating Support manpower constitutes an essential adjunct to Fleet Marine Force readiness by providing the administration, operation, and maintenance of the base structure in which combat forces are housed, supported, supplied, and trained. Manpower in the Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category is assigned to operate the installations at which Fleet Marine Forces are based. The Support Installations sub-category includes manpower assigned to operate logistic and training bases.

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Combat Installations using a fixed/variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the Base Operating Support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services which are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the Tactical/Mobility Forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to Base Operating Support-Combat Installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training.

The Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category also includes Marines assigned to security duties with Marine barracks located at major Navy bases throughout the world. Personnel are provided for security guard posts based on the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and to meet other assigned responsibilities.

The determination of manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Support Installations is based on an analysis of the functional and workload requirements of bases in this sub-category. Since such bases do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units, computation of the variable support element is excluded.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for Base Operating Support manpower at all combat and support installations. All support functions are reviewed periodically to determine if economies can be achieved by changing the method of performance from in-house to contract (and vice versa), consistent with military readiness requirements. A full-scale, on-site manpower survey is conducted at each installation at least once every three years and authorized manning levels are reviewed annually. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to ensure that the approved manpower, grade, and skill levels are appropriate. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. Manpower survey efforts have improved support organizations by consolidating duplicative functions, improving staffing efficiency, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need.

b. Personnel Support. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.7	4.6	4.6
Reserve Components	-	-	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2

Marine Corps requirements in this category include recruiting and examining services, support to disciplinary commands, and other personnel support. The increase in FY 1982 reflects individual Selected Reservists assigned to mobilization support billets.

c. Individual Training

Marine Corps Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.7	7.6	7.7
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2

Individual Training manpower is required to conduct formal military and technical training and professional education of Marine Corps personnel. To the extent that such training can be conducted at other service schools or through alternative on-the-job and field skill methods, the Individual Training manpower requirement is reduced. During FY 1981, approximately 20 percent of those Marines undergoing initial skill training will be trained through such alternative methods. The increase from FY 1981 to FY 1982 is associated with additional instructors in Naval Air Maintenance Training Detachments to meet the requirements of new aircraft models. A detailed justification of training requirements is contained in the FY 1982 Military Manpower Training Report.

d. Force Support Training. Force Support Training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Training Group are tasked with

providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission.

This category also includes manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. The following table summarizes the manpower requirement for the Force Support Training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.2	3.0	2.9
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

* Fewer than 50 spaces

The FY 1980 end strength reflects temporary overmanning of aviation training squadrons. The decrease from FY 1981 to FY 1982 is indicative of reduced aviation training requirements for the F-4.

e. Central Logistics. The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services. A constant military and civilian strength is programmed for FY 1981 and FY 1982.

Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.7	2.7	2.7

f. Centralized Support Activities

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.4	2.4	2.4
Reserve Components	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.3	1.3

The Marines in this category provide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations truce teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, and Marine Corps support to OSD and JCS. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include the Marine Corps Personnel Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records, the Marine Corps Automated Services Center, which maintains the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System, and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the JUMPS system for the Marine Corps. Reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category.

g. Management Headquarters. The following table displays the manpower requirement in the Management Headquarters category.

Marine Corps Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.2	2.3	2.3
<u>Civilian</u>	0.6	0.6	0.6

The manpower requirement for this function is associated with three sub-categories of Management Headquarters. Marines serving at NATO, NORAD, and U.S. Forces Korea headquarters activities are categorized under International Military Organizations. Marines assigned to Unified Commands are also so categorized. The Service Support-Combat Commands sub-category includes the Fleet Marine Force and major Navy operational command headquarters. Manpower requirements for Marine Corps and Navy departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters are categorized under Service Support-Service Commands.

All of the sub-categories of Management Headquarters include requirements external to the Marine Corps. Marines so assigned perform two important functions. First, they provide readily available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps is kept current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs are kept aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations. Management Headquarters personnel strength essentially remains constant except for temporary undermanning at the end of FY 1980, primarily at Fleet Marine Force headquarters.

h. Federal Agency Support. The following table displays Marine Corps manpower committed to Federal Agency Support.

Marine Corps Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.2	1.3	1.3

Federal Agency Support manpower consists almost exclusively of the Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion, which furnishes security guards for Foreign Service Posts around the world for the Department of State. For FY 1981 and FY 1982, Marines will man six new posts in Africa, Asia, and South America.

4. Individuals

The following table displays the Individuals accounts.

Marine Corps Individuals Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	8.1	7.7	7.7
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	1.7	1.4	1.4
Trainees/Students	<u>27.1</u>	<u>24.5</u>	<u>24.0</u>
Total	37.0	33.6	33.1
Reserve Components			
Trainees/Students	4.2	4.1	4.1

The strengths shown in the Individuals accounts are estimates of the number of personnel who will be in a transient, trainee/student, or patient/prisoner/holder status at the end of a fiscal year. These estimates are based partly on historical data and partly on current and projected manpower plans and policies. The Individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces and shortages in authorizations for these accounts will result in strength reductions in the combat or support forces.

Transient requirements have declined as a result of the unit deployment program and other turbulence reduction initiatives in recent years. However, the actual FY 1980 end strength reflects an unusually large number of transients as of 30 September. FY 1981 and FY 1982 transients are projected to remain stable.

The patient/prisoner/holder population is expected to remain even during FY 1981 and FY 1982 as a result of continued quality in recruiting and the small number of personnel awaiting separation. An increase in Marines on appellate leave characterizes the FY 1980 actual strength.

The trainee/student request reflects the impact of programmed training efficiencies, principally in recruit and specialized skill training, during FY 1981 and FY 1982. The FY 1980 strength reflects the large numbers of recruits who entered during the prime summer months.

CHAPTER VI

AIR FORCE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Authorization Request

This chapter describes Air Force military and civilian manpower requirements for both active and reserve forces that are planned for FY 1982. Requirements for FY 1982 and FY 1983 are as summarized in the following table:

Air Force Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
<u>Military</u>		
Active	569.5	577.5
Reserve Components		
ANGUS	98.3	99.2
USAFR	64.0	65.7
<u>Civilian</u>	244.0	244.3

The Air Force manpower program for FY 1982 and FY 1983 reflects continued application of the Total Force Policy to accomplish assigned missions. Total active military manpower continues a modest build in FY 1982 after showing, for the first time since FY 1968, an increase in FY 1981. Civilian manpower begins to build slightly. The Air Force is continuing to search out and implement management initiatives to increase Air Force readiness, improve the utilization of available manpower, and organize and operate its forces for effective, efficient mission accomplishment.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The mission and associated force structure of the Air Force are the primary indicators of resource requirements. Consequently, the size and composition of the force structure to be supported provide the base for the majority of manpower requirements. From a manpower requirements standpoint, the most important force structure characteristics are the numbers and types of aircraft, missiles, and other systems authorized.

The Air Force, in support of the FY 1977 President's Budget, identified a goal of modernizing and fully equipping its 26 active tactical fighter wings by FY 1981, in addition to modernizing the Air Reserve Force tactical fighter force. Due to fiscal constraints, completion of the 26 wing build has now slipped to FY 1984. Force modernization and increased equipage result in 12 additional active tactical fighter aircraft in FY 1981 and 40 more in FY 1982. Concurrently, a net increase of 54

tactical fighters in FY 1982 is added to the Air Reserve Forces as part of the Air Force's program to modernize and upgrade Air Reserve Force tactical fighter aircraft. The modification of C-141A aircraft to C-141B, the "stretch" version, will be completed in FY 1982, and the C-5 wing modernization program will begin. Four KC-10 tanker-cargo aircraft will enter the force in FY 1982, in addition to two AWACS aircraft. Also significant is the continued implementation of the Joint Surveillance System of joint use USAF/FAA radars. Featuring interagency cooperation, the phased implementation of this system will free military and civilian manpower to meet other USAF requirements.

B. Manpower Requirements Determination

The most fundamental task in effective manpower management is the systematic determination of manpower requirements. Despite the use of recognized techniques for quantifying and aggregating total manpower needs, the task is greatly complicated by the anomaly of having to fund and manage a force structured for peacetime against which wartime missions and taskings are laid. As a consequence, the funded manpower levels are derived from a force structure which represents the resources available to the Air Force, rather than those desired in an unconstrained environment.

1. General

a. Wartime Manpower Requirements. The Air Force determines the Total Force manpower required to support the national strategy through an annual exercise in which each major command identifies resources needed to achieve their wartime objectives. The exercise begins with Secretary of Defense guidance to the Services which prescribes the wartime scenario at an established level of risk. Through a series of modeling techniques, the Air Force quantifies the manpower which must be mobilized to meet the deployed, strategic, and war sustaining requirements. Against this total requirement, the Air Force compares actual manpower authorized. The resultant shortfalls or functional mismatches serve as the basis for program adjustments. While we cannot afford to maintain our forces on a wartime footing during peacetime, we recognize the inherent danger in underfunding during peacetime to such an extent that readiness might be impaired. The Air Force goal is to strike a balance between peacetime and wartime requirements which will permit effective responses to potential contingencies.

The Air Force has made substantial progress in documenting the Total Force wartime manpower required to support the national strategy. Successive iterations have improved the process and have provided useful manpower management data which have identified wartime manpower shortfalls in combat and support activities, influenced decisions concerning manpower resource realignments, and provided information for evaluating potential contract candidates. The Air Force is continuing to use simulation modeling techniques such as the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) to evaluate and validate wartime manpower requirements. The Air Force is working towards developing procedures to provide wartime manpower standards for base operating support functions.

The Air Force Wartime Manpower and Personnel Readiness Team, established in 1980, is developing and maintaining a demand and supply data base for Air Force and OSD planning and programming. Their goal is to improve readiness by insuring an adequate military and civilian manpower resource mix by skill, the most effective balance between active and reserve components, and the proper balance between combat and combat-sustaining forces.

b. Air Force Management Engineering Program (MEP). An important aspect of manpower management is the accurate determination of manpower requirements for forces deployed, operated, and maintained to carry out assigned Air Force missions. Annual application of manpower standards and guides, using work load associated with the force structure, determines the numbers, kinds, and distribution of manpower authorizations.

In 1959 the MEP was established to develop and maintain manpower standards and provide management advisory services (MAS). Manpower standards and guides are developed using industrial engineering work measurement techniques and computerized models such as the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM). MEP policy emanates from the Directorate of Manpower and Organization (AF/MPM), while the Air Force Management Engineering Agency (AFMEA) approves all standards, provides technical/procedural guidance, and administers the Air Force-wide MEP schedule. AFMEA has 11 Functional Management Engineering Teams (FMETs) that develop and maintain manpower standards for Air Force common functional areas (supply, security police, etc.) which encompass over 70 percent of total authorized manpower. In addition, about 150 command METs develop/maintain command unique and single point standards and guides and perform on-site work measurement and coordination for FMET studies.

Cumulative results of the MEP through FY 1980 reflect 66.5 percent of authorizations under standard, about \$900 million in combined savings from standard applications and MAS, a return on investment of \$4 for each dollar spent, and over 90,000 authorizations deleted or redistributed. The remaining Air Force authorizations (33.5 percent) are covered by manpower guides. These guides are quantitative expressions of manpower; however, they are less structured than standards and are based on staff estimates, manpower surveys, and contractor estimates rather than on formal work measurement techniques. Guides are preferred where standards development is not practical, for example, when there is a lack of experience with new systems or when standards would be short-lived because a system or activity is approaching phase-out.

A continuing effort of the MEP is to emphasize productivity improvements and reduce the time required from the start of the standards development process to its conclusion when the required manpower adjustment is approved in the budget and entered into the Air Force's Command Manpower Data System (CMDS). Activity in this area ranges from refinement of present procedures to testing of new concepts. Initiatives include: designing standards to enhance their maintainability, reducing the number of measurement points, integrating productivity improvement efforts with standards development, improving the wartime manpower determination process, and designing studies to meet the specific needs of Air Force functional managers.

This program has progressively improved and enjoys increased credibility because of experience gained over the years and through constant refinement of methodology. Annual application of manpower standards and guides provides an accurate, objective, and consistent basis to forecast future manpower requirements based on projected work loads. When mission or force adjustments cause work load changes, this system assures that manpower will also be revised in accordance with the changed mission or force levels and resultant work loads.

2. Management Improvements

As manpower levels for FY 1982 and FY 1983 grow, the Air Force plans significant improvements in its combat capability through improved utilization of manpower resources. The Air Force Productivity Program, as an example, continues to emphasize increased readiness through greater productivity (See Chapter IX).

The Air Force is continuing the use of technological initiatives to provide manpower economies in FY 1982, such as automated telecommunications programs, and replacement of precision approach radars with instrument landing systems.

The Air Force is also undertaking a series of initiatives which bring into closer partnership the functions of manpower, training, and logistics during the earliest phases of system acquisition. In keeping with new DoD policies, the Air Force is making a concerted effort to establish policy which encourages less manpower-intensive engineering design of weapon systems. In addition, a study is underway to determine space operations personnel requirements, accession/training and career progression policies, strategies, and plans.


Increased efficiency through specific management initiatives is a primary means of enhancing the productivity, effectiveness, and readiness of the Air Force combat forces. To enhance overall readiness and mission capability, the Air Force will continue to reallocate resources made available by management initiatives such as those discussed above.

C. Significant Program Highlights

We are beginning to increase our strength to meet the challenge of the 1980s, after experiencing a declining end strength since FY 1968. We reached our lowest level of military personnel since 1950 in FY 1980 and will reach our lowest level of civilian personnel in FY 1981, but then experience a slight increase in FY 1982.

The modest military increase we are programming in FY 1981 and FY 1982 is to provide support, maintenance, and training for the modernization of our tactical fighter force and for the introduction of new

weapons systems such as ALCM, AWACS, TR-1, and EF-111. The Air Force is also taking a significant initiative to improve overall manning levels in field units by insuring that training and transient requirements are more adequately funded. The increase in civilians is primarily the result of conversion of non-military essential positions from military to civilian.



The manpower strength supports the following Air Force force structure in FY 1982:

Strategic Offensive Forces. B-52 and FB-111 bomber forces remain at 316 Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) and 60 PAA respectively. KC-135 aircraft will remain at 615 PAA. Minuteman and Titan II missiles continue at 1,000 PAA and 54 PAA respectively.

Strategic Defensive Forces. The force will consist of five active and ten Air National Guard interceptor squadrons. The Air Force began, in FY 1978, the phased replacement of long-range radars used in the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system with joint use USAF/FAA radars. Since FY 1980, and through FY 1982, additional radars are being transferred to the FAA as joint use, and other USAF radars are being eliminated. The E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) augments this surveillance capability.

Tactical Air Forces. The active tactical fighter force consists of 26 organizationally structured wings, which the Air Force plans to bring to full equipage by FY 1984. In FY 1982, the Air Force is continuing its tactical fighter force modernization with the addition of five F-16 tactical fighter squadrons, two A-10 squadrons, and two additional F-15 squadrons.

By end FY 1982, a 12 plus wing equivalent Air Reserve Force (ARF) structure composed of 42 fighter squadrons augments the active force. Modernization of ANGUS forces in FY 1982 continues with the conversion of F-105, EB-57, and OA-37 units to A-7s, F-4s and A-10s. Modernization of the USAFR continues in FY 1982 as A-37, F-105, and C-123 units equip with A-10, F-4 and C-130 aircraft. The Air Force Reserve also contributes one half of the aircrews for the KC-10 through collocated associate programs.

Other changes programmed in the tactical aircraft force structure in FY 1982 include an increase in E-3A AWACS aircraft to 24 PAA, providing a significant command and control capability; an addition of three EF-111 tactical electronic combat aircraft, and the activation of an EC-130H squadron (6 PAA).

Airlift Forces. Although strategic airlift forces remain at 234 PAA C-141 aircraft and 70 PAA C-5 aircraft, the "stretched" C-141B program will be completed and modification of the C-5 begins. These modifications increase C-141 cargo volume capacity by about 30 percent and provide an air refueling capability which reduces our dependence on foreign enroute basing structures. The C-5 wing modernization program will extend wing life by 30,000 hours.

Air Force Reserve associate units provide the ability to more fully use existing bases and aircraft by providing reserve air crews and maintenance personnel to active C-141, C-5, and C-9 units. C-5 associate crew ratios continue to increase to allow the Air Force Reserve to assume a greater role in strategic airlift. ARF tactical airlift forces decrease by 24 PAA in FY 1982 for a total of 336 C-130, C-7, and C-123 aircraft.

1. Active Military Manpower

Continuing a trend which began in FY 1981, the Air Force is increasing military manpower in FY 1982 to support continuing tactical fighter force modernization and increased maintenance requirements generated by new equipment, requirements for independent operating locations, and increased RF-4 wartime sortie rates. The modernization is concentrated in the addition of F-15, F-16, and A-10 aircraft which replace older F-4s. In addition, new weapons systems being phased in over the next few years, to include the ALCM, TR-1, EF-111, GLCM, and NATO AWACS, require manpower increases. Increases also occur for new space programs such as the Space Transportation System (STS) and increased cargo handling in aerial ports generated in part by the increased cargo capacity of the stretch C-141s. At the same time, the Air Force is taking a significant initiative to improve overall manning levels in field units by insuring that training and transient requirements are more adequately funded. Finally, to insure that military are used only for military essential functions, the Air Force is reviewing all military positions and is identifying/converting non-military essential positions to civilian.

a. Accession Programs-Active Force

Enlisted. Enlisted recruiting goals for FY 1981 through FY 1983, and the number of personnel recruited in FY 80, are shown below:

Active Air Force Enlisted Accession Goals

<u>FY 80</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 81</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 82</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 83</u> (Projected)
74,860	82,200	79,700	85,990

During FY 1979, for the first time in All-Volunteer Force history, the Air Force fell short of its enlisted recruiting objective by 2 percent (about 1,400). The objectives were met in FY 1980. However, there was still a downward trend in the quality of enlistees. The FY 1980 high school diploma graduate rate was the lowest in the history of the AVF, and the combined Mental Category I and II rates were the lowest since 1958. Continuation of these trends portends increased recruiting costs and increased attrition.

The Air Force initially entered the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) with adequate recruiting resources, an economic climate which facilitated recruiting success, an increasing youth population, and a competitive enlistment package. That package consisted of wages which were comparable with the private sector, a retirement program and inservice entitlements which enhanced the appeal of a military career, and a strong educational incentive in the GI Bill. The purchasing power of recruiting resources has declined and the economy has fluctuated. Further, FY 1979 represented the start of the decline in the 18-year old youth market, which is the major source of Non-Prior Service (NPS) enlistments. This decline has been accompanied by increased competition from civilian industry and

college campuses to attract quality youth. The OSD Spring 1980 Youth Survey indicates that the inclination of youth to enlist, although improved over FY 1979, is still 35 percent below the FY 1975 level. Even with some improvement in FY 1981, the enlistment package has failed to keep pace with the civilian sector in terms of pay increases and military compensation; the Veterans Education Assistance Program (VEAP) educational incentive is not as attractive as the former GI Bill. The net result is a marked drop in youth availability. However, with adequate resources, the Air Force expects to meet its personnel accessions under the AVF.

Officer. The officer procurement program supports established undergraduate flying training rates and officer requirements in the broad range of essential combat sustaining research and development and management functions. During FY 1980, the Air Force continued to encounter increasing difficulties in recruiting officer candidates in the technical and engineering areas, as well as in the health care professions. The market for these skills is highly competitive and, in the volunteer force environment, recruiting is a particularly difficult challenge. In FY 1980, we achieved only 39 percent of our total engineering officer requirements and attained only 48 percent of our physician goal. The Air Force has realigned recruiting resources and will expend every effort to meet the officer force requirements. The Air Force is preparing a legislative proposal to establish an engineering officer bonus which is a necessary, positive step toward making the USAF more competitive in the engineer recruiting environment. Officer accession goals in FY 1981 and FY 1982 and FY 1980 experience are shown below:

Active Air Force Officer Accession Goals

FY 80 (Actual)	FY 81 (Proj)	FY 82 (Proj)
9,748	8,617	8,781

To continue to attract and retain the necessary kinds and numbers of people (enlisted and officer), with increasing accession requirements and a declining target market youth population, we must continue to have Congressional help. This includes adequate recruiting and advertising resources; pay and entitlements commensurate with the unique demands of military life; restoration of a non-contributory educational incentive similar to the GI Bill; major CHAMPUS program improvements; and continuing strong statements of support for military service from the members of Congress, individually and collectively. Regarding the latter, the diminishing youth market must be convinced of the advantages of the military profession. Vital to this is the public attitude toward national defense and the opportunities the military offer young people. Fundamental to accomplishing this is the need to maintain the effectiveness, dignity, and status of the Armed Forces. Toward that end, the Air Force solicits a strong statement of support from members of the Congress, individually in their respective districts, as well as in a collective body, which positively encourages youth toward service in the military institution.

b. Women

(1) Numbers. The Air Force expects to continue to increase the number of women in both the officer and enlisted force. As of the end of FY 1980, there were 59,905 female personnel assigned (10.8 percent of the total). There will be approximately 85,000 women assigned by September 1983. If accession requirements and female continuation rates through FY 1983 remain as originally estimated, women will then constitute nearly 14 percent of the total strength of the active force.

(2) Combat Restriction. The statutory restriction regarding combat excludes women from only two percent of the Air Force Specialty codes which equates to ten percent of the total positions in the Air Force. However, to enhance the utilization prerogatives of the Service Secretaries, the Air Force supports action to repeal Section 8549 of Title 10, USC. This is not to imply that basic Air Force policy would change if this legislation was repealed, but rather would provide the Secretary of the Air Force the flexibility to manage the female portion of the force in a manner which best fits the needs and mission of the Air Force.

2. Air Reserve Forces Manpower

The Air Reserve Forces play a vital role in our total force posture. During the last several years, the Air Force has recognized the need to modernize the Air Reserve Forces and has incrementally equipped them with first line aircraft--A-7s, F-4s, C-130s, KC-135s, F-106s and A-10s. By the end of FY 1982, the Air Reserve Forces will possess approximately 34 percent of the tactical fighter aircraft, 61 percent of the tactical airlift aircraft, 49 percent of the strategic airlift crew capability, 53 percent of aerial ports capability, 21 percent of the strategic tanker aircraft, 65 percent of the strategic defensive interceptor aircraft, and 57 percent of tactical reconnaissance aircraft.

a. Accession Programs-Air Reserve Forces

Air Reserve Forces (ARF) enlisted recruiting goals for FY 1981 through FY 1982 and the number of personnel recruited in FY 1980 are shown below:

Air Reserve Forces Enlisted Accession Goals

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Program	24,973	28,105	27,205
Actual	28,087	-	-

Both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve exceeded their congressionally authorized end strength objectives in FY 1980. However, fact-of-life problems in manning certain critical specialties requires that the ARF concentrate their effort toward a more precise recruiting program to fill these vacancies. This effort will require the full recruiting resources requested for FY 1982. The comments regarding the facts-of-life in today's market place made in the previous section on active force accession also apply to the Air Reserve Forces.

The Air Reserve Forces will continue to offer an enlistment bonus and educational assistance to Non Prior Service (NPS) personnel during FY 1981 for certain hard-to-fill career fields. The recently approved affiliation bonus for prior service obligors will also be used to attract prior service personnel into critical skills.

The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, during FY 1980, were successful in their aggressive campaign to procure officers. However, the Air Reserve Forces still have critical manning level problems in some mission essential skill areas, such as weapons systems officers, and in the professional areas, such as doctors. These shortages have direct impact on our combat capabilities.

The congressionally directed test of converting full-time unit support military technicians to full time unit support Active Guard/Reserve positions was completed on 30 June 1980. Air Force results and recommendations were forwarded to OSD and were included in the OSD report to Congress on 31 December 1980. OSD recommended no mass conversion to military status but that the Services, in concert with OSD, determine the future civilian Technician/Active Guard Reserve Military mix of the full-time unit support personnel.

3. Civilian Manpower

At the end of FY 1980, the Air Force employed 244,342 inservice civilians. Civilian manpower for FY 1981 is nearly 3,900 below this level. In FY 1982, in-service civilians assigned to the vitally important Central Logistics function will comprise 94 percent of the total inservice Central Logistics manpower. Other civilian intensive areas include Research and Development (56 percent), Base Operating Support (37 percent), and Centralized Support Activities (39 percent).

The slight build in civilian manpower in FY 1982 is due primarily to the conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian, increased logistics depot work load, Air Reserve Forces force structure adjustments, application of manpower standards, and support for increased military end strength, partially offset by potential in-service to contract conversions.

4. Commercial or Industrial Type Activities (CITA)

The Air Force uses a mix of military (active, reserve, and national guard), federal civilian employees, and contractors to satisfy mission requirements. This practice helps provide sufficient military personnel to meet wartime commitments while taking advantage of the experience and continuity provided by civilian employees and the economies often generated by contracting.

Guidance for determining whether to accomplish commercial/industrial type activity (CITA) work load in-house or by contract is

provided in OMB Circular A-76. Generally, A-76 reaffirms the Government's general policy of reliance on the private sector for goods and services, while recognizing that certain functions are inherently governmental in nature, and directs that all other CITA work load be reviewed to determine the most cost effective method of operation.

The Air Force has established an aggressive program to implement A-76. First, determinations are made as to work load that must be performed by military personnel based on military essentiality. Criteria for military essential positions include combat and direct combat support duties, maintenance of favorable overseas rotation indices, and career progression requirements. Additionally, positions which must be manned by Air Force military or civilian employees because of inherent management responsibilities or to comply with applicable statutes or regulations are retained in-house. All remaining CITA work load is considered eligible for contract. From these eligible work loads, the Air Force develops a cost comparison program for each fiscal year by identifying candidate activities which will be cost studied for possible contract performance.

The Fiscal Year 1980 cost comparison program was announced to Congress in March 1979 and was the first conducted using revised A-76 guidelines; 225 candidates and 5,500 associated manpower authorizations were considered for contract. The Fiscal Year 1981 program will address about 160 activities with 2,100 authorizations while the FY 1982 program is expected to address 3,100 authorizations. The Air Force, as a budget planning assumption, has programmed 5,200 authorizations (the combined FY 1981 and 1982 programs) to convert to contract in FY 1982; the Fiscal Year 1981 program was not announced until December 3, 1980, and contract awards are not expected until FY 1982.

Air Force experience with revised A-76 guidelines is limited to the FY 1980 cost comparison program. To date, 94 studies have been completed, resulting in 65 activities going contract and 29 remaining in-house. Cost advantages generated by the 65 contract decisions exceed \$66 million while the 29 activities remaining in-house will generate \$16.6 million savings primarily from more efficient use of in-house manpower. The FY 1980 program has thus far resulted in 30 percent of the activities remaining in-house compared to 19 percent in FY 1979. This may reflect a trend toward more competitive in-house bids resulting from increased pressure to ensure in-house calculations are based on the most efficient estimates to perform the Statement of Work. Also, new "performance oriented" Statements of Work, which in effect become mission statements for each activity after the cost comparison, have enabled in-house bids to concentrate on performance rather than conformance with past procedures.

Generally, results of the FY 1980 cost comparison program have been positive, and our evaluation of revised A-76 is that it provides a fair and equitable means of comparing contract versus in-house costs.

It is interesting to note that the relative percentages of Air Force manpower in the three categories -- active military, inservice civilian, and contract manyear equivalents -- have changed very little since FY 1973. As a percent of manpower in these three categories, inservice civilian manpower has increased by 2 percent, while active military has decreased by 4 percent, and contract manyear equivalents have remained almost constant.

D. Air Force Manpower Requirements By Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)

The following tables display Air Force manpower by DPPC for the period FY 1980 through FY 1982. Continuing a policy which began in FY 1980, Selected Reserve numbers throughout this chapter include reservists on full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserve forces. This section relates Air Force manpower requirements to force levels and describes the significant features of and changes in the FY 1981 through FY 1982 program.

AIR FORCE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>74.1</u>	<u>75.7</u>	<u>75.3</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	54.6	56.0	56.5
Defensive Strategic Forces	8.6	8.4	7.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	10.9	11.3	11.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>118.9</u>	<u>126.8</u>	<u>130.7</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	82.9	90.0	92.5
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	36.0	36.8	38.3
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>49.9</u>	<u>48.3</u>	<u>48.8</u>
Intelligence	16.3	14.3	14.6
Centrally Managed Communications	15.1	15.3	15.4
Research and Development	10.6	10.8	10.8
Geophysical Activities	7.9	7.9	8.0
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>254.6</u>	<u>258.4</u>	<u>257.8</u>
Base Operating Support	154.5	156.2	154.1
Medical Support	12.4	13.9	14.0
Personnel Support	5.8	6.2	6.3
Individual Training	19.3	20.0	20.6
Force Support Training	24.4	25.0	25.8
Central Logistics	4.3	4.5	4.6
Centralized Support Activities	15.1	14.2	13.9
Management Headquarters	18.3	18.2	18.2
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>497.3</u>	<u>509.3</u>	<u>512.6</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>60.5</u>	<u>55.4</u>	<u>56.9</u>
Transients	15.9	13.5	14.7
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	0.8	0.6	0.6
Students, Trainees	39.4	36.9	37.2
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.4
<u>Total</u>	<u>558.0</u>	<u>564.5</u>	<u>569.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (ANGUS)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>21.1</u>	<u>20.9</u>	<u>20.3</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	10.6	10.4	10.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.7	9.8	9.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>59.1</u>	<u>60.2</u>	<u>60.7</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	42.2	43.7	44.0
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	17.0	16.5	16.7
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>11.4</u>	<u>11.8</u>
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	10.6	10.9	11.3
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.5	0.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>3.1</u>
Base Operating Support	0.4	0.5	0.5
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.4	0.5	0.5
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	1.6	1.9	1.9
Management Headquarters	0.1	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>93.8</u>	<u>95.6</u>	<u>95.9</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.4</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	2.5	2.4	2.4
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>96.3</u>	<u>98.1</u>	<u>98.3</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (USAFR)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1980 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1981 <u>FY 1982 Budget</u>	FY 1982 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.2</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	1.9	2.1	2.1
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>39.4</u>	<u>39.8</u>	<u>41.2</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	6.6	7.0	8.8
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	32.8	32.8	32.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>3.0</u>
Intelligence	1.2	1.5	1.6
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	0.1
Research and Development	0.7	0.7	0.7
Geophysical Activities	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>14.1</u>	<u>14.6</u>	<u>16.2</u>
Base Operating Support	7.5	7.7	7.8
Medical Support	2.7	3.0	3.4
Personnel Support	0.3	0.3	0.3
Individual Training	1.0	0.8	1.8
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	0.5	0.5	0.5
Centralized Support Activities	1.1	1.1	1.1
Management Headquarters	1.0	1.0	1.1
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>57.9</u>	<u>59.5</u>	<u>62.7</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.3</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	1.0	1.3	1.3
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>58.9</u>	<u>60.8</u>	<u>64.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1982 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>7.8</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	3.7	3.5	3.7
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.4	3.1	3.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.0	1.0	1.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>26.7</u>	<u>27.6</u>	<u>28.6</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	14.1	14.6	15.7
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	12.6	12.9	12.9
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>21.0</u>	<u>21.0</u>
Intelligence	1.5	1.7	1.8
Centrally Managed Communications	3.7	4.3	4.1
Research and Development	13.8	14.0	14.1
Geophysical Activities	1.0	1.1	1.1
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>189.5</u>	<u>184.2</u>	<u>186.3</u>
Base Operating Support	92.7	88.3	89.4
Medical Support	2.9	3.0	3.0
Personnel Support	1.3	1.4	1.4
Individual Training	5.1	5.2	5.3
Force Support Training	1.8	1.7	1.6
Central Logistics	68.1	66.7	67.7
Centralized Support Activities	8.7	8.9	9.0
Management Headquarters	8.9	8.9	9.0
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>244.3</u>	<u>240.4</u>	<u>244.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

1. Determination of Active Military End Strength

The internal manpower management system of the Air Force records authorized strength for force units vice the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a given DPPC, differs from the actual strength because of fluctuations in manning. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. High school graduates are available in the summer months, and hence the Air Force strength declines through the spring in anticipation of the prime recruiting months of June, July, and August. Thus, although the Air Force meets overall military end strength levels by the year end, some airmen will still be in the training pipeline vice filling required manpower positions in field units. The DPPC strengths in FY 1981 were generated by deducting from the authorized strength for each DPPC a pro rata share of the projected 30 September force undermanning. Several initiatives to increase readiness, coupled with fact of life programming, will result in improved force manning in FY 1982. The personnel pipeline will better support the flow of students in FY 1982 and trainees awaiting entry to courses will also be reduced. In addition, overall personnel procurement will be lower and monthly variations in enlistments will be lessened. With force manning approaching 100 percent in FY 1982, adjustments to DPPC strengths are not deemed necessary. The strength deducted from each DPPC in FY 1981 is shown below.

MILITARY UNDERMANNING BY DPPC

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1981</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.3
Defensive Strategic Forces	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	
Land Forces	-
Theater Forces	-
Tactical Air Forces	0.5
Naval Forces	-
Mobility Forces	0.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	
Intelligence	0.1
Centrally Managed Communications	0.1
Research and Development	0.1
Geophysical Activities	*

Support Activities

Base Operating Support	0.9
Medical Support	0.1
Personnel Support	*
Individual Training	-
Force Support Training	0.2
Central Logistics	*
Centralized Support Activities	0.1
Management Headquarters	0.1
Federal Agency Support	*

Total 3.0

*Less than 50

Total may not add due to rounding

2. Strategic. Air Force Strategic Forces are subdivided into Offensive, Defensive, and Control and Surveillance forces.

a. Offensive Strategic Forces. The following tables show Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-52	316	316	316
FB-111	60	60	60
<u>Tankers</u>			
KC-135	487	487	487
<u>Missiles</u>			
Titan II	54	54	54
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
<u>Tankers</u>			
ANGUS KC-135	104	104	104
USAFR KC-135	24	24	24

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	54.6	56.0	56.5
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	10.6	10.4	10.4
USAFR	1.9	2.1	2.1

Civilian

3.7

3.5

3.7

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional (non-nuclear) weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1982, there are 20 B-52 squadrons, four FB-111 squadrons, 33 active force and 16 reserve force KC-135 tanker squadrons, six Titan missile squadrons, and 20 Minuteman squadrons with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

The FY 1981 active military manpower increase is primarily due to an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980, and additional maintenance requirements in support of the KC-135 tanker force, due to increased flying hours. FY 1982 reflects increases in B-52 aircraft maintenance generated by increased sorties of shorter duration, offset in part by a military to civilian conversion.

Air Force Reserve manpower increases in FY 1981 reflect realignment of specific pay groups into the Selected Reserve. ANGUS manpower decreases in 1981 are due to a higher than programmed assigned strength at the end of FY 1980.

Civilian decreases in FY 1981 reflect a higher than programmed assigned strength in the ANGUS for FY 1980, while civilian increases in FY 1982 are due to conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian.

b. Defensive Strategic Forces. The following tables show Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Interceptor Squadrons</u>			
Active Force	6	6	5
ANGUS	10	10	10

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.6	8.4	7.4
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	9.7	9.8	9.2
USAFR	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.4	3.1	3.0

FY 1982 Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces include aircraft and ground radars of the Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard for surveillance and control and limited defense. To perform this mission in FY 1982, the Air Force will employ a force of one active F-15 squadron, four active Air Force and five Air National Guard F-106 squadrons, and five Air National Guard F-4 squadrons. The ground environment systems include two region operations control centers, five regional control centers, and 61 surveillance radar sites (including USAF/FAA joint use). Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

FY 1981 active military manpower decreases are primarily due to the phase in of the Joint Surveillance System (JSS). FY 1982 active military decreases reflect force structure changes in the composition and size of the interceptor fleet plus continued implementation of the Joint Surveillance System.

ANGUS increases in FY 1981 are the result of the conversion of one F-101 unit to an F-4C unit and a slight increase in the level of manning. Decreases in FY 1982 reflect the conversion of an EB-57 unit to a tactical/attack mission and the decrease of two F-101 units, offset by an increase of two F-4 units.

The FY 1981 decrease in civilian manpower is primarily the result of a temporary overage in assigned strength at the end of FY 1980 and the continued implementation of the Joint Surveillance System (JSS). The FY 1982 reductions are primarily the result of adjustments to the ANGUS force structure program.

c. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.9	11.3	11.4
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.0	1.1

Control and Surveillance Forces include the following aircraft in FY 1982: one squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance; 27 EC-135 post attack command and control system aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers; and four E-4A/B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Command Post in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American continent; three ballistic missile early warning sites; four Submarine

Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) detection and warning sites; the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System facility; six SPACETRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control and warning sites; and portions of the National Military Command and Control System. Control and Surveillance Forces also include communications and command and control support equipment. Finally, some of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System automatic data processing resources are also included in this category.

The apparent increase in active military manpower in FY 1981 is primarily the result of temporary assigned strength shortfalls at the end of FY 1980. The FY 1982 increase in active military is the result of improved force manning through initiatives to increase readiness.

Civilian increases in FY 1982 are the result of conversion of non-military essential authorizations to civilian.

3. Tactical/Mobility. Air Force Tactical and Mobility Forces are discussed in the following sections.

a. Tactical Air Forces. The following tables show Air Force Tactical Air Forces.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Fighter Wings (TFW)	26	26	26
Tactical Fighter Squadrons	79	77	79
Reconnaissance Squadrons	6	6	6
Special Operations Force Squadrons	5	5	5
Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) Squadrons	3	3	3
Airborne TACS Squadrons	9	9	9
Airborne TACCS Squadrons	2	2	2
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10)	0	1	1
Electronic Combat Squadrons	0	1	2
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ANGUS Fighter/Attack Squadrons	31	31	33
ANGUS Reconnaissance Squadrons	8	8	8
USAFR Fighter/Attack Squadrons	8	8	9
USAFR Special Operations Squadrons	2	2	2
ANGUS Airborne TACS Squadrons	6	6	5
ANGUS Electronic Combat Squadron	1	1	1
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10) (USAFR-Assoc) ¹	0	1	1

¹ Associate squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	82.9	90.0	92.5
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	42.2	43.7	44.0
USAFR	6.6	7.0	8.8
<u>Civilian</u>	14.1	14.6	15.7

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance, tanker/cargo, and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces include air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, and weapon systems security and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control Systems, the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center (AFTEC), civil engineering deployable heavy repair (RED HORSE) squadrons, and tactical intelligence squadrons.

FY 1981 active military increases are a result of an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980, increases for five KC-10 aircraft, three EC-130 aircraft, two AWACS aircraft, European Tactical Air Control System enhancements, War Readiness Materiel (WRM) capabilities to support wartime requirements, new tactical fighter range equipment, the initial increment for the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) system management office, and structural changes from the Intelligence and Base Operating Support DPPCs to the Tactical Air Forces DPPC. These increases are partially offset by savings in maintenance as a result of force modernization. Active military increases in FY 1982 are due principally to increases for two AWACS Aircraft, four KC-10 tanker-cargo aircraft, maintenance of new systems, increased sortie rates for RF-4 squadrons, initial manpower increments for TR-1 squadrons, continued growth in support of Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) System Management Office, EF-111, Compass Call, and tactical fighter force structure increases. These increases are partially offset by savings as a result of force modernization, a structural change from the Tactical Air Force DPPC to the Mobility and Intelligence DPPCs, and force undermanning as result of personnel still in the training pipeline.

The ANGUS increases in both FY 1981 and FY 1982 are the result of the continued modernization and expansion of the tactical fighter force. Reserve component increases in FY 1981 and FY 1982 also reflect the continued modernization and expansion of the Air Force Reserve tactical fighter force, to include conversion of A-37 and F-105 squadrons with increases in A-10, F-4, and KC-10 PAA.

The civilian manpower increase in FY 1981 reflects modernization of Reserve Forces; and an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980. FY 1982 increases are a result of Reserve Force modernization.

b. Mobility Forces. The following tables show Air Force Mobility Forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	14	14	14
Strategic Airlift Squadrons	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons	3	3	3
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons	7	7	7
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons (ANGUS/USAFR)	36	36	35
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (USAFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (USAFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons (ANGUS/USAFR)	6	6	6

1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5A squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	36.0	36.8	38.3
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	17.0	16.5	16.7
USAFR	32.8	32.8	32.4
<u>Civilian</u>	12.6	12.9	12.9

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, aeromedical airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Manpower supporting these forces include crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations and Air Force special mission forces.

Active military manpower increases in FY 1981 are primarily due to an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980, increased wartime maintenance manpower requirements for C-130s, and a structural change from the Centralized Support DPPC to the Mobility DPPC. FY 1982 increases are primarily due to further increases associated with aerial port requirements driven by increased cargo handling capability

(C-141 stretch) plus structural changes between both the Tactical Air Force DPPC and Centralized Support DPPC, impacting the Mobility DPPC.

ANGUS manpower decreases in FY 1981 are due to higher than programmed assigned strength at the end of FY 1980, while increases in FY 1982 reflect the increase in crew composition of the aeromedical evacuation units and higher unit manning levels. USAFR manpower decreases in FY 1982 reflect changes in force structure.

Civilian manpower changes in FY 1981 are associated with an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980.

4. Auxiliary Activities. Auxiliary Activities are subdivided into Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development Activities, and Geophysical Activities.

a. Intelligence.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.3	14.3	14.6
Reserve Components			
USAFR	1.2	1.5	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.7	1.8

This category includes manpower for the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and Air Force support to the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The Air Force Intelligence Service and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the two Air Force organizations whose primary mission is intelligence; however, nearly all major Air Force organizations also support these activities.

In FY 1981, the decrease in active military reflects the realignment of tactical cryptologic activities to the Tactical Air Forces DPPC.

FY 1982 active military increases reflect realignment of intelligence collection and processing assets in the General Defense Intelligence Program from the Tactical Air Forces DPPC, offset by a structural realignment between the Intelligence DPPC and Management Headquarters DPPC. Civilian increases in FY 1981 are due to an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980.

b. Centrally Managed Communications.

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.1	15.3	15.4
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	10.6	10.9	11.3
USAFR	-	-	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	3.7	4.3	4.1

This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

FY 1981 active military manpower increases are due to temporary assigned strength shortfalls at the end of FY 1980. The FY 1982 active military increase is a result of improved force manning through initiatives to increase readiness.

The USAFR increase in FY 1982 reflects the activation of a communications security unit.

Increased ANGUS manpower reflects the Air National Guard's efforts to enhance the readiness of its communications units by increasing manpower to required levels.

FY 1981 civilian increases are due primarily to an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980. FY 1982 civilian decreases are due primarily to potential contract conversions and an OSD-imposed undefinitized communications reduction.

c. Research and Development

Air Force Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.6	10.8	10.8
Reserve Components			
USAFR	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	13.8	14.0	14.1

This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

The increase in active military and civilian manpower in FY 1981 is the result of temporary assigned strength shortfalls at the end of FY 1980. The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1982 is the result of the conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian.

d. Geophysical Activities

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.9	7.9	8.0
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.4	0.5	0.5
USAFR	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.1	1.1

The manpower in this category supports active Air Force and Air Reserve Force weather service activities, meteorological and navigational satellite/space programs, and Defense mapping, charting, and geodesy activities. The FY 1981 civilian increase is the result of a temporary assigned strength shortfall in FY 1980. Increased ANGUS manpower in FY 1981 reflects the Air National Guard's efforts to increase manning in its weather units. The apparent active military build in FY 1982 is the result of minor work load increases which results, due to rounding, into a program increase.

5. Support Activities. Support Activities are subdivided into Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support, Individual Training, Force Support Training, Central Logistics, Centralized Support Activities, Management Headquarters, and Federal Agency Support.

Accounting for Base Operating Support manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the Base Operating Support category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. However, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps manpower providing food, transportation, and supply type services to divisions and ships are integral with those units for operational purposes and are counted as mission manpower. The Air Force accounts for this manpower in Base Operating Support and carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These organizational differences preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

a. Base Operating Support. Base Operating Support has two subcategories: Combat Installations and Support Installations.

(1) Base Operating Support - Combat Installations.

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Combat Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	112.3	113.1	111.4
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.4	0.5	0.5
USAFR	7.2	7.4	7.5
<u>Civilian</u>	50.9	49.0	49.8

This category contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as control tower operations, aircraft dispatch, air-field and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, data automation, and supply.

Active military manpower increases in FY 1981 are principally due to an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980. The increases are partially offset by a structural realignment between the Tactical Air Forces DPPC and BOS DPPC. In addition, realignments within the BOS DPPC between combat installations and support installations occurred. FY 1981 civilian manpower decreases are due primarily to potential in-service to contract conversions, the continued phase-in of the Joint Surveillance System, and base realignment actions at Rickenbacker AFB.

FY 1982 decreases in active military and increases in civilian are due to the conversion of non-military to civilian and potential in-service to contract conversions, offset by implementation of manpower standards.

USAFR manpower increases in FY 1981 and FY 1982 reflect the transfer of Richards-Gebaur AFB to the USAFR and reduction of the manpower shortfall for requirements to operate eleven bases. ANGUS increases in FY 1981 reflect ANG efforts to increase the level of manning in support areas.

(2) Base Operating Support - Support Installations

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Support Installations.
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	42.2	43.1	42.7

Reserve Components			
USAFR	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	41.8	39.3	39.5

This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance of auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as base hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, laundries and commissaries.

FY 1981 active military increase is due to an end strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980, structural realignments between the Centralized Logistics Operations DPPC and the BOS DPPC and internal re-alignments within the BOS DPPC. FY 1982 military decreases are the result of DPPC structure changes between BOS-support installations and BOS-combat installations, potential in-service to contract conversions, partially offset by implementation of manpower standards, and force structure changes.

FY 1981 civilian manpower decreases are primarily due to potential in-service to contract conversion. FY 1982 increases are primarily a result of converting non-military essential positions to civilian and application of manpower standards, offset by potential in-service to contract conversions.

b. Medical Support.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.4	13.9	14.0
Reserve Components			
USAFR	2.7	3.0	3.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	3.0	3.0

Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and Air Force Reserve medical service units.

Increases in FY 1981 military and civilian manpower are due primarily to temporary shortages in assigned strength at the end of FY 1980. Increases in FY 1982 active military are the result of improved force manning through initiatives to increase readiness.

The USAFR increase in FY 1981 is due to both additional individual mobilization augmentees and medical support for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). FY 1982 increases also reflect increased support for the RDF.

c. Personnel Support.

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.8	6.2	6.3
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.4	0.5	0.5
USAFR	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.4	1.4

The Air Force operates over 1,000 recruiting offices and contributes manpower to 67 Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES). Air Force manpower requirements in support of investigative activities, personnel processing, and the Air Force Aerial Demonstration Team are also included in this category.

The FY 1981 active military increase is for additional recruiters to support increased procurement of personnel. The FY 1982 active military increase is primarily due to the addition of trainers in recruiting squadrons.

The FY 1981 ANGUS manpower increase provides retention NCOs and an officer minority recruiting team, which will assist the ANGUS in meeting accession goals.

The FY 1981 increase in civilian manpower is due primarily to an end strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980.

d. Individual Training.

Air Force Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	19.3	20.0	20.6
Reserve Components			
USAFR	1.0	0.8	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	5.1	5.2	5.3

Manpower required to conduct training is included in this category. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees and Students and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Increases in FY 1981 active military are due primarily to an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980, increased recruit and specialized training to support higher procurement levels, and increases in undergraduate pilot training requirements. FY 1982 military increases are in undergraduate navigator training and establishment of Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training, and are partially offset by conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian.

USAFR manpower decreases in FY 1981 are due to higher than programmed assigned strength at the end of FY 1980, while the increases in FY 1982 are the result of realignment of programmed end strength in pay group "B" mobilization augmentees.

In FY 1981, civilian manpower increases due to an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980. FY 1982 civilian manpower increases are associated with conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian.

Detailed justification of training requirements is presented in the FY 1982 Military Manpower Training Report.

e. Force Support Training.

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	24.4	25.0	25.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.8	1.7	1.6

Manpower in this category includes Air Force strategic, tactical, and mobility mission support training. Tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training are also included.

Increased FY 1981 active military requirements are associated with increased maintenance, instructors, and training initiatives for MAC airlift training requirements. FY 1982 increases are due to increased training by Field Training Detachments and increased personnel support associated with weapons systems conversion.

FY 1981 and FY 1982 decreases in civilian manpower are associated with contract initiatives.

f. Central Logistics.

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.3	4.5	4.6
Reserve Components			
USAFR	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	68.1	66.7	67.7

Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily of the Air Force Logistics Command.

FY 1981 active military manpower increases are the result of an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1980. Increases in FY 1982 active military are the result of improved force manning through initiatives to increase readiness.

FY 1981 civilian manpower decreases are primarily due to an assigned strength overage at the end of FY 1980, reductions to reach reduced employment levels, and potential in-service to contract conversions. Civilian manpower increases in FY 1982 are due to greater depot work loads as a result of increased force programmed flying hours, offset partially by potential in-service to contract conversions.

g. Centralized Support Activities.

Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.1	14.1	13.9
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	1.6	1.9	1.9
USAFR	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.7	8.9	9.0

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions which do not fit other DPPCs and includes Air Force support to OSD, JCS, unified commands, and international military organizations. Manpower supporting foreign military sales, counterintelligence activities, readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affairs, and various Air Reserve Force activities is also included.

Active military manpower in FY 1981 decreases principally due to a realignment of installation audiovisual support and American Forces Radio and Television Service to BOS. FY 1982 decreases reflect conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian.

The FY 1981 increase in ANGUS is the result of the increase in full-time active duty personnel account and ANG efforts to increase the level of manning in support areas.

FY 1981 civilian manpower increases are primarily due to temporary shortfalls in assigned strength at the end of FY 1980. Civilian increases in FY 1982 are due to conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian.

h. Management Headquarters.

Air Force Manpower in DoD Management Headquarters
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.3	18.2	18.2
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.1	0.1	0.1
USAFR	1.0	1.0	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.9	8.9	9.0

The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters including the Air Force Secretariat, the Air Staff (including the National Guard Bureau), major command headquarters and their numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, and Air Force Communications Command area headquarters. Air Force manpower supporting international military headquarters and unified command headquarters is also included in this category.

FY 1981 active military decrease is the result of personnel still in the training pipeline. Civilian increase in FY 1982 is the result of a military to civilian conversion.

i. Federal Agency Support.

Air Force Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.3	0.3	0.3
Reserve Components			
USAFR	0.1	0.2	0.2

Civilian

*

*

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*Fewer than 50.

This category includes manpower supporting other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis. The manpower in this category remains stable through FY 1982. USAFR manpower increases reflect new requirements for the National Security Agency.

6. Individuals. The Individuals accounts contain manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets.

a. Transients

Air Force Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.9	13.5	14.7

Transient manpower is required to maintain unit manning at authorized levels while military members are in travel and leave-enroute status during PCS moves.

The FY 1981 decrease in transient manpower is a result of an overage in assigned strength at the end of FY 1980. The increase in FY 1982 is a result of a greater number of projected PCS moves to support the higher end strength in FY 1982.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.6	0.6

Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining and remains fairly constant through the program.

c. Trainees and Students

Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	39.4	36.9	37.2
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	2.5	2.4	2.4
USAFR	1.0	1.3	1.3

This category accounts for people undergoing training. The active military decrease in FY 1981 is the result of a temporary overage of assigned personnel in FY 1980, coupled with increases associated with higher procurement. The active military increase in FY 1982 is the result of increased students in undergraduate flight training, the Airmen Education and Commissioning Program, the Advanced Degree Program, partially offset by reductions of students in basic/specialized training due to lower procurement levels.

Reserve component manpower changes in FY 1981 and FY 1982 reflect accession program changes because of new incentives and increased recruiter activities.

d. Cadets

Air Force Cadet Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.4	4.4	4.4

This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE AGENCIES MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

This chapter contains the manpower requirements of the following organizations:

- Office of the Secretary of Defense
 - Staff
 - Field Activities ^{1/}
- Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Defense Audit Service
- Defense Audiovisual Agency
- Defense Communications Agency
- Defense Contract Audit Agency
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Defense Investigative Service
- Defense Logistics Agency
- Defense Mapping Agency
- Defense Nuclear Agency
- Defense Security Assistance Agency
- Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.
- US Court of Military Appeals

These organizations, collectively called the defense agencies for the purposes of this report, perform specialized functions supporting the entire Department of Defense. The National Security Agency is excluded from this report for security reasons.

B. Manpower Requirements

The combined manpower requirements of the defense agencies are shown in the following table. All military strengths displayed in the table and throughout this chapter are included in service strengths in the preceding chapters. In all tables in this chapter, details may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} Includes personnel assigned to the Washington Headquarters Services, the American Forces Information Service, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, the Tri-Service Medical Information System Project Office, the Office of Economic Adjustment, and the Department of Defense Dependents Schools.

Defense Agencies Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	7.4	7.9	8.0
Civilian, Direct Hire and Indirect Hire	76.7	80.9	81.7
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	84.1	88.8	89.7

The FY 1980 data shown throughout this chapter are actual strengths as contrasted to manpower space authorizations in FY 1981 and FY 1982. Actual civilian strengths are typically below authorizations because vacated positions cannot always be immediately refilled. This accounts for all apparent FY 1980 to FY 1981 civilian increases in this chapter unless otherwise indicated.

The mission and associated manpower requirements of each agency are discussed in the following paragraphs. At the end of this chapter, the combined defense agency manpower requirements are displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

a. Staff. OSD staff provides the Secretary of Defense with the analytical capability and specialized expertise necessary for him to fulfill his management responsibilities over the vast and complex operations of the Defense Department. OSD staff manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

OSD Staff Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	0.4	0.4	0.4
Civilian	1.2	1.2	1.2
Total	1.6	1.6	1.6

b. Field Activities of OSD. Field activities comprise the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) and five other organizations that perform designated services, under the direct supervision of an OSD staff official, for designated DoD activities. These programs are more limited in scope than those of a defense agency. These organizations are described below.

(1) The Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support to the OSD staff and to the other OSD field activities.

(2) The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program, including the dissemination of internal information and the management of materials and resources used in support of this program.

(3) The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) manages the payment for medical care in non-military facilities for retired members and for dependents or survivors of active or retired members.

(4) The Tri-Service Medical Management Information System (TRIMIS) Program Office centrally manages the development and application of standardized automated systems to improve the effectiveness and economy of health care in the military services.

(5) The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) aids communities which have been affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, and growth impacts.

(6) The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates the primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas.

The combined manpower requirements of the field activities of OSD are shown in the following table.

	<u>Manpower Requirements</u> <u>Field Activities of OSD</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	0.2	0.2	0.2
Civilian	<u>10.3</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>12.2</u>
Total	10.5	11.9	12.4

DoDDS requirements increase in FY 1981 and FY 1982 to provide special education programs required by the Education Amendments Act of 1978. The manpower requirements of the other field activities remain stable.

2. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)

OJCS provides military expertise and technical and administrative support to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to aid them in discharging their statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense. OJCS manpower requirements are as follows:

OJCS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	1.0	1.0	1.0
Civilian	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Total	1.3	1.3	1.3

3. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA manages high-risk, high-payoff basic research and applied technology programs. Its objective is to select and pursue revolutionary technology developments that minimize the possibility of technological surprise and offer potential for major increases in national defense capability. In the performance of its work, DARPA makes use of the services of the military departments, other government agencies, private industry, educational and research institutions, and individuals. The following table shows DARPA's manpower requirements.

DARPA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	0.1	0.1	0.1

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

4. Defense Audit Service (DAS)

DAS plans and conducts audits for OSD, the unified and specified commands, the defense agencies, and the security assistance and other DoD-wide programs. DAS manpower requirements are shown below.

DAS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Civilian Only	0.4	0.4	0.4

5. Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)

DAVA was established by DoD Directive 5040.1 in June 1979. Its mission is to provide to all DoD components centrally managed production, acquisition, distribution, and depository support and services for selected audiovisual aids. DAVA's manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

DAVA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	*	0.1	0.1
Civilian	*	0.5	0.5
Total	*	0.6	0.6

* Fewer than 50 spaces

The military and civilian increases beginning in FY 1981 are due to the transfer of personnel from the military departments to DAVA as the Agency becomes fully operational.

6. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

DCA is responsible for:

- System engineering and management of the Defense Communications System;
- System architect functions for current and future Military Satellite Communications Systems;
- System engineering and technical support to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the National Military Command System, and the Minimum Essential Communications Network; and
- Procurement of leased communications circuits, services, facilities, and equipment for DoD and other government agencies.

DCA's manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

DCA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	1.4	1.5	1.5
Civilian	1.6	1.6	1.6
Total	3.0	3.1	3.1

7. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

DCAA provides the procurement and contract administration activities of the Department with financial information and advice on proposed or existing contracts and contractors. DCAA's services are used in negotiation, administration, and settlement of contract payments and prices. DCAA also provides audit services to other Federal departments and agencies in which the Department of Defense has a continuing audit

interest or when this procedure is considered efficient from a government-wide point of view. Primary among these non-DoD agency clients are the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Transportation.

DCAA's manpower requirements are as follows:

DCAA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Civilian Only	3.4	3.5	3.5

8. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The primary mission of DIA is to produce finished, all-source foreign general military and scientific and technical intelligence and all DoD intelligence estimates and DoD contributions to National Estimates; determine information gaps and validate intelligence collection requirements; provide plans, programs, policies, and procedures for DoD intelligence collection activities; manage the production of general military intelligence by the military services, unified and specified commands, and DIA; produce or manage the production of all DoD scientific and technical intelligence; serve as the J-2 of the Joint Staff; and manage and coordinate all DoD intelligence information systems programs and the interface of such systems with the intelligence community and DoD systems.

The DIA supports the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, military departments, the National Security Council, various other departments of the Executive Branch, and congressional committees. The table below shows DIA manpower requirements.

DIA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	1.7	1.9	2.0
Civilian	2.6	2.6	2.7
Total	4.3	4.5	4.7

The increase in strength in FY 1981 represents increases in intelligence analysts requested in the President's Budget or added by Congress. Additional analysts and direct support personnel are added in FY 1982. Selected Defense Attache Offices are also augmented in FY 1982.

9. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS performs personnel security investigations for the DoD components to determine the suitability of an individual for employment in a position of trust within the Department or a facility performing under classified contracts. DIS also performs criminal investigations and crime prevention surveys for the Defense Logistics Agency and conducts special investigations as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Starting in FY 1981, the Defense Industrial Security Program (DISP) transfers from the Defense Logistics Agency to DIS.

The following table shows the manpower requirements of the DIS.

DIS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	0.2	0.1	0.1
Civilian	1.5	2.7	2.7
Total	1.7	2.8	2.8

A congressional mandate to civilianize DIS leads to a gradual decrease in military manpower. The increase in civilian manpower results from an effort to decrease case completion time and reduce backlog and from the addition of DISP personnel.

10. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common supplies and a broad range of logistic services to the military departments, other defense components, Federal agencies, and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence and medical goods, industrial and construction material, general supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services rendered by DLA include contract administration, surplus personal property disposal, documentation services to the R&D community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA is the largest of the defense agencies, accomplishing its varied missions both in the United States and overseas through 25 major field activities. The manpower required for DLA's extensive operations is displayed in the following table.

DLA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	1.0	1.1	1.1
Civilian	46.1	46.7	46.7
Total	47.1	47.8	47.8

11. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA produces and distributes aeronautical, hydrographic, and topographic products for all DoD components and manages and coordinates all DoD mapping, charting, and geodesy activities. It executes DoD mapping responsibilities under international and interagency agreements. DMA has statutory responsibility for providing nautical charts and marine navigation data for all vessels of the United States and provides cartographic support for the cruise missile program.

DMA manpower requirements are shown below.

DMA Manpower Requirements (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	0.4	0.4	0.4
Civilian	<u>8.1</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>8.2</u>
Total	8.5	8.5	8.6

The civilian increase in FY 1982 is to support increased mapping requirements related to the Rapid Deployment Force.

12. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA is the consolidated manager of the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile. It also manages the nuclear weapon effects test and development programs. DNA manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

DNA Manpower Requirements (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	0.5	0.5	0.5
Civilian	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Total	1.1	1.1	1.1

13. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for management of the DoD Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs. Its manpower requirements are as follows:

DSAA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	0.1	0.1	0.1

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

14. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)

USUHS was created by PL 92-426 to provide high quality education in health sciences to individuals who demonstrate dedication to a career in the health professions of the uniformed services. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees.

The total manpower requirements -- including staff, faculty, and students -- of the growing University are as follows:

USUHS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Military	0.5	0.6	0.7
Civilian	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>
Total	1.0	1.3	1.4

15. US Court of Military Appeals (USCMA)

The US Court of Military Appeals serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

The manpower requirements of the US Court of Military Appeals are shown below.

USCMA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Civilian Only	39	49	49

C. Manpower Requirements By DPPC.

The following tables show the combined military and civilian requirements of the defense agencies, arranged by DPPC.

DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY^{1/} MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1980 Actual	FY 1981 FY 1982 Budget	FY 1982
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces			
Tactical Air Forces			
Naval Forces			
Mobility Forces			
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.4</u>
Intelligence	1.6	1.8	1.8
Centrally Managed Communications	0.9	1.0	1.0
Research and Development	0.2	0.2	0.2
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>4.1</u>	<u>4.1</u>
Base Operating Support	0.1	0.1	0.1
Medical Support	0.1	0.1	0.1
Personnel Support	*	*	*
Individual Training	0.4	0.5	0.6
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	0.1	0.2	0.2
Centralized Support Activities	0.9	1.1	1.0
Management Headquarters	2.1	2.1	2.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>8.0</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients			
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees			
Students, Trainees			
Cadets			
<u>Total</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>8.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} Military strengths in agencies are also included in Service tables.
NSA is excluded due to security reasons.

* Fewer than 50.

DEFENSE AGENCIES CIVILIAN^{1/} MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1980 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1981 <u>FY 1982 Budget</u>	FY 1982 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.5	0.6	0.6
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>11.4</u>	<u>11.4</u>	<u>11.6</u>
Intelligence	2.4	2.4	2.5
Centrally Managed Communications	0.7	0.7	0.7
Research and Development	0.3	0.3	0.3
Geophysical Activities	8.0	8.0	8.1
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>64.9</u>	<u>68.9</u>	<u>69.5</u>
Base Operating Support	5.4	5.1	5.1
Medical Support	0.7	0.9	0.9
Personnel Support	9.7	11.1	11.6
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	39.7	40.6	40.6
Centralized Support Activities	5.6	7.3	7.4
Management Headquarters	3.7	3.9	3.9
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>76.7</u>	<u>80.9</u>	<u>81.7</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ NSA manpower is excluded due to security reasons.

PART B - Special Analyses and Data

Part B contains special analyses of four subjects related to the Defense manpower program. It also contains a description of manpower and forces by location.

Chapter VIII	-	Recruit Quality
Chapter IX	-	Productivity
Chapter X	-	Cost of Manpower
Chapter XI	-	Manpower and Forces by Location
Chapter XII	-	Manpower Data Structure

CHAPTER VIII

RECRUIT QUALITY

A. Introduction

The quality of people serving in our Armed Forces will continue to be an issue of debate over the next decade. Complicating the challenge of meeting accession requirements with young people capable of performing in an increasingly demanding environment is the shrinking pool of potential recruits -- males between 17 and 21 years of age. Considering that by 1992 this pool will be 20 percent smaller than it was in 1978, we will need one out of every four eligible young men to meet our requirements as currently planned. Any expansion of requirements, improvement in the economy, or other demographic alteration will exacerbate an already tenuous balance. In light of these challenges we must make military service an attractive option to our youth.

Although we experienced some difficulty in attracting as many high school graduates and individuals scoring high on our entrance tests as we wanted, all the Services achieved their quantity recruiting goals in FY 1980. We strive to enlist as many high school graduates and high scoring people as we can, even in the face of the declining recruiting pool.

Quality performance in any field is difficult to assess and even more difficult to predict. It is no easier in the military. The quality of an individual's performance will be a product of individual traits--honesty, integrity, skill, loyalty, commitment, and motivation. It will also be a product of situational variables--the work environment, unit esprit, training, and leadership. Ideally, we would be able to measure the quality of personnel with confidence and to tie that measurement closely and predictably to effective job performance. Unfortunately, our capacity to relate those attributes to on-the-job performance is rudimentary, at best. The attributes principally used to categorize our new recruits are level of education and mental aptitude.

B. High School Diploma Graduates

Possession of a high school diploma is a sound indicator of capacity to adjust to the discipline of a military environment. At present, a high school graduate has almost an 80 percent probability of completing the first three years of military service, compared with a less than 60 percent probability for the nongraduate. Thus, recruiting programs emphasize enlistment of high school diploma graduates.

The recruiting of high school diploma graduates has become increasingly difficult for all the Services since 1976. In FY 1980, each Service recruited more high school diploma graduates than they did in FY 1979. DoD-wide, total high school diploma graduate enlistments exceeded those in FY 1979 by 14,000. However, the proportions of Army and Navy high school graduate accessions declined because the increase in total non-prior service accessions between FY 1979 and FY 1980 was greater than the increase in high school graduates. DoD-wide, the percentage decreased from 73 percent in FY 1979 to 68 percent in FY 1980. Table 1 shows the number of non-prior service high school graduate accessions over the last

six years while Table 2 shows the percentages of high school diploma graduates for the same period for each Service.

Table 1
High School Diploma Graduates
Non-Prior Service Accessions (000s)

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>
Army	107	106	100	91	83	86
Navy	72	71	74	62	62	66
Marine Corps	30	32	32	30	30	33
Air Force	69	65	64	58	55	59
DoD	<u>278</u>	<u>273</u>	<u>269</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>230</u>	<u>244</u>

Table 2
High School Diploma Graduates
Percentage of Non-Prior Service Accessions

	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>
Army	58	59	59	74	64	54
Navy	71	77	73	77	77	75
Marine Corps	53	62	70	75	75	78
Air Force	91	89	88	85	83	83
DoD	66	69	69	77	73	68

High school performance is a measure of staying power, not necessarily a predictor of on-the-job performance. On the one hand, we know that more than a few of today's high school graduates are only marginally literate. On the other hand, we know that a non-high school graduate who stays in the military generally performs as well as the high school graduate. Hence, we continue to recruit and screen for non-high school graduates with potential to complete training successfully.

C. AFQT Categories

An applicant's potential for learning the general and specialized skills of military occupations is measured by the DoD enlistment qualifications test, known as the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). Pencil-and-paper tests have been used by the Department of Defense since the end of World War II to reject draft registrants and applicants for enlistment who have a low probability for success in service. The tests are also used to determine whether recruits are eligible for specific job training. While aptitude tests are not perfect predictors, they do enhance the probability that the Services will select the best suited people from the pool of applicants and will assign them to jobs in which they are most likely to succeed.

To provide historical and Service comparisons the ASVAB general trainability measure is calibrated in terms compatible with those of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which until recently was the sole aptitude

enlistment eligibility criterion. (AFQT scores are now derived from ASVAB). Currently, in addition to meeting the AFQT criterion, every recruit must attain a minimum score in a specific aptitude area in order to qualify for the training in that field. For reporting convenience, AFQT scores of applicants are grouped into five broad categories. Those in Categories I and II are above average in trainability; those in Category III are average; those in Category IV are below average. Those in Category V are markedly below average, and under Service policy, are not eligible to enlist. We prefer enlistees in the higher test score categories because training time and associated costs are lower and because they are more likely to qualify for more skill areas.

As explained in a July 1980 report to the House Committee on Armed Services, the versions of ASVAB in use from January 1976 through September 1980 were miscalibrated. This error resulted in inflated test scores for low-scoring enlistees who entered service during that period. New test conversion tables (converts test raw scores to percentile scores) which corrected the calibration problem were developed in July 1980. When those calibration tables were applied, they had a substantial impact on the score distributions of Service accessions. The significant changes were the decrease of the percentages in Category III and the increase in Category IV. For example, for FY 1980 the reported percentage of accessions DoD-wide in Category IV changed from six to 33 percent.

Although use of the inaccurate calibration table understated the percentage of accessions in Category IV, it is important to put the revised estimates in historical perspective. The new estimate that 33 percent of the FY 1980 accessions were in Category IV is more commensurate with both the historical data base of DoD accessions and scores one would expect in the population as a whole, than is the estimate of six percent that was derived from the faulty calibration. In fact, the 33 percent figure compares favorably with test results obtained during the 1950s, when the number of DoD accessions scoring in Category IV averaged about 27 percent, and in the period of 1967 through 1971, when the percentage of recruits in Category IV was only slightly lower. Table 3 shows for selected years the percentages of Category IV personnel that were enlisted between 1952 and 1980 by Service.

Table 3
Percent of Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions
Whose Test Scores Placed Them In AFQT Category IV
- Selected Fiscal Years 1952-1980-

	<u>1952</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1977*</u>	<u>1979*</u>	<u>1980*</u>
Army	44	27	17	20	28	18	18	44	46	52
Navy	33	32	7	11	17	18	3	21	18	17
Marine Corps	43	35	16	9	22	20	8	27	26	27
Air Force	33	18	12	4	17	8	1	6	9	10
DoD	39	27	14	15	25	16	10	30	30	33

* These percentages were recomputed to correct for the error in ASVAB calibration

The recent discovery of the error in calibrating ASVAB scores raises questions about the ability of some of our recruits to complete training successfully and to perform satisfactorily on the job. We are presently conducting special analyses of the relationship between the ASVAB scores and the demonstrated job performance of those enlistees whose test scores are inflated because of the miscalibration of the test. The first findings from this analysis suggest that most of the low-scoring people are performing adequately.

On October 1, 1980, three new forms of the ASVAB were implemented. They replaced the miscalibrated forms. The new ASVAB is an improvement over the previous versions in several important ways. It (1) more accurately estimates ability, particularly at the lower end of the test score range, (2) is a better measure of literacy, (3) is correctly calibrated and no longer inflates the scores of lower scoring applicants, and (4) will impede test compromise because of its multiple forms.

There is no single correct aptitude standard for entry into military service. Entrance standards have varied over time, primarily as a function of personnel supply and demand. With the introduction of the new ASVAB, the Services have retained the minimum standards in effect in FY 1980 so that the same kinds of people are eligible for enlistment as were eligible during the previous four-year period. However, the Services are attempting to recruit somewhat higher quality young people and have set operational enlistment criteria above their minimum standards. The Services' operational criteria in use as of December 1, 1980, would deny enlistment to 34 percent of the Army recruits, 26 percent of the Marine Corps recruits, five percent of the Navy recruits, and six percent of the Air Force recruits enlisted in FY 1980.

D. Legislative Constraints on Quality

Legislation enacted in FY 1980 placed quality constraints on active force recruiting beginning in FY 1981. In that year, not more than 25 percent of non-prior service recruits can fall within Category IV DoD-wide, and not more than 35 percent of the Army's male non-prior service accessions can be non-high school graduates. In FY 1982, each of the Services is restricted to not more than 25 percent Category IV enlistments, and that ceiling is lowered to 20 percent for each Service in FY 1983.

The Congressional quality constraints are not likely to pose a significant problem in FY 1981. However, in FY 1982, the more severe constraint with no compensating market expansion, in combination with the lost supply resulting from higher operational criteria and declining youth population, could make recruiting much more difficult.

Unless the Services are able to receive the necessary resources and incentives needed to expand the recruiting market to attract higher scoring applicants and more high school graduates, we anticipate that the Congressional quality constraints and the higher enlistment standards may result in recruiting shortfalls, particularly for the Army. In FY 1982, for example, when not more than 25 percent of the Army non-prior service

enlistments can be in Category IV, the Army must enlist approximately 102,000 Category I-III individuals--a one-third increase above the 76,100 FY 1980 Army Category I-III accessions. Consequently, we are providing the Army with additional recruiters and advertising. In addition, we are requesting authority for an enhanced and more flexible Army enlistment bonus program. We are also testing more valuable educational incentives including a much higher level of Veterans Educational Assistance Program benefits in an attempt to alter favorably the profile (in terms of both test scores and education) of Army recruits.

We are in favor of repealing the statutory limits on the enlistment of Category IV personnel. We understand and agree with the intent of the constraints to improve the quality of military manpower. However, it is important to recognize that the Services have well-established programs for eliminating those recruits who demonstrate that they are not capable of becoming useful servicemembers. The quality constraints are likely to hamper Service flexibility to adjust to changes in manpower needs and changes in the labor market and could unnecessarily deny enlistment to some who may be capable of satisfactory performance. We should not over-stress the importance of enlistment standards as a control on the quality of military manpower.

Aptitude tests and high school graduation can be related generally but not precisely to performance in service. While the screening systems currently used by the Services are as sophisticated and effective as any in the civilian world, we are constantly striving to improve them both to improve manpower selection, utilization, and performance and to reduce costs.

E. Conclusion

Central to the problem of relating screening measures to performance is the difficulty of measuring performance. There is currently no single, solid, and reliable measure of an individual's performance in the military. In the absence of such a single measure, we attempt to estimate the quality of an individual's performance by assessing various easily measured indicators that have some logical, although imperfect, relationship to job performance. An individual has to pass through many gates before being assigned to a military unit and, after that, in order to remain in service. A new enlistee must graduate from recruit training and pass a skill training course before being assigned to a unit. A member of a unit must reach a standard level of performance, often having to pass written and hands-on performance tests, before being recommended for promotion. Finally, each first-termee is carefully evaluated to determine his eligibility to reenlist and become part of the career force. These multiple gates serve to screen out many of the people who are initially admitted to military service. It is reasonable to assume that an individual who passes through these gates successfully is a satisfactory performer.

We are not satisfied with our efforts to relate our entrance standards to job performance and believe the ultimate validation of entrance tests and standards is by measurement against job performance. The Department

has initiated a long-term program of research to relate our enlistment standards to performance on the job. Each of the Services, in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, is in the process of implementing a research effort in this area. As this work is completed, the Services should be in a much improved position to set aptitude standards for enlistment in a way that relates them to performance and the costs associated with both recruiting and training.

CHAPTER IX

PRODUCTIVITY

A. Program Overview

The increased awareness of productivity growth as essential, if the DoD is to effectively meet its material readiness objectives, has resulted in the strengthening of the DoD Productivity Program established in August 1975. The program was further expanded in April 1979 to include a focus on labor productivity, incorporation of motivation efforts into the program, and establishment of the principle of shared savings to provide an incentive for participation to DoD managers.

The DoD Productivity Program contains the following key program management elements:

1. Integration of productivity enhancement, measurement, and evaluation into resource management systems.
2. Establishment of productivity goals as an integral part of planning, programming, and budgeting and the resultant allocation of resources to attain those goals.
3. A planned approach to productivity enhancement.

Productivity enhancement, under the program, is to be accomplished through:

1. Continuing analysis, performance appraisal, and improvement of all operating methods and systems.
2. Effective use of work measurement and statistical techniques to determine work force efficiency, establish a data base for use in operating systems, and provide a basis for planning and budgeting requirements.
3. A comprehensive program to identify opportunities for and to provide funding of productivity enhancing investments.
4. Analysis and evaluation of productivity improvement alternatives.
5. An aggressive and cohesive program of research and management efforts to improve work force motivation and quality of working life.

The DoD program has now been implemented in military departments and defense agencies. A unique productivity enhancing capital investment program has been developed which promises to achieve excellent returns in manpower and dollar savings in future years. Productivity measurement and evaluation efforts, however, while constantly improving have not progressed to the level desired for optimum utility. The productivity data and measures contained in this chapter are based on information

accumulated for the Federal Government productivity report and, to the degree that they match expressed congressional interests, have been incorporated in this report on Defense productivity.

B. Composition Of The Program

1. Program Management

Sustained productivity growth can be achieved most effectively where the potential for improvement is assessed and productivity improvements are identified and planned for implementation. Thus, the DoD program establishes a requirement in the resource planning process for identifying: (a) productivity goals by major support function, and (b) the improvement actions/investments necessary to attain these goals. Further integrating productivity planning into the resources management system, OSD budget guidance required incorporating the productivity plans in the budget estimates with identification of productivity investments and how the anticipated resource savings will be used. To provide an incentive to managers to seek out and implement productivity enhancing projects, components are encouraged to reapply the savings achieved to validated unfunded work requirements within the originating organization.

2. Productivity Enhancement and Measurement

a. Work Measurement and Methods Improvement

Work measurement and methods improvement have been used to improve operations, establish a data base for resource management across a broad range of Defense activities, develop staffing standards, and measure labor performance. The most intensive applications have been in the depot maintenance, arsenal, depot supply, and real property maintenance activities. These applications have already resulted in significant productivity increases.

A natural evolution of the DoD work measurement program has been to standardize procedures and the times for their accomplishment. Data from this Defense Work Measurement Standard Time Data Program can be applied to increase productivity through installation of standard methods in all activities and to reduce the time needed to analyze processes and establish appropriate time values. This program is available to all DoD activities and is provided on request to other government agencies and private industry.

b. Capital Investment

In recognizing that judicious capital-labor substitutions are an effective means to positively affect productivity, current DoD productivity guidance requires that consideration be given to productivity

enhancement in capital investment planning and to the impact of potential investments in the establishment of productivity goals. Historically, productivity investments in the DoD have lost out to higher priority direct mission related investments in the budget process. To provide a greater focus on productivity investments, three funding alternatives have been developed to encourage investments in productivity projects. These funding alternatives are: (1) Productivity Enhancing Incentive Funds (PEIF); (2) Industrial Fund Fast Payback; and (3) Productivity Incentive Funds (PIF).

Since 1977, DoD has carried out programs which provide financing for small dollar investments expected to return manpower and dollar savings within two years. These funds are known as Productivity Enhancing Incentive Funds (PEIF). PEIF requires establishment of a level of funding in annual budgets so that investment opportunities can be promptly financed. Projects funded from PEIF cost \$100,000 or less and are typically off-the-shelf items.

Concurrent with the PEIF, changes were made to regulations governing the use of DoD industrial funds which permitted financing of fast payback investments from operating capital, provided that costs were returned to the funds as operational savings. This program, known as the Industrial Fund Fast Payback Program, is limited to projects costing under \$300,000 with a three-year payback. The program has provided benefits in industrially funded activities similar to those achieved in the PEIF and has assisted in counter-balancing the effects of increases in labor and material costs.

Recognizing that many significant opportunities to improve productivity remain unfunded due to the continuing competition for investment funds, the Department took action in FY 1981 to establish a Productivity Investment Fund (PIF). This fund was intended to surface major PEI opportunities and ensure that proper consideration was given for their funding in competition with other investment projects. Components were invited to submit candidate projects which were then reviewed, ranked, and selected on a competitive basis considering their expected internal rate of return, the long-term return on investment, and the magnitude of manpower savings.

In recognition that the public sector processes provide little incentive to seek out opportunities to improve productivity, the DoD policy states that managers may reapply the program returns to accomplish valid unfunded or deferred workloads. Through this and other means, the Department has sought to curb increasing costs and to conserve resources needed to achieve material readiness objectives.

3. Work Force Motivation

DoD has been and will continue to be involved in developing effective means of motivating its personnel. The purpose of motivation efforts is twofold: first, to improve the worker's quality of employment and thus maintain a more dedicated, stable, and involved work force; and,

second, to increase productivity. DoD encourages experiments in work force motivation and the prudent use of proven motivational techniques. Current efforts include experiments and use of such techniques as job enrichment, quality circles, and performance contingent reward systems. Due to the nature of motivational efforts, their use cannot be institutionalized but rather left to those organizations where there is mutual agreement as to their application between management and union personnel.

a. Measurement and Evaluation

Included within this facet of the DoD program are three related efficiency measures: work measurement, productivity indexes, and unit cost comparisons. These evaluation techniques have been used in programming and budgeting, in analyzing investment alternatives, and in determining manpower requirements.

C. DoD in the Federal Program

DoD has participated in the overall Government productivity program since it began in 1973.

Thirty-three percent of the direct hire civilian and eleven percent of the military work force are covered by productivity measures accepted into the Government productivity measurement program. Additionally, DoD is striving to develop productivity measures that are acceptable for inclusion in the federal program for such functions as facilities maintenance, certain areas of depot maintenance, and various personnel activities.

D. Current Program Status

The level and degree of integrating productivity considerations into the planning and budgeting processes varies among the DoD components. While developing productivity goals and planning actions to achieve those goals appears to be easily accomplished, their integration into the complex planning and budgeting processes will take time.

The specific method of achieving this integration is of necessity tailored to each component's management philosophy, resource management systems, and productivity awareness. While some components have had productivity considerations as an integral part of their planning and budgeting systems, others are currently in the process of developing the underlying processes to meet this requirement. Thus, the integration of productivity considerations in the planning and budgeting cycles is currently limited. However, recent actions and initiatives developed by the components are expected to result in increasing focus on productivity in the DoD resources management systems.

Major investment projects in the Productivity Investment Funds (PIF) totalled \$64 million in the FY 1981 Defense Budget. These were competitively selected and included in the component's budgets at OSD direction. PIF projects, with a minimum cost of \$1 million, are expected to have payback periods of four years or less and produce significant manpower savings.

Net savings of \$188 million and 2,200 manpower spaces are forecast from the FY 1981 funding. A summary of actual FY 1981 funding by military department follows:

	FY 1981 \$ Mil
Army	26.3
Navy	31.3
Air Force	6.7
	<u>\$64.3</u>

Similar funding was requested for FY 1982 but was eliminated in budget priority deliberations.

The OSD-sponsored Productivity Enhancing Incentive Funds (PEIF) are designed to finance small dollar productivity investments under \$100,000 with a two-year or less payback period. Annual savings generating from the FY 1979 projects are expected to be \$9.5 million. Long-term savings are forecast to be approximately \$9 for \$1 invested. Similar results are anticipated for FY 1980 through FY 1982.

Funding levels for PEIF projects approved for FY 1980 and included in the FY 1981 and FY 1982 budget are shown below:

	FY 1980 \$ Mil	FY 1981 \$ Mil	FY 1982 \$ Mil
Army	3.0	3.0	3.3
Navy	3.0	3.2	3.4
Air Force	3.8	4.5	10.0
DLA	.5	.7	.4


E. Productivity Trends

Labor productivity trend data are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as a by-product of the Government productivity index computations. The measurement base for FY 1979 totaled 625,000 employee years for work accomplished in 40 functions. The measured employee years include direct hire civilians, military, and indirect hire foreign nationals. The productivity trend data shown in this section cover the FY 1972 to FY 1979 period. While productivity statistics begin with FY 1967 data, the statistics subsequent to FY 1972 cover a more substantial data base and are being used for this report. Data for FY 1980 have been submitted to BLS and are currently being processed.

The overall DoD labor productivity index, as shown in Figure 1, increased 10.6 percent between FY 1972 and FY 1979 rising at an annual rate of 1.7 percent. During this period, work loads, as expressed by the output index, decreased at an annual rate of 1.4 percent while the employee year input index dropped at an annual rate of 3.0 percent. Productivity decreased


in only one year, FY 1973, when work loads declined at a faster rate than personnel as a result of the post Southeast Asia conflict adjustment. From FY 1975 to FY 1979 inputs continued to decline as economies were achieved and personnel realignments were realized while work loads began to stabilize. As a result, significant productivity increases were achieved in this period.

Figure 1



Labor productivity indexes for five major functional groupings are displayed in Figure 2. These functions represent approximately 68 percent of the total DoD employee years included in the measurement base. The functional areas are equipment maintenance, facilities maintenance, medical services, base services, and supply operations.

Figure 2



The equipment maintenance productivity index includes depot and intermediate level maintenance activities. Productivity increased at an annual rate of 1 percent between FY 1972 and FY 1979 with a 2 percent increase in FY 1979. Productivity output measures used in the maintenance of equipment function are the number of items repaired/overhauled or an equivalent. The productivity trend in the equipment maintenance function displays a small long-term gain but a significant upward movement from the downturn in FY 1973. The gains reflect continuing investments in labor savings equipment, realignment of work loads to consolidate similar rework, and other management initiatives. The changing characteristics of the work loads in this area, particularly the move to more complex items, present a measurement problem which was not totally factored out of the data. Thus the actual level of improvement may have been greater than that reflected in the statistics.

Data for the depot level maintenance of ships are not included in the index for FY 1978 and FY 1979. The testing of an improved measurement methodology for this function was not successful. Consequently, other measurement methodologies are being evaluated.

The facilities maintenance function includes those personnel involved in the maintenance and repair of real property. Productivity has increased by 7 percent between FY 1972 and FY 1979, recovering from a sharp downturn in FY 1973. Increases have resulted where staffing levels have been reduced more than the outputs. The existing output measures, however, do not allow for adjustments to reflect changes in level of effort and need to be refined.

The medical services function includes the administration and operation of medical hospitals and clinics. While productivity rose by 1.6 percent in FY 1979, the average annual rate of change between FY 1972 and FY 1979 was a negative 0.5 percent. Productivity declined in FY 1973 and FY 1974 as a result of efforts to improve the quality of health care through increasing the staff-per-patient ratio in hospitals. Between FY 1974 and FY 1977, productivity has increased by more than 3 percent as employee-year input was reduced. Improving health care techniques to reduce the length of time patients stay in hospitals and providing more outpatient services were contributing factors. Productivity declined in FY 1978 when work loads declined at a greater rate than the input. Improvement actions such as greater use of automated equipment, increased use of para-professionals, and other management actions were offset by an increase in work efforts related to programs which, although not included in the measured outputs, resulted in an increase in the manpower input.

The base service function includes food service, laundry and dry cleaning, commissary, and printing activities. Productivity increased at an annual rate of 1.8 percent from FY 1972 to FY 1979 with an intermediate decrease in FY 1973. Factors contributing to the productivity growth were consolidation of facilities, automation of operations, and better alignment of personnel with work loads.

The supply operation function encompasses both depot and local supply operations, inventory control, and property disposal activities. Productivity in these areas increased by 16 percent between FY 1972 and FY 1977. This improvement was achieved through such initiatives as mechanization of manual operations, capital investments in materiel handling equipment, and consolidation of overseas activities. Productivity declined in FY 1978 by almost 4 percent as work loads and personnel related to reorganizations and consolidations of supplies in two areas were out of alignment. Productivity also declined in FY 1979. The rate of productivity growth in those elements which had had productivity increases slowed from prior years and did not offset the declines.

F. Program Initiatives

By its very nature productivity improvement must be a continuing process. The dynamics of management in the public sector environment dictate a need for continuing program evaluation and refinement to respond to changing needs and challenges.

Continuing initiatives which will impact the FY 1982 program year are the development and issuance of operating instructions which will expand the basic policy guidance, providing more specific direction in the areas of enhancement, measurement, and evaluation.

A DoD Instruction has been recently issued which provides the framework for the use of capital investments in improving productivity. This instruction includes specific guidance on investment policies, procedures for allocating funds, and information requirements in response to Congressional perspectives on the program.

G. Component Highlights and Initiatives

1. Department of the Army

a. Program Management

To enhance productivity, MACOMs/Agencies are required to establish formal programs to set productivity improvement goals, to identify fast payback capital investment opportunities, to review and improve work methods, to establish labor performance standards, to implement broad-based functional performance measurement and evaluation, and to pursue the acquisition of the resources necessary to support productivity initiatives developed with these techniques. Initiatives and related productivity improvement goals are reported through documents as part of budget submissions. Resource requirements stated in those budget submission must consider the effects of the productivity initiatives reported in those same submissions.

Annual productivity goals have been established for the following areas:

<u>Functional Area</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Central Finance & Accounting	2.0%
Admin Use Motor Vehicle Maint	2.0
Depot Maint	1.0
Intermediate Maint	2.0
Central Procurement	1.2
Local Supply	1.0
Single Mgr Trans & Tfc Mgt	1.0
Commissary	1.6
Munitions Production	.9
Weapons Production	1.1

To increase the number of summary functional groupings for which goals are established, the Army is testing the applicability of output indicators in 29 additional summary functional groupings. Goals have been established for those areas on a test basis.

b. Productivity Enhancement

(1) Methods and Standards

Analysis of functions throughout the Army indicated that there were many functional areas where standards would be more appropriately established at the summary functional level than at the detailed process level. A major commitment in manpower resources was made (starting in the Civilian Personnel functional area) to produce such summary functional standards. The establishment of detailed standards for use Army-wide also progressed, with emphasis on coordinated efforts through assignment of functional responsibilities to the MACOM level to avoid duplication between MACOMs.

Idea Interchange, a valuable management improvement tool, became a major area of separate effort during FY 1981. On a quarterly basis, successfully implemented ideas are collected at the HQDA level to add to a growing reference data base accessible by keyword search. Successful innovations are disseminated through public affairs channels.

(2) Productivity Capital Investment Programs

Throughout the Army, productivity enhancing investments are enthusiastically supported. The Army's Quick Return on Investment Program (QRIP), the forerunner of the OSD-sponsored PECI program for small dollar investments, was funded at \$3 million in FY 1980. These QRIP projects produced annual savings of \$5.4 million. Projects planned for FY 1981 are estimated to produce savings of \$2.9 million annually from the

\$3 million QRIP fund. These savings have been incorporated into statements of Army Resource Requirement levels (which would otherwise be higher than currently stated).

(3) Performance Measurement and Evaluation

Army is developing a Total Factor Productivity analysis concept which combines consideration of all resources used to perform a mission with performance attributes such as timeliness, quality, and unit cost. To support this measurement concept, a Performance Module is being designed into the revised Standard Financial Reporting System which the Army is preparing to field in combination with a revised AMS structure.

2. Department of the Navy

a. Program Management

Although the Navy Productivity Program encompasses all military and civilian organizations, the Naval Material Command (NMC) organic industrial community is the focus of current planning. The primary emphasis in the Navy productivity program is on improving labor productivity at those industrial activities where the potential payoff is significant. The program's major objective is to develop productivity enhancement initiatives as a means to more effectively manage and allocate resources through use of productivity data in program, budget, and performance evaluations. To manage this effort, the NMC established a Productivity Management Office to provide guidance, direction, and coordination for the productivity enhancement efforts of the NMC industrial community.

b. Productivity Enhancement

The Navy Productivity Program, as presently structured, explores three major areas of opportunity: technological advancement, organizational development, and process management. This orientation has stimulated a growing productivity awareness among managers as well as rank and file personnel. Within this context, productivity is being recognized in terms of new technology, cost factors in production, and expectations about the work environment and the potential for an enriching experience while enhancing productivity. Recognition of and investment in new tools, procedures, and attitudes is key to success in this endeavor.

(1) Work Methods and Measurement.

Navy concentration on work methods is directed toward identification of organic industrial processes and their generic elements which may be redesigned and embedded with in-process automations, to improve flow time and decrease labor investment per unit of product output. Specific focus is planned on turbine engine disassembly/assembly processing and an investigative analysis of structural disassembly and assembly processes in shipyards and in depots.

Work measurement efforts are being focused on studies of potential aggregate measures of productivity for naval shipyards, which can be utilized as a quantitative basis for measurement of effectiveness for productivity initiatives such as capital investment. Development of aggregate measurements of productivity in naval shipyards and aeronautical depots is difficult because of the heterogeneous nature and broad scope of such operations. Application of advanced operations research and modeling techniques currently gives promise of yielding valid measures of productivity.

(2) Capital Investment

The Chief of Naval Material initiated a Cost of Ownership Reduction Investment (COORI) in July 1979. FY 1982 will be the first year of COORI program execution. Pending full funding approval, the FY 1982 COORI will invest \$42M in about 54 productivity projects largely centered in industrial activities. The nature of these investments addresses a wide spectrum of interests, from productivity-increasing equipment substitution for labor or obsolete machinery through infusion of new technology and prototype equipment into the operational work force conditions, to modernization of facilities, and modification of incentives and rewards. The anticipated manpower savings from these investments are over 200 manyears per year in manpower requirement avoidance. The near-term Navy goal is capital commitment of sufficient magnitude to take advantage of currently identified but unfunded Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment opportunities of more than 750 million dollars.

(3) Motivation

The Navy's Organizational Development Program efforts include stimulation of productivity awareness through media presentations, distinguished lecture series, indoctrination of prospective commanding officers, and information bulletins as well as application of behavioral science techniques. Current motivational applications are Performance Contingent Reward Systems and Quality Circles.

An incentive program designed to improve individual productivity provides for a monetary bonus directly proportional to the amount of work exceeding a production standard. This program known as the Performance Contingent Reward System (PCRS) was developed by the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center and was first implemented in the data entry section of a data processing center at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. The employees participating in the study were Navy civilian data entry operators. Consistent production standards were developed and a PCRS was designed in accordance with sound behavioral principles and federal guidelines. Implementation of PCRSs at other naval shipyards has shown that where the basic tenets of a PCRS exist (i.e., regular performance feedback, timely monetary reward, and reasonable time-on-the-job standards) significant increases in productivity may be expected.

In January of 1980, the Naval Material Command sponsored a study to isolate impediments to productivity within the Navy's industrially funded logistics community (shipyards, naval air rework facilities, public works centers, supply centers, and weapons stations). The study was conducted by the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, with technical assistance provided by the Office of Personnel Management. Completed in October 1980, the study will serve as a basis for refinement of Navy operations and procedures to eliminate controllable impediments.

3. Department of the Air Force

a. Program Management

A formal productivity planning process, initiated with the FY 1980 operating year, is being refined to provide more consistent results. Under this process, each major command and operating agency develops an annual productivity plan which includes establishing goals and broad initiatives for achieving these goals and reporting progress toward achieving prior year goals. The command plans are fed down to the individual bases and up to Air Staff functional managers. Each base uses the command plan to formulate supportive goals and develop specific improvement initiatives. The functional managers use the command plans to establish broad functional goals which are incorporated into the planning and budgeting process. Improvements are anticipated in the planning process for FY 1982 as a result of analytical review of current command plans and further refinement of the requirements.

b. Productivity Enhancement

(1) Work Methods and Standards

Since 1961, the Air Force has operated the Management Engineering Program (MEP) to measure labor and determine manpower requirements. FY 1982-86 productivity improvement initiatives established for the MEP are: (1) an expanded use of work center descriptions which better serve to question and eliminate unnecessary requirements; (2) development of a methodology to better identify productivity enhancing investment opportunities; and (3) increased management use of consultative services (Management Advisory Studies) to improve or resolve local problems.

Expanded use of idea interchange will also produce operational improvements. The annual productivity plans developed by each command provide a ready source of operational methods improvement to be cross-fed to managers across the Air Force. Functional managers will screen the command plans and select for cross-feeding those ideas which potentially have broad application.

The Air Force suggestion program complements existing productivity enhancement efforts. For FY 1980, 19,000 suggestions with benefits of \$76 million were adopted.

c. Productivity Enhancing Capital Investments

Participation in the Productivity Investment fund (PIF), Fast Payback Capital Investment (FASCAP) for projects under \$100,000 and the Industrial Fund Fast Payback Program has been expanded through increased awareness at all organization levels. Industrial Fund projects approved for FY 1980 funding totaled \$4.7 million with an expected three-year return of \$12.9 million. FASCAP funds of \$10 million have been budgeted for FY 1982. FY 1980 FASCAP actions and FY 1981 projections based on current trends are as follows:

<u>FY</u>	<u>Budget (M\$)</u>	<u>Projects Approved</u>	<u>Investment Cost (\$M)</u>	<u>Two Year Savings(\$M)</u>
80	3.8	141	3.5	6.7
81	4.5	200	4.9	9.8

d. Motivation

Quantifying the productivity impact resulting from application of behavioral science techniques on an organization has been one of the major factors limiting their use. The Leadership and Management Development Center (LMDC) has developed a methodology which is expected to quantify and isolate changes resulting from the intervention of behavioral science/organizational development techniques within an organization. The Air Force approach has interested several universities) and this interest may result in cooperative efforts with these universities.

Quality circles are considered to be a valuable motivational and productivity enhancement concept by the Air Force. This concept has been applied on a limited basis and is being investigated for broader application.

4. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The FY 1982 initiatives for DIA include the following productivity enhancement goals:

- a. Optimize telecommunications center services to DIA and other intelligence components while reducing long-term costs.
- b. Optimize the printing service to DIA and other selected intelligence components while reducing external assistance printing costs.
- c. Provide the means of expanding intelligence instruction by initiating two new curricula.

Planned actions include the management of the near-term standard for automation of CINC/Service Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) AUTODIN requirements, continued action to consolidate Special Intelligence and General Service telecommunications facilities, and facilitation of the consolidation of additional DSSCS centers with the consolidated DIA DSSCS telecommunications center. These productivity improvement projects are designed to absorb the impact on DIA and the Services resulting from the closure of Special Intelligence Telecommunications Centers and the sizeable increase in the amount of message traffic handled.

Other planned actions include the development and conducting of an Intelligence Collection Management Curriculum and the Senior Enlisted Intelligence Curriculum. Both programs were developed in response to Intelligence Community user request. Productivity will be affected since both programs will be accomplished without additional manpower and without decreasing other programs.

Although there was a minor productivity increase in the DIA printing operations during FY 1982, there was no reduction in external assistance printing costs. Delays in equipment procurement prevented more in-house printing from being accomplished. Equipment has now been received and is expected to be operational during the first quarter FY 1981. It is anticipated that the stated goal will be accomplished.

5. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

Productivity improvement initiatives for FY 1982 will concentrate on both quality and quantity of program outputs. With respect to personnel security investigations, DIS will focus on preservation/enhancement of quality investigations in the face of increased complexity and difficulty of cases. Accordingly no quantitative increases in agent productivity are planned.

A distributed word processing pilot test was completed in FY 1980. Preliminary analysis of the data suggests that the system, if implemented throughout DIS, will improve management control of the investigative process, enhance quality of investigative reports, contribute to integrity of data transmission throughout the organization, and substantially increase productivity of clerical personnel. DIS will seek funding for installation of the system throughout the ten regions.

Another initiative for FY 1982 is implementation of a Performance Contingent Reward System in the data entry element of the DIS information Systems Unit. Based on feasibility analyses and continuing dialogue with personnel of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard which pioneered this approach, substantial productivity improvements and cost avoidance can be realized through implementation of the system.

6. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA productivity improvement efforts are managed under the DMA Effectiveness/Productivity (E/P) Program. The E/P Program is integrated into the management processes and is an identified responsibility at all supervisory levels. Manpower savings from projected productivity gains are reflected in the program and budget activities of the Agency.

Productivity in the map and chart production functions, which cover 98 percent of DMA resources, is projected to increase 3.0 percent in FY 1982. The gains will be achieved primarily through the introduction of productivity enhancing capital investments and improvements in work methods and standards. Projected manpower savings will be reutilized within the production program to reduce the shortfalls in resources to support advanced weapon systems and other high priority DoD programs.

FY 1982 initiatives will continue to emphasize equipment procurement primarily in the advanced technology items required to provide the mapping, charting, and geodesy input to new weapon systems such as Cruise Missile and FIREFINDER. Equipment investment in FY 1982 is projected to total over \$2.1 million, including \$740,000 in fast payback PECIs over \$100,000 and \$1,365,000 in other than fast payback PECIs. These initiatives are projected to save 110 manyears of effort. Anticipated savings from continued efforts in improving work methods and standards are estimated at 35 manyears per year. Overall results from the FY 1982 initiatives are savings of 145 manyears per year during the remainder of the FY 1982-86 time frame.

7. Defense Contract Audit Agency

a. Overview

The Defense Contract Audit Agency is continuing to pursue new measurement methods and productivity goals for its auditors. Regional Productivity Principals have been designated to serve as focal points with responsibilities for this program in each regional office. In addition, a formal program of productivity has been established.

In its operations, this Agency strives to maintain an optimum balance of productivity, effectiveness, and quality in each audit. The quantification and measurement of these factors are difficult. Research and development efforts toward meaningful measurement continue. At present, the Agency has no comprehensive system for measuring the impact of intangible factors influencing much of its work.

b. FY 1982 Initiatives

Consistent with the stated intent to eliminate fraud and waste, the Agency plans to assess its vulnerability from (1) a functional or program aspect and (2) a contractor reliability viewpoint. The Agency expects to devote more time to assuring that contractor internal control systems preclude or detect irregularities resulting from either poor

systems design, inefficient application, or intentional manipulation. This effort is consistent with the broad concern taken by IG and internal audit organizations in DoD and elsewhere in Government. As a result, the Agency is programming a productivity increase of only one percent for incurred costs but hopes to maintain its full productivity objective of two percent for pricing proposals.

CHAPTER X

COST OF MANPOWER

A. Introduction

DoD outlays for manpower costs will be \$89 billion in the President's Budget for FY 1982. This chapter discusses the makeup of those costs.

B. Description of Defense Manpower Costs

1. Cost Categories

The manpower cost categories used in this chapter are described below:

a. Military Personnel Appropriations, one for each Service, fund all the active military pay, cash allowances, enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, permanent change of station travel expenses, and the cost of feeding military people (subsistence-in-kind) in military messes or with field rations.

b. Defense Family Housing Costs. These fund the leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. This appropriation also includes funds for paying civilians who operate and maintain family housing. However, the pay for all DoD civilians is counted under another category, "Civilian Costs," in this chapter. Thus, the Defense Family Housing cost category here excludes civilian costs to avoid double counting and is not the equivalent of the total Defense Family Housing appropriation.


c. Military Retired Pay Appropriation funds the compensation of retired military personnel for previous service. The retired pay appropriation is a single appropriation for DoD; funding is not appropriated or managed with respect to the Service from which annuitants retired. The amount funded in this appropriation depends on the retired military population and is independent of the current force. The budget does not reflect future retirement costs for members of the current force.

d. Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations, one for each of the six reserve components, fund inactive duty drills, active duty training, ROTC, full-time reservists for administration and training, and the Health Professions Scholarship Program.

e. Civilian Costs. Unlike military personnel costs, which are funded through separate appropriations, civilian costs are spread among several appropriations in accordance with the function being performed. Civilian costs include compensation for both direct and indirect hires. Also included are the DoD contributions to retirement and to health and life insurance. Figure 1 shows the percentage of the FY 1982 DoD civilian costs contained in each of the functional appropriations.

Figure 1

FY 1982 Civilian Costs By Appropriation ^{1/}



^{1/} The portion labeled "Industrial Funds" represents salaries paid at industrially funded activities regardless of source appropriation.

f. Personnel Support Costs. Personnel support costs are defined as the non-pay portions of the costs of the following functions:

- Individual Training
- Medical Support (including CHAMPUS)
- Recruiting and Examining
- Overseas Dependents Education
- Base Operating Support (50 percent of total BOS)
- Other Personnel Support

Direct personnel costs, including pay, are not included in personnel support costs, as they have already been included in the previously defined cost categories.

2. Cost Trends

Table 1 shows trends in manpower costs, including payments to retired military personnel, and the associated strengths for the President's FY 1982 budget and selected historical years.

TABLE 1
DEFENSE MANPOWER COSTS ^{1/}
(Outlays, \$ Billion)

	Actual						FY 1982 President's Budget Request	
	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	FY 76	FY 78	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82
Defense Outlays	49.5	77.3	77.6	87.9	103.0	132.8	157.6	180.0
Manpower Outlays								
Military Personnel Appropriations	12.3	19.0	22.1	23.3	25.1	28.5	33.6	37.5
Def. Family Housing Costs ^{2/}	.5	.4	.7	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.6
Military Retired Pay Appropriations ^{3/}	1.2	2.1	5.1	7.3	9.2	11.9	13.8	15.6
Reserve and Guard Personnel Approps.	.7	.9	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.4	3.2	3.7
Civilian Costs ^{4/}	7.5	10.6	14.1	16.4	18.9	21.4	23.3	24.4
Personnel Support Costs ^{5/}	1.7	2.8	2.9	3.8	4.2	4.8	5.8	6.3
Total Manpower Costs	23.9	35.8	46.6	53.5	60.5	70.4	81.2	89.1
End Strengths (000s)								
Regular Employees								
Active Military	2,687	3,547	2,161	2,081	2,061	2,050	2,065	2,094
Civilians ^{4/}								
Direct Hire	1,035	1,274	1,015	960	936	916	916	916
Indirect Hire	140	119	94	87	81	75	78	79
Total	1,176	1,393	1,109	1,046	1,017	990	994	995
Total	3,863	4,940	3,270	3,127	3,078	3,040	3,059	3,089
Others								
Selected Reserve ^{6/}	953	922	925	823	788	851	885	923
Retired Military	435	651	1,012	1,132	1,243	1,328	1,370	1,415

^{1/} Data exclude civil functions, NSA, and special programs for disadvantaged youths.

^{2/} Excludes civilian pay portion of this appropriation which is included under civilian costs.

^{3/} For those already retired. Future retirement costs for current members are not currently reflected in the budget.

^{4/} The cost of civilians is budgeted under the functional appropriations -- e.g., operations and maintenance, family housing, RDT&E. Often indirect hire civilians are excluded from manpower costs and strength data.

^{5/} Excludes the pay of military and civilian personnel, since they are accounted for separately. Includes costs of individual training, medical support, recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, half of base operating support, and a miscellaneous category. Note that FY 1981 and FY 1982 personnel support costs are preliminary estimates.

^{6/} Includes National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also counted as civilian employees. Includes all people attending paid drills or receiving initial training. From FY 1980 on, the reserve data also include officers on statutory tours and other reservists on full-time duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve forces.

A number of improvements were made in military compensation and reimbursement which significantly increased the Military Personnel Appropriation account. Chief among these were an 11.7 percent pay raise on October 1, 1980, increases in the basic allowance for subsistence, sea pay, flight pay, PCS mileage reimbursement, and implementation of a variable housing allowance (VHA) to allow more equitable payment for housing in high cost-of-living areas. In addition, Congress raised the limit for both enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. DoD is also now paying reenlistment bonuses to many more people. All of these actions are aimed at making military pay more competitive with the private sector and thus improving retention.

3. Pay Raise Assumption

The pay raise assumptions contained in the FY 1982 budget submissions and the previous actual experience are shown below as percentages of base pay:

	<u>Military</u>	<u>General Schedule</u>	<u>Wage Board</u> ^{1/}
FY 80	7.0	7.0	6.4
FY 81	11.7	9.2	6.2
FY 82	9.1	5.5	6.9

^{1/} Wage board raises were limited by legislative action in 1980 and 1981.

C. Current Civilian and Military Pay Rates

The General Schedule, Wage Board and active military pay rates are shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Note that the Wage Board pay table entries are simple averages for wage areas. Each area has its own distinct pay table. These tables are included as samples only. Table 5 shows Regular Military Compensation (RMC) for active military personnel. RMC is the total of basic pay, quarters (BAQ) and subsistence (BAS) allowances, variable housing allowance, station housing allowance, and the estimated value of the tax advantage which results because the allowances are not taxed. Figures shown in Table 5 are the average cash and in-kind RMC for each pay grade and longevity step assuming that all military personnel receive the allowances in cash. The RMC averages assume that the total housing allowance received by members living off post is the sum of BAQ plus VHA, while in-kind quarters are valued at the BAQ rate only. Station housing allowance, a part of RMC, is currently being estimated, but the numbers were not yet available at time of printing. The pay per training assembly for military reserve personnel is in Table 6. A training assembly is usually a four-hour training period. The annual pay for reserves is a function of the number of drills, which varies by pay group. All of these tables are as of 1 October 1980 and do not include the military and General Schedule pay raises scheduled for October 1981.

TABLE 2
ANNUAL GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY RATES

FY 1981

As implemented by Executive Order 12248, October 16, 1980.
Effective on the first day of the first applicable pay period beginning on or after October 1, 1980.

Step	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS-1	\$7,960	\$8,225	\$8,490	\$8,755	\$9,020	\$9,175	\$9,437	\$9,699	\$9,712	\$9,954
2	8,951	9,163	9,459	9,712	9,820	10,109	10,398	10,687	10,976	11,265
3	9,766	10,092	10,418	10,744	11,070	11,396	11,722	12,048	12,374	12,700
4	10,963	11,328	11,693	12,058	12,423	12,788	13,153	13,518	13,883	14,248
5	12,266	12,675	13,084	13,493	13,902	14,311	14,720	15,129	15,538	15,947
6	13,672	14,128	14,584	15,040	15,496	15,952	16,408	16,864	17,320	17,776
7	15,193	15,699	16,205	16,711	17,217	17,723	18,229	18,735	19,241	19,747
8	16,826	17,387	17,948	18,509	19,070	19,631	20,192	20,753	21,314	21,875
9	18,585	19,205	19,825	20,445	21,065	21,685	22,305	22,925	23,545	24,165
10	20,467	21,149	21,831	22,513	23,195	23,877	24,559	25,241	25,923	26,605
11	22,486	23,236	23,986	24,736	25,486	26,236	26,986	27,736	28,486	29,236
12	26,951	27,849	28,747	29,645	30,543	31,441	32,339	33,237	34,135	35,033
13	32,048	33,116	34,184	35,252	36,320	37,388	38,456	39,524	40,592	41,660
14	37,871	39,133	40,395	41,657	42,919	44,181	45,443	46,705	47,967	49,229
15	44,547	46,032	47,517	49,002	50,487*	51,972*	53,457*	54,942*	56,427*	57,912*
16	52,247*	53,989*	55,731*	57,473*	59,215*	60,957*	62,699*	64,441*	66,183*	
17	61,204*	63,244*	65,284*	67,324*	69,364*					
18	71,734*									

* Basic pay is limited by Section 5308 of Title 5 of the United States Code to the rate for level V of the Executive Schedule which is, as of the effective date of this schedule, \$58,500. Notwithstanding the above rates, the maximum rate payable, as of the effective date of this schedule, is \$50,112.50. (The effect of Section 101(c) of Public Law 96-369 (the continuing resolution approved October 1, 1980) is to limit the use of the funds so appropriated so that they are not available to pay salaries in this schedule in excess of the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule on September 30, 1980.)

TABLE 3

FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL ANNUAL AVERAGE SCHEDULE (APPROPRIATED FUND)*
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1980
(BASED ON 133 AREAS - ALASKA AND PUERTO RICO EXCLUDED)

STEP GRADE	WC-RATES					VL-RATES					WS-RATES				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1	10,800	11,300	11,700	12,100	12,600	11,900	12,400	12,900	13,400	13,900	15,900	16,600	17,200	17,900	18,600
2	11,500	12,000	12,400	12,900	13,400	12,600	13,200	13,700	14,200	14,700	16,600	17,300	18,000	18,600	19,300
3	12,200	12,700	13,200	13,700	14,200	13,400	13,900	14,500	15,100	15,600	17,200	18,000	18,700	19,400	20,100
4	12,900	13,400	13,900	14,400	14,900	14,100	14,700	15,300	15,900	16,500	18,000	18,700	19,400	20,200	20,900
5	13,600	14,100	14,700	15,200	15,800	14,900	15,500	16,200	16,800	17,400	18,700	19,400	20,200	21,000	21,800
6	14,200	14,800	15,400	16,000	16,600	15,700	16,300	17,000	17,600	18,300	19,300	20,100	20,900	21,700	22,500
7	14,900	15,600	16,200	16,800	17,400	16,400	17,100	17,800	18,500	19,200	20,000	20,900	21,700	22,500	23,400
8	15,600	16,300	16,900	17,600	18,200	17,200	17,900	18,500	19,300	20,000	20,700	21,600	22,400	23,300	24,100
9	16,300	17,000	17,700	18,300	19,000	18,000	18,700	19,400	20,200	20,900	21,400	22,300	23,200	24,100	25,000
10	17,000	17,700	18,400	19,100	19,800	18,700	19,500	20,200	21,000	21,800	22,100	23,000	23,900	24,800	25,800
11	17,700	18,400	19,100	19,900	20,600	19,400	20,300	21,100	21,900	22,700	22,700	23,600	24,500	25,500	26,400
12	18,300	19,100	19,900	20,700	21,400	20,200	21,000	21,900	22,700	23,500	23,400	24,400	25,300	26,300	27,300
13	19,000	19,800	20,600	21,400	22,200	21,000	21,800	22,700	23,500	24,400	24,300	25,300	26,300	27,300	28,300
14	19,700	20,500	21,300	22,200	23,000	21,700	22,600	23,500	24,400	25,300	25,400	26,400	27,500	28,500	29,600
15	20,400	21,200	22,100	22,900	23,800	22,400	23,400	24,300	25,200	26,200	26,600	27,700	28,800	30,000	31,100
16											28,000	29,200	30,400	31,500	32,700
17											29,600	30,900	32,100	33,300	34,600
18											31,400	32,700	34,000	35,300	36,600
19											33,300	34,700	36,100	37,500	38,900

* Rates at Step 2, WC represent a simple average of 133 Wage Board area schedules. Other rates are computed as defined in FPM Supplement 532-1, 55-11P. All numbers are rounded to the nearest \$100.00.

TABLE 3 (Continued)
FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL AVERAGE SCHEDULE (NON-APPROPRIATED FUND)*
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1980
(BASED ON 141 AREAS)

STEP	GRADE	NA-RATES					NL-RATES					NS-RATES				
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1		6,600	6,900	7,100	7,400	7,700	7,200	7,600	7,900	8,200	8,500	8,700	9,000	9,400	9,800	10,100
2		7,100	7,400	7,700	8,000	8,300	7,800	8,100	8,500	8,800	9,100	9,200	9,500	9,900	10,300	10,700
3		7,600	7,900	8,300	8,600	8,900	8,400	8,700	9,100	9,400	9,800	9,700	10,100	10,500	10,900	11,300
4		8,200	8,500	8,900	9,200	9,500	9,000	9,400	9,800	10,100	10,500	10,300	10,700	11,100	11,500	12,000
5		8,700	9,100	9,500	9,800	10,200	9,600	10,000	10,400	10,800	11,200	10,800	11,300	11,700	12,200	12,600
6		9,300	9,700	10,100	10,500	10,900	10,200	10,700	11,100	11,500	12,000	11,400	11,900	12,300	12,800	13,300
7		9,900	10,300	10,700	11,100	11,500	10,800	11,300	11,700	12,200	12,700	11,900	12,400	12,900	13,400	13,900
8		10,400	10,900	11,300	11,700	12,200	11,500	11,900	12,400	12,900	13,400	12,500	13,000	13,500	14,100	14,600
9		11,000	11,500	11,900	12,400	12,900	12,100	12,600	13,100	13,600	14,100	13,200	13,800	14,300	14,900	15,400
10		11,600	12,100	12,600	13,000	13,500	12,800	13,300	13,800	14,400	14,900	13,900	14,500	15,100	15,700	16,200
11		12,200	12,700	13,200	13,700	14,200	13,400	14,000	14,500	15,100	15,600	14,600	15,200	15,800	16,500	17,100
12		12,800	13,300	13,900	14,400	14,900	14,100	14,600	15,200	15,800	16,400	15,300	16,000	16,600	17,200	17,900
13		13,400	13,900	14,500	15,000	15,600	14,800	15,300	15,900	16,500	17,100	16,000	16,700	17,400	18,000	18,700
14		14,000	14,500	15,100	15,700	16,300	15,400	16,000	16,600	17,300	17,900	16,700	17,500	18,200	18,900	19,600
15		14,500	15,100	15,700	16,300	17,000	16,000	16,700	17,300	18,000	18,700	17,500	18,200	18,900	19,600	20,400
16												18,200	18,900	19,700	20,400	21,200
17												18,900	19,700	20,500	21,300	22,000
18												19,600	20,400	21,300	22,100	22,900
19												20,300	21,200	22,000	22,900	23,700

* Rates at Step 2, NA represent a simple average of 141 non-appropriated area wage schedules. Other rates are computed as defined in FPM Supplement 532-1, SS-11F. All numbers are rounded to the nearest \$100.00.

TABLE 4

MILITARY PAY

Monthly Basic Pay Effective 1 October 1980

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY GRADE	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS														
O-10**	3,942.90	4,081.50	4,081.50	4,081.50	4,081.50	4,238.10*	4,238.10*	4,562.70*	4,562.70*	4,889.10*	4,889.10*	5,216.10*	5,216.10*	5,541.60*
O-9	3,494.40	3,586.20	3,586.20	3,586.20	3,586.20	3,755.70	3,755.70	3,911.70	3,911.70	4,238.10*	4,238.10*	4,562.70*	4,562.70*	4,889.10*
O-8	3,165.00	3,259.80	3,259.80	3,259.80	3,259.80	3,434.60	3,434.60	3,605.00	3,605.00	3,931.70	3,931.70	4,258.10*	4,258.10*	4,584.50*
O-7	2,629.80	2,808.90	2,808.90	2,808.90	2,808.90	2,984.60	2,984.60	3,155.00	3,155.00	3,481.70	3,481.70	3,808.10*	3,808.10*	4,134.50*
O-6	1,949.40	2,128.00	2,128.00	2,128.00	2,128.00	2,303.60	2,303.60	2,474.00	2,474.00	2,799.70	2,799.70	3,126.10*	3,126.10*	3,452.50*
O-5	1,559.10	1,830.90	1,830.90	1,830.90	1,830.90	1,957.20	1,957.20	2,083.60	2,083.60	2,409.70	2,409.70	2,736.10*	2,736.10*	3,062.50*
O-4	1,314.30	1,599.90	1,599.90	1,599.90	1,599.90	1,726.20	1,726.20	1,852.60	1,852.60	2,178.70	2,178.70	2,505.10*	2,505.10*	2,831.50*
O-3	1,221.30	1,365.30	1,365.30	1,365.30	1,365.30	1,509.30	1,509.30	1,653.30	1,653.30	1,986.90	1,986.90	2,320.50*	2,320.50*	2,654.10*
O-2	1,064.70	1,163.10	1,163.10	1,163.10	1,163.10	1,261.50	1,261.50	1,359.90	1,359.90	1,693.50	1,693.50	2,027.10*	2,027.10*	2,360.70*
O-1	924.30	962.10	962.10	962.10	962.10	1,060.50	1,060.50	1,158.90	1,158.90	1,492.50	1,492.50	1,826.10*	1,826.10*	2,159.70*
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS ENLISTED MEMBERS														
O-3						1,614.90	1,692.00	1,751.20	1,847.40	1,939.20	2,016.90	2,016.90	2,016.90	2,016.90
O-2						1,444.20	1,474.20	1,521.00	1,599.90	1,661.40	1,707.00	1,707.00	1,707.00	1,707.00
O-1						1,163.10	1,242.30	1,288.20	1,334.70	1,381.20	1,444.20	1,444.20	1,444.20	1,444.20
WARRANT OFFICERS														
W-4	1,244.10	1,334.70	1,334.70	1,334.70	1,334.70	1,490.40	1,490.40	1,552.80	1,661.40	1,738.20	1,799.70	1,847.40	1,907.70	2,124.90
W-3	1,131.00	1,226.70	1,226.70	1,226.70	1,226.70	1,382.30	1,382.30	1,444.70	1,553.30	1,630.10	1,686.60	1,734.90	1,794.90	1,999.90
W-2	990.60	1,071.30	1,071.30	1,071.30	1,071.30	1,226.70	1,226.70	1,289.10	1,397.70	1,474.50	1,531.00	1,579.30	1,639.30	1,866.60
W-1	825.30	946.20	946.20	946.20	946.20	1,117.50	1,117.50	1,163.10	1,211.10	1,257.00	1,303.20	1,348.80	1,397.10	1,597.10
ENLISTED MEMBERS														
E-9***						1,183.90	1,219.20	1,231.00	1,231.00	1,231.00	1,231.00	1,231.00	1,231.00	1,231.00
E-8						1,023.30	1,023.30	1,023.30	1,023.30	1,023.30	1,023.30	1,023.30	1,023.30	1,023.30
E-7	828.00	891.70	927.00	927.00	927.00	992.10	992.10	992.10	992.10	992.10	992.10	992.10	992.10	992.10
E-6	715.20	779.70	812.40	812.40	812.40	878.10	878.10	878.10	878.10	878.10	878.10	878.10	878.10	878.10
E-5	627.90	683.40	716.40	716.40	716.40	776.50	776.50	776.50	776.50	776.50	776.50	776.50	776.50	776.50
E-4	603.60	637.50	674.70	674.70	674.70	727.20	727.20	727.20	727.20	727.20	727.20	727.20	727.20	727.20
E-3	580.50	612.30	636.90	636.90	636.90	662.10	662.10	662.10	662.10	662.10	662.10	662.10	662.10	662.10
E-2	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60	558.60
E-1	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30	501.30

* Basic Pay is limited to \$4,176.00 by Level V of the Executive Schedule.

** While serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or Commandant of the Marine Corps, basic pay for this grade is \$6,114.30 regardless of cumulative years of service.

*** While serving as Sergeant Major of the Army, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, or Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, basic pay for this grade is \$2,212.80 regardless of cumulative years of service.

TABLE 4 (Continued)

MONTHLY
BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS RATES
EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 1980

PAY GRADE	WITHOUT DEPENDENTS		WITH DEPENDENTS	BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE RATES
	FULL RATE ^{1/}	PARTIAL RATE ^{2/}		
O-10	427.80	50.70	535.20	\$82.58 per month
O-9	427.80	50.70	535.20	
O-8	427.80	50.70	535.20	Enlisted Members:
O-7	427.80	50.70	535.20	
O-6	384.00	39.60	468.60	When on leave or authorized to mess separately: \$3.94 per day
O-5	354.00	33.00	426.30	
O-4	315.30	26.70	380.40	When rations in-kind are not available: \$4.45 per day
O-3	277.20	22.20	342.00	
O-2	240.60	17.70	304.50	When assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no messing facilities of the United States are available: \$5.89 per day
O-1	187.80	13.20	244.50	
W-4	303.60	25.20	366.60	
W-3	270.90	20.70	333.90	
W-2	235.50	15.90	299.70	
W-1	212.70	13.80	275.40	
E-9	229.20	18.60	322.50	
E-8	211.20	15.30	297.90	
E-7	179.70	12.00	277.20	
E-6	163.20	9.90	255.00	
E-5	156.90	8.70	234.30	
E-4	138.30	8.10	206.10	
E-3	123.60	7.80	179.70	
E-2	109.20	7.20	179.70	
E-1	103.20	6.90	179.70	

^{1/} Payment of the full rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates for members of the uniformed services to personnel without dependents is authorized by 37 United States Code 403 and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

^{2/} Payment of the partial rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates to members of the uniformed services without dependents who, under 37 United States Code 403(b) or 403(c), are not entitled to the full rate of basic allowance for quarters, is authorized by 37 United States Code 1009(d) and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

TABLE 5

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS ENLISTED MEMBERS

TABLE 5 (Continued)
REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Assume All Cash RMC Pay Grade Averages)

PAY GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE															26
	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22			
WARRANT OFFICERS																
W-4								28,159	29,211	30,044	30,635	31,448	32,300	34,361		
W-3						23,080	24,094	24,703	25,312	25,907	26,537	27,347	28,145	28,983		
W-2		18,585	18,926	19,333	20,099	20,916	21,503	22,102	22,681	23,291	23,887	24,486	25,274			
W-1	15,381	16,889	16,892	17,882	18,465	19,048	19,631	20,244	20,831	21,417	21,992	22,614				
ALL WO	15,381	16,901	17,755	18,531	19,298	20,860	21,888	22,128	22,781	23,991	25,265	26,807	29,077	33,044		
ALL OFF	16,171	18,904	21,856	25,756	26,766	27,591	29,392	31,665	32,620	36,832	38,777	41,018	45,348	51,621		
ENLISTED MEMBERS																
M/S																
E-9																
E-8																
E-7																
E-6																
E-5																
E-4																
E-3																
E-2																
E-1																
ALL ENL	10,421	11,944	12,784	13,797	14,816	16,027	16,879	17,875	18,508	20,030	20,730	22,525	24,213	28,052		
ALL DOD	10,734	12,340	13,576	14,974	16,678	18,348	19,799	21,682	22,960	24,335	25,355	27,359	32,316	37,117		

DATA AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1980

TABLE 6
DAILY DRILL PAY PER TRAINING ASSEMBLY* -- RESERVE PERSONNEL

EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 1980

PAY GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE													
	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS														
O-8	105.50	97.28	99.59	99.59	99.59	107.02	107.02	112.08	112.08	116.73	121.80	126.47	131.54	131.54
O-7	87.66	83.82	83.82	83.82	87.57	87.57	92.66	92.66	97.28	107.02	114.37	114.37	114.37	114.37
O-6	64.98	71.40	76.06	76.06	76.06	76.06	76.06	76.06	78.64	91.09	95.75	97.82	103.50	112.25
O-5	51.97	61.03	65.24	65.24	65.24	65.24	67.23	70.83	75.57	81.23	85.90	88.49	91.58	91.58
O-4	43.81	53.33	56.90	56.90	57.94	60.52	64.64	68.28	71.40	74.52	76.59	76.59	76.59	76.59
O-3	40.71	45.51	48.65	53.83	56.40	58.44	61.58	64.64	66.23	66.23	66.23	66.23	66.23	66.23
O-2	35.49	38.77	46.57	48.14	49.14	49.14	49.14	49.14	49.14	49.14	49.14	49.14	49.14	49.14
O-1	30.81	32.07	38.77	38.77	38.77	38.77	38.77	38.77	38.77	38.77	38.77	38.77	38.77	38.77
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS ENLISTED MEMBERS														
O-3	0.	0.	0.	53.83	56.40	58.44	61.58	64.64	67.23	67.23	67.23	67.23	67.23	67.23
O-2	0.	0.	0.	48.14	49.14	50.70	53.33	55.38	56.90	56.90	56.90	56.90	56.90	56.90
O-1	0.	0.	0.	38.77	41.41	42.94	44.49	46.04	48.14	48.14	48.14	48.14	48.14	48.14
WARRANT OFFICERS														
W-4	41.47	44.49	44.49	45.51	47.58	49.68	51.76	55.38	57.94	59.99	61.58	63.59	65.72	70.83
W-3	37.70	40.89	40.89	41.41	41.90	44.95	47.58	49.14	50.70	52.22	53.83	55.91	57.94	59.99
W-2	33.02	35.71	35.71	36.75	38.77	40.89	42.43	43.99	45.51	47.10	48.65	50.19	52.22	52.22
W-1	27.51	31.54	31.54	34.17	35.71	37.25	38.77	40.37	41.90	43.44	44.96	46.57	46.57	46.57
ENLISTED MEMBERS														
E-9	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	47.12	48.19	49.28	50.42	51.54	52.54	55.31	60.68
E-8	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	39.53	40.64	41.72	42.81	43.93	44.95	46.05	48.76	54.20
E-7	27.60	29.79	30.90	31.97	33.07	34.11	35.21	36.30	37.39	38.48	39.57	40.66	43.37	48.76
E-6	23.84	25.99	27.08	28.22	29.27	30.34	31.45	32.54	33.63	34.72	35.81	36.90	38.00	39.09
E-5	20.93	22.78	23.88	24.92	26.55	27.63	28.74	29.79	30.34	30.34	30.34	30.34	30.34	30.34
E-4	20.12	21.25	22.49	24.24	25.20	25.20	25.20	25.20	25.20	25.20	25.20	25.20	25.20	25.20
E-3	19.35	20.41	21.23	22.07	22.07	22.07	22.07	22.07	22.07	22.07	22.07	22.07	22.07	22.07
E-2	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62	18.62
E-1	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71	16.71

* This table lists drill pay per training assembly. A training assembly comprises 4 hours. An individual normally attends, and is paid for, four training assemblies per 2-day weekend of reserve duty. Thus his daily rate of pay is twice the listed amount.

CHAPTER XI

MANPOWER AND FORCES BY LOCATION

A. U.S. Strategic Forces

END FY 1982 STRATEGIC FORCES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
1054 ICBM	CONUS	
24 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111)	1 Guam 23 CONUS	
33 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	1 Japan 32 CONUS	Deter nuclear and conventional attack against the US and our allies, our military forces, and bases. If deterrence should fail, support measures aimed at early war termination at the lowest possible level of conflict on terms acceptable to the US and our allies.
<u>ANGUS</u>		
13 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>USAFR</u>		
3 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>NAVY</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
34 SSBNs ^{1/}	Charleston, S.C.	
4 Submarine Tenders	Holy Loch, Scotland Guam, and Kings Bay, Georgia	
<u>Reserve</u>		
8 Submarine Tender Augmentation Units	CONUS	

^{1/} Includes one TRIDENT SSBN

DEFENSIVE

AIR FORCE

Active

5 Interceptor
Squadrons (F-15,
F-106)

CONUS

Airspace control and
crisis air defense.

ANGUS

10 Interceptor
Squadrons (F-4,
F-106)

CONUS

Airspace control and
crisis air defense.

B. U.S. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Forward deployments of U.S. tactical/mobility forces are shown in the first display below. In addition to location, this display provides the missions of deployed units. The second display shows the locations of units in or near the United States.

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

END FY 1982 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Army Divisions</u>		
1st Armored Division	W. Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other US forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack with a minimum of loss of NATO territory and ensure the prompt restoration of prewar boundaries.
3d Armored Division		
3d Infantry Division (M)		
8th Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 2d Armored Division		
Bde, 1st Cavalry Division		
2d Infantry Division	S. Korea	Force presence. Provides ground combat and security forces for South Korea.

Special Mission Brigades

Berlin Brigade	W. Germany	Force presence.
172d Infantry Brigade	Alaska	Defense of Alaska.
193d Infantry Brigade	Panama	Defense of the Panama Canal.

Armored Cavalry Regiments

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment	W. Germany	Force presence. Provides reconnaissance and security forces.
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment		

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Navy Ships and Aircraft</u>		
<u>Sixth Fleet 1/ 2/</u>	Mediterranean	Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean. Provide naval force in Mediterranean in the event of a NATO conflict. Provide crises management or contingency force in Mediterranean.
2 Multipurpose Carriers		
14 Surface Combatants		
15 Attack Submarines and Auxiliaries		
1 Amphibious Ready Group 3/		
1+ ASW Patrol Squadrons (12 aircraft)		
<u>Middle East Force 1/ 2/</u>	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.
1 Flagship (AGF)		
2 Surface Combatants		
<u>Seventh Fleet & Western Pacific 1/ 2/</u>	Western Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management of contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.
2 Multipurpose Carriers		
21 Surface Combatants		
13 Attack Submarines and Auxiliaries		
2 Amphibious Ready Groups 3/		
4 ASW Patrol Squadrons		

- 1/ Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from US homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, contain a few units selectively homeported overseas, including one CV homeported in Japan.
- 2/ SIXTH and SEVENTH Fleets are providing units from the assigned forward deployed forces to the Indian Ocean in response to JCS tasking for presence in that area.
- 3/ An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is one-ninth of an Amphibious Task Force (ATF). It consists of 6 to 9 amphibious ships with a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) or a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked. In WESTPAC the two ARGs consist of one MAU (afloat) and one BLT (administratively loaded).

Marine Corps Forces

Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Mediterranean	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.
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Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Atlantic Deployed afloat intermittently	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean.
3d Marine Division (-)	Japan (Okinawa)	Provide forward deployed ground/air combat forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.
1st Marine Aircraft Wing (-)	Japan (incl. Okinawa)	
<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Western Pacific	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Pacific and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)		

Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/

Europe

14 Squadrons	United Kingdom	Provide force presence in
16 Squadrons	West Germany	forward areas. Provide close
1 Squadron	Netherlands	air support, gain air superio-
3 Squadrons	Spain	rity, and provide interdiction
1 Squadron	Iceland	and reconnaissance for a Nato
5 Squadrons (Dual-based)	W. Germany,	conflict.
40	Italy, England.	
	(U.S. Based)	

Pacific

3 Squadrons	Philippines	Provide force presence.
4 Squadrons	Japan (Okinawa)	Provide close air support,
6 Squadrons	Korea	gain air superiority, and
13		provide interdiction and
		reconnaissance for
		an Asian conflict.

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, TACCS and airborne TACS squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces 1/

Europe 2/

2 Squadrons	W. Germany	Provides transportation
1 Squadron	United Kingdom	air logistic support,
		and aeromedical evacuation
		capability for theater forces.

Pacific

1 Squadron	Japan
2 Squadrons	Philippines

1/ Includes tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft.

2/ Includes rotational squadron.

UNITS IN OR NEAR THE UNITED STATES

END FY 1982 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Active Army</u>	
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
1st Infantry Division (M) 1/	Fort Riley, Kansas
2d Armored Division 1/	Fort Hood, Texas
4th Infantry Division (M)	Fort Carson, Colorado
1st Cavalry Division 1/	Fort Hood, Texas
9th Infantry Division	Fort Lewis, Washington
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
82d Airborne Division	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
7th Infantry Division 2/	Fort Ord, California
24th Infantry Division (M) 2/	Hunter/Stewart, Georgia
5th Infantry Division (M) 2/	Fort Polk, Louisiana
25th Infantry Division 2/	Hawaii

1/ These divisions each have one brigade in Europe.

2/ Composed of two active brigades and one from the reserve components.

Army Separate Brigades

194th Armored Brigade	Fort Knox, Kentucky
197th Infantry Brigade	Fort Benning, Georgia
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	Fort Hood, Texas

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
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Armored Cavalry Regiment

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Fort Bliss, Texas
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Reserve Components

Army Divisions

49th Armored Division	Texas
50th Armored Division	New Jersey, Vermont
40th Infantry Division (M)	California
38th Infantry Division	Indiana, Michigan
28th Infantry Division	Pennsylvania
26th Infantry Division	Massachusetts, Connecticut
42d Infantry Division	New York
47th Infantry Division	Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa

Army Separate Brigades 1/

30th Armored Brigade	Tennessee
31st Armored Brigade	Alabama
149th Armored Brigade	Kentucky
155th Armored Brigade	Mississippi
48th Mechanized Brigade 2/	Georgia
157th Mechanized Brigade	Pennsylvania (USAR)
218th Mechanized Brigade	South Carolina
256th Mechanized Brigade 2/	Louisiana
69th Mechanized Brigade	Kansas
29th Infantry Brigade 2/	Hawaii
32d Mechanized Brigade	Wisconsin
67th Mechanized Brigade	Nebraska
30th Mechanized Brigade	North Carolina
45th Infantry Brigade	Oklahoma
187th Infantry Brigade	Massachusetts (USAR)
39th Infantry Brigade	Arkansas
81st Mechanized Brigade	Washington
205th Infantry Brigade	Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa (USAR)
41st Infantry Brigade 2/	Oregon
53d Infantry Brigade	Florida
73d Infantry Brigade	Ohio
92d Infantry Brigade	Puerto Rico
58th Infantry Brigade	Maryland
116th Infantry Brigade	Virginia

1/ The 33d Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) is provided for school support and is not included.

2/ Round-out brigade for active Army division.

Unit

Location

Army Armored Cavalry Regiments

107th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Ohio, West Virginia
116th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Idaho, Oregon, Mississippi
163d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Montana, Texas
278th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Tennessee

Navy Ships and Aircraft

Active

Tycom/Second Fleet/Western Atlantic

4 Multipurpose Carriers

93 Surface Combatants

130 Attack Submarines, Patrol
Combatants, Mine Warfare
Ships, Amphibious Ships,
and Auxiliaries

10 ASW Patrol Squadrons

U.S. East Coast and Western
Atlantic

Tycom/Third Fleet/Eastern Pacific
 4 Multipurpose Carriers
 72 Surface Combatants
 106 Attack Submarines, Patrol
 Combatants, Amphibious Ships,
 and Auxiliaries
 8 ASW Patrol Squadrons

U.S. West Coast and Eastern
 Pacific

Reserve Components

Second Fleet and Western Atlantic
 7 Surface Combatants
 16 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious
 Ships
 3 Auxiliaries
 7 ASW Patrol Squadrons

U.S. East Coast and Western
 Atlantic

Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific
 2 Surface Combatants
 12 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships
 5 Auxiliaries
 6 ASW Patrol Squadrons

U.S. West Coast and Eastern
 Pacific

Unit

Location

Marine Corps Forces

Active

I MAF

(1st Marine Division/3d
 Marine Air Wing, 1st Force Service
 Support Group, plus supporting
 elements).

Camp Pendleton, Calif.; Marine
 Corps Air Station (MCAS), El
 Toro, Calif.; and Marine Corps
 Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif.

II MAF

(2d Marine Division/2d
 Marine Air Wing, 2d Force Service
 Support Group plus supporting
 elements).

Camp Lejeune, N.C.; MCAS,
 Cherry Point, N.C.;
 MCAS, New River, N.C.; and
 MCAS, Beaufort, S.C.

1st MARINE BRIGADE

(Regimental Landing Team 3/Marine
 Aircraft Group 24, plus supporting
 Brigade Service Support Group).

MCAS, Kaneohe Bay; and
 Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii

Reserve Components

DIVISION WING TEAM

(4th Marine Division/4th
 Marine Air Wing/4th
 Force Service Support
 Group).

Headquarters at New Orleans,
 Louisiana

Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/

Active

53 Squadrons 2/
49 CONUS
3 Alaska
1 Hawaii

CONUS, Alaska and
Hawaii

Reserve Components

59 Squadrons
57 CONUS
1 Puerto Rico
1 Hawaii

CONUS, Puerto Rico
and Hawaii

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, electronic combat, tanker/cargo (KC-10), TACCS, and airborne TACS squadrons.

2/ Excludes dual-based squadrons.

Unit

Location

Air Force Mobility Forces 1/

Active

28 Squadrons 2/
27 CONUS
1 Alaska

CONUS and Alaska

Reserve Components

54 Squadrons 3/
53 CONUS
1 Alaska

CONUS and Alaska

1/ Includes strategic and tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft. Does not include rescue or tanker/cargo aircraft.

2/ Excludes rotational squadrons.

3/ Includes C-130 reserve squadrons and C-5, C-141, and C-9 USAFR Associate Squadrons.

C. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country

The following tables show active duty military personnel strengths by regional area and country for FY 1980 through FY 1982.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1960

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY **	MARINE CORPS
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,050,826	777,036	557,969	527,352	188,469
ASHORE	1,840,046	777,036	557,969	326,027	179,014
AFLTAT	210,780	-	-	201,325	9,455
U.S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,562,100	519,182	445,886	443,350	153,702
CONTINENTAL U.S.	1,266,125	470,871	403,234	256,997	135,023
ALASKA	19,815	7,949	10,095	1,566	185
HAWAII	43,313	17,116	5,942	10,976	9,277
AMERICAN SAMOA	8	8	-	-	-
GUAM	9,083	18	3,859	4,790	386
JOHNSTON ATOLL	119	109	10	-	-
MIDWAY ISLANDS	488	-	-	498	-
PUERTO RICO	3,707	380	43	3,135	149
U.S. MISCELLANEOUS PACIFIC ISLANDS	7	-	-	-	7
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	10	7	1	2	-
WAKE ISLAND	7	-	7	-	-
TRANSIENTS	68,009	22,702	22,695	14,472	8,140
AFLTAT	151,429	-	-	150,894	535
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	488,726	257,874	112,083	84,002	34,767
ASHORE	429,375	257,874	112,083	33,571	26,847
AFLTAT	59,351	-	-	50,431	8,920
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	331,705	217,550	77,813	28,140	8,202
AUSTRIA	57	6	6	1	24
BELGIUM	2,114	1,343	836	108	27
CYPRUS	12	2	-	-	10
DENMARK	44	6	18	10	10
FINLAND	19	8	3	1	10
FRANCE	77	18	20	7	32
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)	244,320	207,698	36,043	276	101
GREECE	4,445	1,730	2,278	422	15
GREENLAND	2,287	-	287	-	-
ICELAND	2,668	2	1,049	1,700	117
IRELAND	7	2	4	-	1
ITALY	11,903	4,045	4,115	3,468	255
LUXEMBOURG	6	-	-	-	8
MALTA	1	1	-	-	-
NETHERLANDS	2,630	970	1,634	17	9
NORWAY	645	34	116	30	465
PORTUGAL	1,367	63	989	305	10
SPAIN	6,974	30	4,973	3,792	179
SWEDEN	17	1	5	4	7

NOTE: Strengths by country are based on early strength reports, and hence the total does not agree with the adjusted actual strengths used elsewhere in the report.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1980

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
SWITZERLAND	38	5	3	2	28
TURKEY*	5,269	1,178	4,003	69	19
UNITED KINGDOM*	24,312	211	21,829	2,162	310
AFLOAT	22,313	-	-	15,748	6,567
*EUROPEAN NATO	(300,287)	(217,488)	(72,819)	(8,594)	(1,378)
(2) EAST ASIA & PACIFIC					
AUSTRALIA	114,845	32,395	31,214	27,372	23,864
BURMA	644	6	243	387	8
CHINA	10	3	1	-	6
HAINLAND	12	3	3	-	6
TAIWAN ***	1	-	1	-	-
HONG KONG	39	6	5	12	16
INDONESIA	55	12	16	14	13
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	46,004	2,423	14,380	7,248	21,953
OKINAWA	(30,546)	(1,288)	(9,134)	(2,674)	(17,450)
MALAYSIA	16	6	2	-	7
NAURU	2	-	2	-	-
NEW ZEALAND	263	196	11	50	6
PHILIPPINES	13,387	40	7,757	4,905	885
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	39,780	29,647	8,770	285	78
SINGAPORE	23	4	1	11	7
THAILAND	95	49	22	10	14
AFLOAT	15,515	-	-	14,450	1,065
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA					
AFGHANISTAN	21,617	404	674	19,002	1,487
BAHRAIN	6	-	-	-	6
BANGLADESH	66	2	-	64	-
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY	7	-	-	-	7
CAMEROON	1,373	-	-	1,373	-
CONGO	6	-	-	-	6
EGYPT	7	-	-	-	7
ETHIOPIA	495	5	434	32	24
GABON	6	-	-	-	6
GHANA	11	3	-	-	8
INDIA	32	3	4	5	20
IRAN	21	6	3	3	9
ISRAEL	97	40	23	7	27
IVORY COAST	10	3	-	-	7
JORDAN	25	9	9	-	7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1980

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
KENYA	27	7	3	-	12
KUWAIT	22	14	1	1	6
LEBANON	21	2	4	-	15
LIBERIA	20	6	2	5	7
MADAGASCAR	6	-	-	1	7
MALAWI	2	2	-	-	-
MALI	6	-	-	-	6
MAURITIUS	6	-	-	-	6
MOROCCO	40	11	6	4	19
NEPAL	11	2	-	-	9
NIGER	6	-	-	-	6
NIGERIA	15	4	2	-	9
OMAN	5	3	1	-	1
PAKISTAN	31	5	6	1	19
ST. HELENA	1	-	1	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	502	284	150	58	12
SENEGAL	9	-	-	-	9
SEYCHELLES	4	-	4	-	-
SOMALIA	9	3	-	-	6
SOUTH AFRICA	17	1	3	2	11
SRI LANKA	9	-	-	3	6
SUDAN	13	2	2	-	9
SYRIA	12	2	-	-	10
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	9	-	1	-	9
TUNISIA	29	16	-	2	10
UPPER VOLTA	6	-	-	-	6
YEMEN (SANA)	20	9	5	-	6
ZAIRE	22	10	5	-	7
ZAMBIA	6	-	-	-	6
AFLOAT	16,559	-	-	17,443	1,116
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE	16,878	6,884	2,211	8,658	1,127
ANTIGUA	122	-	1	121	-
ARGENTINA	27	3	7	6	11
BAHAMAS, THE	47	-	7	34	6
BARBADOS	6	-	-	-	6
BERMUDA	1,350	-	-	1,268	84
BOLIVIA	16	6	3	-	7
BRAZIL	46	9	7	5	25
CANADA	691	26	249	400	16
CHILE	17	2	1	1	13
COLOMBIA	30	10	3	3	14

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1980

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
COSTA RICA	11	2	-	-	9
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,150	-	3	1,664	483
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	16	4	-	4	8
ECUADOR	21	4	6	2	9
EL SALVADOR	27	7	1	-	19
GUATEMALA	15	4	2	-	9
GUYANA	9	-	-	-	9
HAITI	13	3	1	-	9
HONDURAS	19	2	6	1	6
JAMAICA	13	-	-	-	13
MEXICO	29	12	3	1	13
NICARAGUA	12	3	1	-	8
PANAMA	9,146	6,771	1,886	325	162
PARAGUAY	11	2	1	1	7
PERU	26	6	6	3	9
URUGUAY	14	4	1	2	7
VENEZUELA	30	4	10	5	11
AFLOAT	2,964	-	-	2,792	172
(6) ANTARCTICA	76	-	-	76	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	176	65	24	6	81
BULGARIA	10	2	2	-	6
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	-	7
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	51	44	-	-	7
HUNGARY	11	3	1	-	7
POLAND	15	2	2	-	11
ROMANIA	13	3	2	-	8
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	46	7	6	-	26
YUGOSLAVIA	18	5	6	1	6
(7) UNDISTRIBUTED	3,427	526	147	2,750	4

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

** Includes 199 Reservists serving on full-time active duty and who are charged against Selected Reserve authorizations.

*** Under confinement.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TOTAL WORLDWIDE					
ASHORE	2,065,338	775,300	564,500	537,456	188,082
Afloat	1,855,720	775,300	564,500	334,605	181,315
	209,618	-	-	202,851	6,767
U.S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS					
CONTINENTAL U.S.	1,565,859	515,842	448,158	445,465	156,394
ALASKA	1,295,277	490,221	414,362	254,750	135,944
HAWAII	20,276	8,055	10,320	1,708	193
GUAM	44,743	17,384	6,156	11,697	9,306
JOHNSTON ATOLL	8,664	-	3,766	4,514	384
	21	12	9	-	-
MIDWAY ISLANDS	414	-	-	414	-
PUERTO RICO	2,800	138	44	2,475	143
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	59	32	-	27	-
U.S. MISCELLANEOUS PACIFIC ISLANDS	3	-	3	-	-
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	2	-	-	2	-
WAKE ISLAND	7	-	7	-	-
TRANSIENTS	48,418	-	13,491	25,748	9,179
Afloat	145,175	-	-	143,930	1,245
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES					
ASHORE	499,479	259,458	116,342	91,991	31,688
Afloat	435,036	259,458	116,342	33,070	26,166
	64,443	-	-	58,921	5,522
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE					
AUSTRIA	348,531	221,706	81,953	39,934	4,938
BELGIUM*	35	6	4	1	24
CYPRUS	2,114	1,319	649	115	31
DENMARK*	12	2	-	-	10
FINLAND	42	1	20	10	11
	20	5	3	2	10
FRANCE*	64	9	13	9	33
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	252,577	213,898	38,291	303	85
GREECE*	3,419	437	2,500	467	15
GREENLAND*	291	-	-	-	-
ICELAND*	3,059	2	1,096	1,852	109
IRELAND	15	2	7	-	6
ITALY*	12,395	3,805	4,328	4,002	260
LUXEMBOURG*	6	-	-	-	6
NETHERLANDS*	2,548	827	1,695	17	9
NORWAY*	214	47	116	38	13
PORTUGAL*	1,615	63	1,058	484	10
SPAIN	9,004	25	5,045	3,751	183
SWEDEN	18	1	6	4	7
SWITZERLAND	40	4	3	-	33

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TURKEY*	5,063	1,132	3,812	100	19
UNITED KINGDOM*	25,799	121	23,016	2,340	322
AFLOAT	30,181	-	-	26,439	3,742
*EUROPEAN NATO	(309,206)	(221,661)	(76,885)	(9,737)	(923)
(2) EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	132,987	30,488	32,092	45,015	25,392
AUSTRALIA	694	5	258	423	8
BURMA	10	2	2	-	6
CHINA	8	2	4	2	-
MAINLAND	42	6	5	16	15
HONG KONG	58	10	17	20	11
INDONESIA	47,724	2,355	14,810	7,737	22,822
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	12	3	2	-	7
MALAYSIA	67	2	9	50	6
NEW ZEALAND	13,754	14	8,075	4,989	678
PHILIPPINES	37,292	28,029	8,886	335	42
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	24	4	1	12	7
SINGAPORE	102	56	23	11	12
THAILAND	33,200	-	-	31,420	1,780
AFLOAT	3,838	427	293	2,730	388
AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	10	2	2	-	6
AFGHANISTAN	12	2	-	-	10
ALGERIA	1	-	1	-	-
ANGOLA	77	4	-	72	1
BAHRAIN	9	2	-	1	6
BANGLADESH	1,438	-	-	1,438	-
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY	8	2	-	-	6
CAMEROON	1	1	-	-	-
CHAD	9	-	3	-	6
CONGO	128	12	98	30	28
EGYPT	6	-	-	-	6
ETHIOPIA	6	-	-	-	6
GABON	11	3	-	-	8
GHANA	30	1	4	7	18
INDIA	103	38	28	9	28
ISRAEL	13	3	-	3	7
IVORY COAST	23	11	5	-	7
JORDAN	25	5	5	2	13
KENYA	16	8	1	3	6
KUWAIT	16	1	-	-	16
LEBANON	1	1	-	-	-

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
LIBERIA	18	5	2	4	7
MADAGASCAR	8	-	-	1	7
MALAWI	2	2	-	-	-
MALJ	6	-	-	-	6
MAURITIUS	6	-	-	-	6
MOROCCO	41	9	4	13	15
NEPAL	9	2	-	-	7
NIGER	9	3	-	-	6
NIGERIA	12	-	3	-	9
OMAN	3	-	1	1	1
PAKISTAN	32	4	8	3	17
ST. HELENA	11	-	11	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	497	274	141	69	13
SENEGAL	11	-	-	2	9
SEYCHELLES	4	-	4	-	-
SOMALIA	8	2	-	-	6
SOUTH AFRICA	21	2	3	4	12
SRI LANKA	9	-	-	3	6
SUDAN	17	3	3	-	11
SYRIA	11	2	-	-	9
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	9	-	-	-	9
TUNISIA	19	7	1	2	9
UGANDA	10	-	-	-	10
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	4	4	-	-	-
UPPER VOLTA	6	-	-	-	6
YEMEN (SANA)	12	6	-	-	6
ZAIRE	21	9	5	-	7
ZAMBIA	6	-	-	-	6
ZIMBABWE	10	-	-	-	10
AFLOAT	1,062	-	-	1,062	-
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	13,944	6,777	1,982	4,299	886
ANTIGUA	120	-	1	119	-
ARGENTINA	26	4	6	5	11
BAHAMAS, THE	42	-	1	35	6
BARBADOS	10	-	-	4	6
BERMUDA	1,452	-	-	1,372	80
BOLIVIA	17	5	4	1	7
BRAZIL	56	10	6	16	24
CANADA	827	5	213	598	11
CHILE	14	2	-	-	12
COLOMBIA	22	2	3	4	13

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
COSTA RICA	11	2	-	-	9
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,177	-	-	1,756	421
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	23	9	1	4	9
ECUADOR	24	2	-	3	19
EL SALVADOR	23	2	2	-	19
GUATEMALA	13	2	1	1	9
GUYANA	6	-	-	-	6
HAITI	12	3	1	-	8
HONDURAS	20	4	7	1	8
JAMAICA	10	-	-	1	9
MEXICO	26	6	4	3	13
NICARAGUA	14	4	1	1	8
PANAMA	8,924	6,709	1,714	355	146
PARAGUAY	10	1	1	1	7
PERU	21	2	5	5	9
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	1	-	1	-	-
URUGUAY	14	1	2	4	7
VENEZUELA	29	2	8	10	9
(5) ANTARCTICA	-	-	-	-	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	179	60	22	13	64
BULGARIA	10	2	2	-	6
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	-	7
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	45	37	-	-	8
HUNGARY	13	4	1	1	7
POLAND	17	3	2	1	11
ROMANIA	14	3	2	1	8
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	50	7	7	8	28
YUGOSLAVIA	19	3	5	2	9
(5) ANTARCTICA	-	-	-	-	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	179	60	22	13	64
(7) UNDISTRIBUTED	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,106,301	817,740	554,833	545,628	188,100
ASHORE	1,889,308	817,740	554,833	335,402	181,333
AFLTAT	216,993	-	-	210,226	6,767
U.S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,605,812	559,505	437,009	452,912	156,386
CONTINENTAL U.S.	1,325,842	533,643	401,483	254,753	135,963
ALASKA	20,634	8,024	10,714	1,703	193
HAWAII	45,167	17,656	6,276	11,917	9,318
GUAM	8,720	-	3,806	4,530	-
JOHNSTON ATOLL	21	12	9	-	-
MIDWAY ISLANDS	108	-	-	108	-
PUERTO RICO	2,851	138	44	2,526	143
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	59	32	-	27	-
U.S. MISCELLANEOUS PACIFIC ISLANDS	3	-	3	-	-
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	2	-	-	2	-
WAKE ISLAND	7	-	7	-	-
TRANSIENTS	49,974	-	14,667	26,167	9,140
AFLTAT	152,424	-	-	151,179	1,245
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	500,489	258,235	117,824	92,716	31,714
ASHORE	435,920	258,235	117,824	33,669	26,192
AFLTAT	64,569	-	-	59,047	5,522
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	348,750	220,941	82,531	40,340	4,938
AUSTRIA	33	6	2	1	24
BELGIUM*	2,129	1,332	649	117	31
CYPRUS	12	2	-	-	10
DENMARK*	42	1	20	10	11
FINLAND	19	5	2	2	10
FRANCE*	65	9	13	10	33
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	251,859	213,103	38,366	305	85
GREECE*	3,451	438	2,522	476	15
GREENLAND*	285	-	285	-	-
ICELAND*	3,110	2	1,095	1,904	109
IRELAND	8	2	-	-	6
ITALY*	12,357	3,820	4,291	3,986	280
LUXEMBOURG*	6	-	-	-	6
NETHERLANDS*	2,566	827	1,713	17	9
NORWAY*	213	47	115	38	13
PORTUGAL*	1,627	63	1,069	485	10
SPAIN	6,804	25	4,823	3,773	183
SWEDEN	18	1	5	4	7
SWITZERLAND	40	4	3	-	33

NOTE: Due to data base errors which could not be corrected in time for this report, the strengths for Continental U.S. and total worldwide are in error. They should be corrected as follows: Army -31,440, Air Force +14,667, and Navy +4,072.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TURKEY*	5,087	1,132	3,836	100	19
UNITED KINGDOM*	26,607	122	23,721	2,442	322
AFLOAT	30,412	-	-	26,670	3,742
*EUROPEAN NATO	(309,404)	(220,896)	(77,695)	(9,890)	(923)
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	133,396	30,051	32,999	44,953	25,393
AUSTRALIA	696	5	258	425	8
BURMA	10	2	2	-	6
CHINA	8	2	4	2	-
MAINLAND	42	6	5	16	15
HONG KONG	48	10	17	10	11
INDONESIA	48,203	2,372	15,227	7,781	22,823
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	12	3	2	-	7
MALAYSIA	67	2	9	50	6
NEW ZEALAND	13,719	14	8,032	4,997	676
PHILIPPINES	37,375	27,575	9,420	338	42
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	24	4	1	12	7
SINGAPORE	101	56	22	11	12
THAILAND	33,091	-	-	31,311	1,780
AFLOAT	4,217	404	292	3,112	409
AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	10	2	2	-	6
AFGHANISTAN	12	2	-	-	10
ALGERIA	1	-	1	-	-
ANGOLA	77	4	-	72	1
BAHRAIN	9	2	-	1	6
BANGLADESH	1,839	-	-	1,839	-
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY	8	2	-	-	6
CAMEROON	7	1	-	-	6
CHAD	9	-	3	-	6
CONGO	100	12	58	2	28
EGYPT	6	-	-	-	6
ETHIOPIA	6	-	-	-	6
GABON	11	3	-	-	8
GHANA	30	1	4	7	18
INDIA	103	38	28	9	28
ISRAEL	13	3	-	3	7
IVORY COAST	23	11	5	-	7
JORDAN	25	5	5	2	13
KENYA	16	6	1	3	6
KUWAIT					

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
LEBANON	18	1	-	1	16
LIBERIA	18	5	2	4	7
MADAGASCAR	8	-	-	1	7
MALAWI	2	2	-	-	-
MALI	6	-	-	-	6
MAURITIUS	6	-	-	-	6
MOROCCO	41	9	4	13	15
NEPAL	9	2	-	-	7
NIGER	9	3	-	-	6
NIGERIA	12	-	3	-	9
OMAN	3	-	1	1	1
PAKISTAN	32	4	8	3	17
QATAR	6	-	-	-	6
ST. HELENA	11	-	11	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	476	251	140	72	13
SENEGAL	11	-	-	2	9
SEYCHELLES	4	-	4	-	-
SOMALIA	8	2	-	-	6
SOUTH AFRICA	21	2	3	4	12
SRI LANKA	9	-	-	3	6
SUDAN	17	3	3	-	11
SYRIA	11	2	-	-	9
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	9	-	-	-	9
TUNISIA	19	7	1	2	9
UGANDA	10	-	-	-	10
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	4	4	-	-	-
UPPER VOLTA	6	-	-	-	6
YEMEN (SANA)	12	6	-	-	6
ZAIRE	21	9	5	-	7
ZAMBIA	6	-	-	-	6
ZIMBABWE	10	-	-	-	10
AFLSAT	1,066	-	-	1,066	-
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	13,950	6,779	1,983	4,298	890
ANTIGUA	122	-	1	121	-
ARGENTINA	25	4	6	5	11
BAHAMAS, THE	42	-	1	35	6
BARBADOS	10	-	-	4	6
BERMUDA	1,462	-	-	1,382	80
BOLIVIA	17	5	4	1	7
BRAZIL	56	10	6	16	24

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1982

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
CANADA	749	5	213	520	11
CHILE	14	2	-	-	12
COLOMBIA	21	2	3	3	13
COSTA RICA	11	2	-	-	9
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,245	-	-	1,820	425
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	23	9	1	4	9
ECUADOR	24	2	-	3	19
EL SALVADOR	23	2	2	-	19
GUATEMALA	12	2	1	-	9
GUYANA	6	-	-	-	6
HAITI	12	3	1	-	8
HONDURAS	20	4	7	-	8
JAMAICA	10	-	-	1	8
MEXICO	26	6	4	3	9
NICARAGUA	14	4	1	1	13
PANAMA	6,930	6,711	1,715	358	8
PARAGUAY	10	1	-	-	146
PERU	21	2	5	5	7
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	1	-	1	-	9
URUGUAY	14	1	2	4	-
VENEZUELA	29	2	8	10	7
(5) ANTARCTICA	-	-	-	-	9
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	176	60	19	13	-
BULGARIA	10	2	2	-	84
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	-	8
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	45	37	-	-	7
HUNGARY	13	4	1	-	8
POLAND	16	3	1	1	7
ROMANIA	13	3	1	1	11
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	50	7	7	1	8
YUGOSLAVIA	18	3	4	2	28
(5) ANTARCTICA	-	-	-	-	9
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	176	60	19	13	-
(7) UNDISTRIBUTED	-	-	-	-	84

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

CHAPTER XII

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

A. Introduction

This chapter provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1981.

B. Structure Changes

The FY 1975 and FY 1976 Senate Armed Services Committee reports discussed the need for improvements in the DPPCs. In response, the Department undertook a major restructuring of the DPPCs. That effort and the resulting manpower shifts were reported in the FY 1977, FY 1978, and FY 1979 DMRRs. Originally scheduled for implementation at the same time was a restructuring of the Base Operations DPPC; however, this became ensnarled in the bureaucracy and was not implemented until the spring of 1980.

The base operations restructuring creates base operations program elements for the base operations resources in R&D and in industrially funded activities. In this report those program elements are shown under the Base Operations DPPC. The other major improvement from this change is a standardization of the definition for base operations across all Services except the Air Force; see page VI-26.

Manpower shifts from the base operations change as well as from other changes are displayed in this chapter. They do not affect total manpower but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions which alter the manner of accounting for manpower. The manpower shifts since the FY 1982 DMRR are displayed in the following table.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 80	FY 81	FY 80	FY 82
ARMY						
BOS Restructure						
	Research & Development	BOS	1.0	1.0	1.0	6.2
	Central Logistics	Centralized Support	.2	.2	.1	.1
	Central Logistics	BOS	1.2	1.2	11.1	11.1
	Personnel Spt.	BOS	.2	.2	.1	.1
	Intelligence	BOS	.1	.1	.2	.2
	Mobility Forces	BOS	.1	.1	.7	.7
	Centralized Spt.	Division Forces	.6	.4	.3	.2
	BOS	Division Forces	1.2	1.2	8.3	12.4
	Medical Spt.	BOS	-	*	-	.2
	Force Spt. Tng.	BOS	-	.1	-	.1
	Land Forces	BOS	-	.4	-	.8
	Individual Tng.	BOS	-	.1	-	.3
Audio-Visual Restructure						

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 80	FY 81	FY 80	FY 82
<u>Navy</u>						
Trident Base Support	Offensive Strategic Forces	Base Operating Support			0.9	0.9
Cruise Missile Support	Offensive Strategic Forces	Tactical Air Forces			0.2	0.2
FBM Control System	Strategic Control & Surv'l Forces	Central Logistics			0.1	0.1
WMCCS	Strategic Control & Surv'l Forces	Naval Forces			0.1	0.1
Aviation Support	Naval Forces	Central Logistics			*	*
Navy Command Control System	Naval Forces	Central Logistics			0.1	0.1
Satellite Comms	Centrally Mgd Comms	Central Logistics			0.1	0.1
Navy Research Lab	Research & Development	Base Operating Support			1.1	1.1
NORDA/Nav Bio Sciences Lab	Research & Development	Base Operating Support			*	*
CRYPTO Activities	Intelligence	Base Operating Support	1.0	1.0	0.5	0.5
Communications Activities	Centrally Mgd Comms	Base Operating Support	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.4
Weather Serv/Oceanography/ Geodesy	Geophysical Activities	Base Operating Support	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3
Supply Depots/ICP/Procurement Activities	Central Logistics	Base Operating Support			2.5	2.5
Real Estate & Construction Activities	Central Logistics	Base Operating Support			0.5	0.5

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82
<u>Navy (continued)</u>								
Education Equipment & Support Centers	Force Support Training	Base Operating Support				0.1	0.1	0.1
Hospitals/Medical/Dental Ctr.	Medical Support	Base Operating Support				1.3	1.3	1.3
Medical Schools	Individual Training	Base Operating Support	0.9	0.9	0.9	*	*	*
Naval Home	Personnel Support	Base Operating Support	*	*	*	0.1	0.1	0.1
Reserve Personnel Center	Centralized Support Activities	Base Operating Support				0.4	0.4	0.4
WARDACs	Central Logistics	Centralized Support	*	0.4	0.4	2.1	2.1	2.1
CRYPTO Training	Individual Training	Base Operating Support	0.2	0.2	0.2			
Personnel Mobilization Teams	Individual Training	Base Operating Support	0.4	0.8	0.8			
Printing Consolidation	Base Operating Support	Central Logistics				0.1	0.1	0.1
	Research & Development	Central Logistics				0.1	0.1	0.1

*Less than 50.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 80	FY 81	FY 82	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82
<u>MARINE CORPS</u>								
No Changes								
<u>AIR FORCE</u>								
Eastern Test Range		BOS	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3
Space/MSL Test Center		BOS	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3
Electro Magnetic Combat Support		Tactical Air Force	*	0.4	0.4	1.0	1.0	1.0
Base OPS - RDT&E		BOS	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.4	2.2	2.2
Real Property Maintenance (RDT&E)		BOS	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0